Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
164 detections
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The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects modifications to Cisco device configurations that could be used by an adversary for persistence, privilege escalation, or to impact system availability. Specifically, it looks for commands related to enabling HTTP/HTTPS servers, configuring Kron jobs (scheduled tasks), modifying access lists, archiving configurations, and setting NTP servers. These commands, if used maliciously, can allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary commands, control network access, or disrupt time synchronization.
Detects potential exploitation of Cisco SNMP vulnerability (CVE-2025-20352) by identifying shell command patterns within SNMP traffic, indicative of remote code execution attempts as seen in Operation Zero Disco.
This analytic detects suspicious data transfer activities involving the use of the `split` syscall with the `-b` option, which specifies the size of each output file. This technique can be used by attackers to evade detection by breaking large files into smaller parts, bypassing size-based security controls, and facilitating covert exfiltration of sensitive data. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized use of the `split` syscall with a specified block size, this analytic helps identify potential data exfiltration attempts.
This analytic identifies the bulk creation of ransomware notes (e.g., .txt, .html, .hta files) on an infected machine. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 11 to detect multiple instances of these file types being created within a short time frame (10 seconds). A detection is triggered if 15 or more unique readme paths are observed. This activity is a strong indicator of an active ransomware attack, where the attacker is notifying the victim of the encryption. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to widespread data encryption, rendering critical files inaccessible and potentially causing significant operational disruption.
The following analytic detects suspicious attempts to find credentials stored in password stores, indicating a potential attacker's effort to access sensitive login information. Password stores are critical repositories that contain valuable credentials, and unauthorized access to them can lead to significant security breaches. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized activities related to password store access, this analytic helps identify potential credential theft attempts, allowing security teams to respond promptly and prevent unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others. It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path, and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
The following analytic detects MSIExec making network connections over ports 443 or 80. This behavior is identified by correlating process creation events from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents with network traffic logs. Typically, MSIExec does not perform network communication to the internet, making this activity unusual and potentially indicative of malicious behavior. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could be using MSIExec to download or communicate with external servers, potentially leading to data exfiltration, command and control (C2) communication, or further malware deployment.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's download methods such as "DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest and its aliases "IWR" or "Curl". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity can be significant as such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected system.
The analytic detects the use of Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to make remote HTTP or HTTPS connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments containing URLs. This activity is significant because adversaries often use mshta.exe to download and execute remote .hta files, bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network infiltration.
The analytic detects the use of Windows Curl.exe to download a file to a suspicious location, such as AppData, ProgramData, or Public directories. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that include the -O or --output options. This activity is significant because downloading files to these locations can indicate an attempt to bypass security controls or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) loading a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file from a remote URL. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing URLs. This activity is significant as it can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, potentially leading to unauthorized code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to run scripts using engines like JScript or VBScript, leading to further system compromise or data exfiltration.
Detects the execution of a packet capture command with a specific buffer size known to be used by the LINE VIPER malware on Cisco ASA devices. LINE VIPER is a sophisticated malware designed to target Cisco ASA devices, often deployed by the RayInitiator bootkit.
Detects exploitation attempts against common network edge devices (Cisco, Ivanti, Palo Alto) associated with Salt Typhoon's TTPs for initial access.
This analytic detects unexpected outbound network connections initiated by known webserver processes such as `httpd.exe`, `nginx.exe`, or `tomcat.exe` to common file sharing or public content hosting services like GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin. Webservers are rarely expected to perform outbound downloads, especially to dynamic or anonymous file hosting domains. This behavior is often associated with server compromise, where an attacker uses a reverse shell, webshell, or injected task to fetch malware or tools post-exploitation. The detection leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module flow data, enriched with process context, to identify this highly suspicious behavior.
This detection identifies a single MAC address rapidly appearing on multiple switch ports within a short time frame. This behavior, known as MAC flapping, is a strong indicator of a network loop, which can cause broadcast storms and degrade or disable network services.
The analytic detects outbound network connections from an endpoint process to suspicious or non-standard ports. It uses Cisco Network Visibility Module flow data to identify processes communicating over ports like 4444, 2222, or 51820, which are commonly associated with tools such as Metasploit, SliverC2, other penetration testing tools, red team activities, or malware. These connections warrant further investigation, especially when initiated by unexpected or non-network-native binaries.
This analytic detects changes to SNMP community strings on Cisco devices, which could indicate an attacker establishing persistence or attempting to extract credentials. After gaining initial access to network devices, threat actors like Static Tundra often modify SNMP configurations to enable unauthorized monitoring and data collection. This detection specifically looks for the configuration of SNMP community strings with read-write (rw) or read-only (ro) permissions, as well as the configuration of SNMP hosts that may be used to exfiltrate data. These activities are particularly concerning as they may represent attempts to establish persistent access or extract sensitive information from compromised devices.
This analytic detects the configuration of TFTP services on Cisco IOS devices that could be used to exfiltrate sensitive configuration files. Threat actors like Static Tundra have been observed configuring TFTP servers to make device configuration files accessible for exfiltration after gaining initial access. The detection specifically looks for commands that expose critical configuration files such as startup-config, running-config, and other sensitive system information through TFTP. This activity is particularly concerning as it may represent an attempt to steal credentials, network topology information, and other sensitive data stored in device configurations.
This analytic detects the creation or modification of network interfaces on Cisco devices, which could indicate an attacker establishing persistence or preparing for lateral movement. After gaining initial access to network devices, threat actors like Static Tundra often create new interfaces (particularly loopback interfaces) to establish covert communication channels or maintain persistence. This detection specifically looks for the configuration of new interfaces, interface state changes, and the assignment of IP addresses to interfaces. These activities are particularly concerning when they involve unusual interface names or descriptions containing suspicious terms.
This analytic identifies non-browser processes reaching out to public IP lookup or geolocation services. These services are commonly used by legitimate tools, but their usage outside of browsers may indicate network reconnaissance, virtual machine detection, or staging by malware. This activity is observed in post-exploitation frameworks, stealer malware, and advanced threat actor campaigns. The detection relies on Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) telemetry and excludes known browser processes to reduce noise.
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