Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation, modification, or renaming of plist files within macOS LaunchAgent directories that match a specific naming pattern (com.[16 letters].plist). This pattern is often used by malware or unauthorized scripts to establish persistence. The rule excludes common, legitimate system processes like Installer and softwareupdated.
This rule detects repeated attempts to use the 'dscl' utility on macOS with the 'authonly' flag within a short timeframe, which is a known indicator of credential validation loops often used by backdoors like Bazinga. The detection also looks for correlations with suspicious 'osascript' system preference prompts and the creation of '.passphrase' files to identify potential automated credential theft activity.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects a sequence of actions often used to bypass macOS Gatekeeper protections: removing the quarantine extended attribute using 'xattr -c' on a file in the /tmp directory, followed by making that file executable with 'chmod +x', and finally executing the file. This behavior is indicative of malicious software attempting to evade Apple's security checks for downloaded files.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects the execution of command-line sequences associated with the second stage of ClickFix-style malware (often linked to AMOS or fake-Xcode campaigns). This rule looks for the concatenation of hex decoding (xxd), AES decryption (openssl), decompression (gunzip), and subsequent evaluation (eval) of a shell variable, which is a signature pattern for decrypting and executing malicious payloads in memory.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and execute malicious commands in a shell environment. The rule triggers on process execution of terminal or shell binaries (zsh, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing indicators of obfuscated execution or remote code downloading, such as piped shell commands (curl | sh/zsh) or PowerShell encoded command execution.
Detects attempts to bypass macOS Gatekeeper security controls by either removing the quarantine extended attribute or marking a file as executable using 'xattr' or 'chmod'. These techniques are used to allow untrusted or malicious applications to execute without user authorization.
Detects network connections to known FLATROOF and ROOFDECK C2 infrastructure used by Jade Sleet/TraderTraitor (UNC4899, Lazarus) in campaigns targeting IT services and DevOps engineers.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects instances where an unprivileged user executes commands like 'ls -l' or 'stat' on the Parallels dispatcher Unix socket (/var/run/prl_disp_service.socket) specifically when it is world-writable (mode 0777). This behavior indicates an adversary attempting to verify if they can exploit the insecure socket permissions to interact with or hijack the Parallels dispatcher service.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
Detects the execution of base64-encoded shell commands on macOS, a pattern commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious payloads into their Terminal.
Detects a suspicious sequence of network downloads initiated by bash, sh, or zsh using curl or wget where the command-line includes the 'force=1' parameter. This behavior is indicative of the ClickFix macOS dropper chain often associated with the Macfinger campaign, where multiple payloads (shell scripts and Mach-O binaries) are retrieved from a common C2 infrastructure.
Detects the execution of base64-encoded shell commands on macOS, a pattern commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' social engineering campaign where users are tricked into copying and pasting malicious payloads into their Terminal.
Detects a suspicious sequence of network downloads initiated by bash, sh, or zsh using curl or wget where the command-line includes the 'force=1' parameter. This behavior is indicative of the ClickFix macOS dropper chain often associated with the Macfinger campaign, where multiple payloads (shell scripts and Mach-O binaries) are retrieved from a common C2 infrastructure.
Detects the installation of a rogue root certificate into the operating system's trust store. This is a common technique used by adversaries to perform TLS/SSL interception (Adversary-in-the-Middle) by establishing a chain of trust for malicious proxy traffic. The rule identifies suspicious use of Windows 'certutil' to add certificates to the 'Root' store, macOS keychain certificate management commands, and indicators associated with 'Localcertificate.zip' payloads.
Detects the presence of Atomic macOS Stealer (AMOS) binaries and their associated malicious behaviors. The rule identifies suspicious artifacts including password prompt requests using osascript to deceive users, attempts to access keychain and browser credential databases, and the use of curl piping to remote shell execution which is a common delivery vector for this malware family.
This rule detects potentially suspicious process executions originating from Electron-based applications (like Cursor or VS Code) where the command line contains 'nohup', '--type=renderer', and indicators of system or sensitive library paths. This behavior is often associated with unauthorized attempts to leverage Electron's rendering engine for executing commands, masquerading as legitimate helper processes, or potentially accessing sensitive system cloud configuration or update files.
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