Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects attempts to stop security-related services on an endpoint, which may indicate malicious activity. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for processes involving the "sc.exe" or "net.exe" command with the "stop" parameter or the PowerShell "Stop-Service" cmdlet. This activity is significant because disabling security services can undermine the organization's security posture, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further attacks like malware installation or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could compromise the endpoint and the entire network, necessitating immediate investigation and response.
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) using InfoTech Storage Handlers to load Windows script code from a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant because it can be used to execute malicious scripts embedded within CHM files, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the creation of a program executable in an unquoted service path, a common technique for privilege escalation. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is 'services.exe'. This activity is significant because unquoted service paths can be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain higher-level access, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent control over the affected endpoint.
The following analytic identifies the abuse of Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code, specifically detecting the loading of "scrobj.dll" by Regsvr32.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line executions. This activity is significant because Regsvr32.exe is a trusted, signed Microsoft binary, often used in "Squiblydoo" attacks to bypass application control mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise and persistent access.
The following analytic detects the usage of the SharpHound binary by identifying its original filename, `SharpHound.exe`, and the process name. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process metadata and command-line executions. SharpHound is a tool used for Active Directory enumeration, often by attackers during the reconnaissance phase. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out the network, identify high-value targets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation and lateral movement within the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve the password policy in a Windows domain.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain security settings.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions.
Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of domain security settings.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments used to enumerate domain users via the `Get-DomainUser` command. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams using PowerView for Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain situational awareness and identify valuable targets within the domain, potentially leading to further exploitation.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet, which is used to query local user accounts. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant because adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify potential targets for further exploitation or privilege escalation within the environment.
The following analytic detects the use of Impacket's `wmiexec.py` tool for lateral movement by identifying specific command-line parameters. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on processes spawned by `wmiprvse.exe` with command-line patterns indicative of Impacket usage. This activity is significant as Impacket tools are commonly used by adversaries for remote code execution and lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on remote systems, potentially leading to further compromise and data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the use of the EncodedCommand parameter in PowerShell processes.
It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types.
This activity can be significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.
Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.
It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types.
This activity can be significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.
Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.
The following analytic detects the use of Ntdsutil to export the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because exporting NTDS.dit can be a precursor to offline password cracking, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.
The following analytic identifies the usage of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, a rarely utilized executable typically found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution telemetry. The significance of this activity lies in its uncommon usage, which may indicate malicious intent such as code execution or persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this process to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further compromise of the system.
The following analytic identifies instances of reg.exe being launched from a command prompt (cmd.exe) that was not initiated by the user, as indicated by a parent process other than explorer.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names. This activity is significant because reg.exe is often used in registry manipulation, which can be indicative of malicious behavior such as persistence mechanisms or system configuration changes. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to modify critical system settings, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistent access.
The following analytic detects the use of CreateDump.exe to perform a process dump. This binary is not native to Windows and is often introduced by third-party applications, including PowerShell 7. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, GUIDs, and complete command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to dump LSASS memory, which can be used to extract credentials. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the use of `certutil.exe` to download files using the `-URL`, `-urlcache` or '-verifyctl' arguments. This behavior is identified by monitoring command-line executions for these specific arguments via Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry. This activity is significant because `certutil.exe` is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to download and execute malicious payloads. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to download and execute arbitrary files, potentially leading to code execution, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the system.
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's download methods such as
"DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest
and it's aliases "IWR" or "Curl".
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on
process execution logs that include command-line details.
This activity can be significant such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious
PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run
arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration,
or further compromise of the affected system.
"DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest
and it's aliases "IWR" or "Curl".
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on
process execution logs that include command-line details.
This activity can be significant such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious
PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run
arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration,
or further compromise of the affected system.
The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query global, local and domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local or domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory or privileged accounts discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
The following analytic detects the execution of AppCmd.exe to install a new module in IIS. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it to install webshells or backdoors, leading to credit card scraping, persistence, and further post-exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access, execute arbitrary code, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information from the compromised web server.
The following analytic detects the use of msiexec.exe with an HTTP or
HTTPS URL in the command line, indicating a remote file download attempt. This detection
leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process
execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant as
it may indicate an attempt to download and execute potentially malicious software
from a remote server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code
execution, system compromise, or further malware deployment within the network.
HTTPS URL in the command line, indicating a remote file download attempt. This detection
leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process
execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant as
it may indicate an attempt to download and execute potentially malicious software
from a remote server. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code
execution, system compromise, or further malware deployment within the network.
The following analytic detects the enumeration of Windows services using the net start command, which is a built-in utility that lists all running services on a system. Adversaries, system administrators, or automated tools may use this command to gain situational awareness of what services are active, identify potential security software, or discover opportunities for privilege escalation and lateral movement. The execution of net start is often associated with reconnaissance activity during the early stages of an intrusion, as attackers attempt to map out the system’s defense mechanisms and operational services. By monitoring process execution for instances of cmd.exe /c net start or similar command-line usage, defenders can detect potentially suspicious activity. Correlating this behavior with other reconnaissance commands, such as tasklist or sc query, strengthens detection fidelity. While net start is not inherently malicious, unusual or repeated use in non-administrative contexts should be flagged for further investigation.
The following analytic identifies network share discovery and collection activities performed on Windows systems using the Net command. Attackers often use network share discovery to identify accessible shared resources within a network, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation or data exfiltration. By monitoring Windows Event Logs for the usage of the Net command to list and interact with network shares, this detection helps identify potential reconnaissance and collection activities.
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