Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects multiple successful GitLab authentication events from a specific source IP that contain parameters indicating an attempt to skip or bypass two-factor authentication, consistent with known GitLab 2FA bypass vulnerabilities.
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2023-2825, a path traversal vulnerability in GitLab. The rule monitors HTTP GET requests to the /uploads/ endpoint containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../ or encoded variants) in the URI, indicating an effort to access restricted files on the system.
Detects anomalous GitLab project enumeration where an account performs an excessive number of requests to the Projects API using the 'membership=true' parameter within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover all accessible repositories associated with a compromised or over-privileged GitLab token.
Detects anomalous GitLab project enumeration where an account performs an excessive number of requests to the Projects API using the 'membership=true' parameter within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover all accessible repositories associated with a compromised or over-privileged GitLab token.
Detects anomalous GitLab project enumeration where an account performs an excessive number of requests to the Projects API using the 'membership=true' parameter within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to discover all accessible repositories associated with a compromised or over-privileged GitLab token.
Detects GitLab CI/CD pipeline configuration (.gitlab-ci.yml) that sets job artifacts to 'untracked: true' with 'when: always', which publishes every untracked file as a downloadable CI artifact -- the exact misconfiguration that exposed the leaked GitLab token in the GnuTLS incident.
Detects GitLab CI/CD pipeline configuration (.gitlab-ci.yml) that sets job artifacts to 'untracked: true' with 'when: always', which publishes every untracked file as a downloadable CI artifact -- the exact misconfiguration that exposed the leaked GitLab token in the GnuTLS incident.
Detects GitLab CI/CD pipeline configuration (.gitlab-ci.yml) that sets job artifacts to 'untracked: true' with 'when: always', which publishes every untracked file as a downloadable CI artifact -- the exact misconfiguration that exposed the leaked GitLab token in the GnuTLS incident.
Detects a direct push to the protected 'gnutls_3_7_x' release branch with no associated merge request, bypassing code review even when the pusher's role technically satisfies branch-protection rules.
Detects a direct push to the protected 'gnutls_3_7_x' release branch with no associated merge request, bypassing code review even when the pusher's role technically satisfies branch-protection rules.
Detects unreviewed commits to .gitlab-ci.yml that alter how the gitlab-triage tool invokes the sensitive API_TOKEN variable, with no associated merge request.
Detects a GitLab personal access token/response indicating Owner-level (access_level 50) group access combined with the broad 'api' scope on the sensitive gnutls/gnutls project -- the excessive standing-privilege pattern that turned one leaked token into a 55-project exposure.
Detects a GitLab personal access token/response indicating Owner-level (access_level 50) group access combined with the broad 'api' scope on the sensitive gnutls/gnutls project -- the excessive standing-privilege pattern that turned one leaked token into a 55-project exposure.
Detects a GitLab personal access token/response indicating Owner-level (access_level 50) group access combined with the broad 'api' scope on the sensitive gnutls/gnutls project -- the excessive standing-privilege pattern that turned one leaked token into a 55-project exposure.
Detects unauthenticated GET requests to GitLab CI/CD job artifact download endpoints on a public repository, which can expose leaked secrets bundled into build artifacts.
Detects a single GitLab token/account holding Owner-level access across an unusually large number of projects (50+), the standing-privilege condition that turned one leaked token into a 55-project supply-chain exposure.
Detects the installation of software packages in build or CI pipelines where the package was published to its registry between 30 and 90 days prior to being first used in the environment. This pattern is indicative of potential dependency confusion or typosquatting attacks, where adversaries use newly created packages to deliver malicious code.
Detects CI/CD job activity referencing shell commands that redirect the entire environment to a file (e.g. 'env > out.tmp'), the exact pattern that caused a GitLab CI job in the openconnect/ocserv project to dump secrets into a public build artifact, leaking a high-privilege personal access token with Owner access to GnuTLS and 55 other critical projects.
Detects a GitLab personal access token used from multiple distinct source IPs or from IPs associated with the leaked gitlab-triage token, inconsistent with expected CI runner infrastructure.
Detects an Owner-role GitLab account or token modifying merge-request approval rules, protected-branch settings, or project membership -- controls that, if weakened, defeat code-review safeguards.
Detects anomalous, large-scale cloning or mirroring of code repositories combined with targeted access to infrastructure-as-code configuration files (e.g., .tfvars, .tfstate) or automated exfiltration of CI/CD build artifacts. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to exfiltrate proprietary source code or sensitive secrets stored within repositories.
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