Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when high-privilege application permissions (e.g., Directory.ReadWrite.All, Application.ReadWrite.All) are granted to a service principal via admin consent. This behavior can be used by attackers to gain persistent, stealthy administrative access to a Microsoft Entra ID tenant.
This rule detects when a user registers or adds a new device in Entra ID within a short timeframe (two hours) of experiencing a risky sign-in or a password reset. It specifically flags registrations involving potentially unmanaged, non-compliant, or unusually trusted devices, which may indicate an attempt to establish persistent access or bypass Conditional Access policies.
Detects the registration of a new MFA authentication method on an Entra ID account from an unrecognized IP or device, occurring in close temporal proximity to a password reset or a risky sign-in event. This behavior is indicative of an adversary establishing persistence via self-service MFA registration after compromising user credentials.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) cross-tenant access settings where a new partner is added or inbound trust settings (such as MFA or device compliance) are enabled for an external tenant. This activity may indicate an attempt to establish a persistent backdoor or facilitate initial access into the environment via a compromised or malicious external identity provider.
This rule detects anomalous activity involving cloud-based shell services (AWS CloudShell, Azure Cloud Shell, GCP Cloud Shell). It triggers on two main conditions: (1) First-time usage of these shell environments by a principal within the detection window, and (2) The execution of commands associated with data staging, ingress tool transfer, or exfiltration (e.g., curl, wget, storage copy commands).
Detects unauthorized sharing, copying, or exporting of EBS, disk, or database snapshots to external cloud accounts, subscriptions, or projects that are not present in the defined trusted allow-list for AWS, Azure, or GCP environments.
This rule detects the creation or modification of recurring cloud automation tasks (AWS EventBridge rules, Azure Automation Runbooks/Logic Apps, and GCP Cloud Scheduler jobs). Adversaries leverage these features to establish persistent access to a cloud environment by ensuring malicious code or scripts execute automatically, even after initial compromised credentials have been revoked.
Detects modifications to cloud-based IAM trust policies or resource policies that grant access to an external account, tenant, or project. This activity can indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistent backdoor access via cross-account trust relationships, bypassing standard identity controls.
Detects modifications to cloud security guardrails including AWS Service Control Policies (SCPs), Azure Policy assignments/exemptions, and GCP Organization Policies. These actions may indicate an attempt to disable security controls or weaken organizational policy enforcement.
This rule detects scenarios where a new credential (password or key) is added to a service principal or application, followed by an authentication event using that service principal within a short window (1 hour). This pattern is indicative of potential credential injection or persistence attempts, where an attacker adds a secret and immediately leverages it to establish access.
This rule detects scenarios where a new credential (password or key) is added to a service principal or application, followed by an authentication event using that service principal within a short window (1 hour). This pattern is indicative of potential credential injection or persistence attempts, where an attacker adds a secret and immediately leverages it to establish access.
Detects the addition of certificate-type credentials (AsymmetricX509Cert, usage=Verify) to Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) applications or service principals. This behavior is indicative of an attacker adding an adversary-controlled certificate to impersonate an application or service principal to achieve persistent, long-lived access.
Detects the suspicious sequence of adding a domain or changing federation settings followed rapidly by a configuration update to the federated domain. This pattern is indicative of an adversary establishing a covert federated backdoor for persistent, delegated authentication, allowing bypass of standard credential rotation mechanisms.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) applications, service principals, or Application Proxy configurations that could be indicative of an adversary establishing persistent external access. This includes updates to external URLs, SSO settings, and authentication types, which are frequently used to facilitate persistence via malicious cloud application configurations.
This rule detects administrative changes to Conditional Access (CA) policies in Entra ID (Azure AD), specifically monitoring for the disabling of policies, transitioning them to report-only mode, or the removal of critical security grant controls such as MFA or Compliant Device requirements. It also alerts on the outright deletion of any CA policy, which could indicate an adversary attempting to bypass security controls or maintain persistent access.
Detects Azure Activity Log events where a Storage Account is modified to enable public network access, public blob access, or container-level public access. Such misconfigurations can lead to unauthorized data exposure and exfiltration by internet-based actors.
This rule detects suspicious activities targeting cloud management hierarchy, specifically identifying attempts to remove AWS accounts from organizations, disable policy enforcement, create rogue accounts, or hijack Azure subscriptions through unauthorized transfers or tenant changes. Such actions are often used by adversaries to bypass security guardrails, remove organizational visibility, or establish persistent unauthorized access within a cloud environment.
Detects high-privilege IAM role assignments in Google Cloud Platform and Microsoft Azure environments. The rule specifically monitors for assignments of overly permissive roles (e.g., Owner, Global Administrator, or wildcard actions) that could allow for full environment compromise or persistence.
Detects the deployment of virtual machines with public IP addresses (in Azure) or compute instances with external IP addresses (in GCP) by a single principal within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a newly-privileged identity or an compromised account establishing externally-accessible infrastructure for further malicious activity.
Detects potential abuse of Cloud Shell to persist access in cloud environments. For GCP, it monitors the injection of SSH keys into instance or project metadata from a Cloud Shell session. For Azure, it detects a pattern involving Cloud Shell storage provisioning followed by a subsequent VM run-command or SSH public key update, indicating potential unauthorized management of virtual machines.
Detects the creation of new service principal credentials in Azure AD or GCP service account keys targeting identities holding highly privileged administrative roles. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes long-term access to a cloud environment by creating new, controlled credentials for an existing privileged identity.
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