Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects emails from free-mail domains (@mail.com or @outlook.com) that contain a specific malicious infrastructure indicator in the InternetMessageId or originate from a known suspicious IP address associated with TA419-style spoofing campaigns. This indicates the email was relayed through unauthorized infrastructure rather than the expected legitimate mail providers.
Detects credential stuffing in Entra ID sign-in logs: one source IP failing against many distinct accounts within an hour, then succeeding on a small number of them.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
This rule detects network communication, DNS queries, email interactions, and URL clicks associated with known TA419 threat actor infrastructure. It monitors multiple telemetry sources to identify indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as specific domains, IP addresses, and email addresses.
This rule detects network communication, DNS queries, email interactions, and URL clicks associated with known TA419 threat actor infrastructure. It monitors multiple telemetry sources to identify indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as specific domains, IP addresses, and email addresses.
Detects a multi-stage social engineering chain attributed to TA419. The activity begins with a benign trust-building email from specific domains or addresses, followed by a subsequent email to the same recipient containing a link to a known URL shortener or redirector, indicating a potential AitM phishing sequence.
Detects Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) sign-in attempts that use the specific, hardcoded User-Agent string associated with the TeamFiltration tool. This tool is frequently used for mass credential testing against Microsoft 365 environments. The detection looks for a suspicious and outdated combination of Teams, Electron, and Chrome versions that would not be present in legitimate, modern Microsoft Teams client traffic.
Detects M365 Copilot impersonation and roleplay jailbreak attempts where users try to manipulate the AI into adopting alternate personas, behaving as unrestricted entities, or impersonating malicious AI systems to bypass safety controls. The detection searches exported eDiscovery prompt logs for roleplay keywords like "pretend you are," "act as," "you are now," "amoral," and "roleplay as" in the Subject_Title field. Prompts are categorized into specific impersonation types (AI_Impersonation, Malicious_AI_Persona, Unrestricted_AI_Persona, etc.) to identify attempts to override the AI's safety guardrails through persona injection attacks.
This rule monitors for network and user interaction with known phishing domains that impersonate Microsoft, Outlook, or Teams services. It aggregates data from DNS queries, device network connections, inbound email URL links, and web URL click events to identify potential phishing attempts using a community-sourced watchlist from phishunt.io.
Detects a multi-stage social engineering chain attributed to TA419. The activity begins with a benign trust-building email from specific domains or addresses, followed by a subsequent email to the same recipient containing a link to a known URL shortener or redirector, indicating a potential AitM phishing sequence.
Detects a multi-stage social engineering chain attributed to TA419. The activity begins with a benign trust-building email from specific domains or addresses, followed by a subsequent email to the same recipient containing a link to a known URL shortener or redirector, indicating a potential AitM phishing sequence.
Hunting query, not intended as a scheduled alert.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Detects instances where a user account registers or modifies MFA authentication methods (such as phone numbers or apps) for a different user account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker with administrative privileges attempting to establish persistence on a target account by adding their own MFA device.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
This rule detects incoming phishing emails that use specific financial or payment-related lures (e.g., 'eft wire transfer', 'invoice receipt') in the subject line or body to entice users into clicking a link that points directly to an executable file, often disguised as a document.
Detects inbound phishing emails containing brand mentions for Signal, WhatsApp, or Telegram alongside lure phrases related to verification, 2FA, or device linking. The rule specifically filters for emails containing URLs while excluding messages originating from official domains associated with these services.
Detects credential stuffing in Entra ID sign-in logs: one source IP failing against many distinct accounts within an hour, then succeeding on a small number of them.
Detects credential stuffing in Entra ID sign-in logs: one source IP failing against many distinct accounts within an hour, then succeeding on a small number of them.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
This analytic detects mailbox rule creation, a common technique used in Business Email Compromise. It uses a scoring mechanism to identify a combination of attributes often featured in mailbox rules created by attackers. This may indicate that an attacker has gained access to the account.
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