Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for HTTP POST requests containing 'class.module.classLoader', which is a characteristic payload component used to exploit the Spring4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2022-22965) in Spring Framework applications. This vulnerability allows for remote code execution (RCE) by manipulating class loader properties.
Detects instances where common web server processes initiate command interpreters or system utilities. This behavior is a common indicator of web shell execution, where an adversary uses a web application vulnerability to gain remote code execution on the underlying server.
Detects the creation of files on web servers matching known Neo-reGeorg web shell tunnel variants. These files are typically used as backdoors to tunnel traffic and provide persistent access to the server.
This rule query identifies likely post‑exploitation activity associated with React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) in which Part 1 identifies web servers spawning unusual child processes (such as command shells or system utilities) combined with suspicious command-line patterns, which may indicate post-exploitation behavior following a compromise. and part 2 detects web servers making outbound network connections to known malicious IPs or hostnames, or to domains associated with tunneling services (e.g., trycloudflare.com), suggesting potential command-and-control activity or data exfiltration.
Detects instances where a Java-based application (specifically associated with 'floci' or API Gateway components) spawns suspicious child processes such as shell interpreters (sh, bash, powershell, cmd.exe). This pattern is often indicative of post-exploitation activity following a remote code execution (RCE) attempt against a template engine or web-facing gateway. It also identifies specific file paths related to documented 'floci' POCs and RCE payloads.
Detects attempts to restore or extract files containing path traversal characters ('../' or '..\') commonly associated with the ZipSlip vulnerability. This technique was utilized in Operation Escaneo (via the mkzip34.py tool) to deploy webshells automatically upon legitimate archive restoration. The rule specifically looks for file creation or modification events where the initiating process is a common archive extraction tool (unzip, tar) or a Java application server (java, tomcat), the file extension is for a Java web application (.jsp, .jspx), and the resulting folder path contains path traversal sequences.
Identifies potential Neo-reGeorg webshell execution by correlating HTTP POST requests to Java Server Pages (.jsp/.jspx) with reflection events (defineClass) in system logs. This specific mechanism is utilized by Operation Escaneo (MexicanMafia) to load AES-encrypted, base64/BLV-encoded payloads in memory.
This rule detects processes generating network connections to multiple known malicious ports (4444, 7211, 8000, 8001, 8002, 10000) within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of command and control (C2) beaconing, where a compromised system periodically communicates with a C2 server. The rule is designed to identify a pattern of C2 activity that might be used across different threat campaigns, leveraging ports commonly associated with various C2 frameworks or custom C2 implementations.
Detects the deletion of .pkg_history or .pkg_logs, an anti-forensic attempt after the dropper completes, associated with the Mastra NPM compromise.
This rule detects attempts to write or modify cron persistence entries via HTTP. Specifically, it looks for HTTP client body content containing the string "/etc/cron" (case-insensitive). This indicates a potential attacker trying to establish persistence on a Linux system by scheduling malicious tasks.
This rule detects attempts to upload malicious web server modules, plugins, or components. It specifically looks for HTTP PUT requests to URIs containing '/modules/', '/plugins/', or '/components/' and checks the file data for the 'MZ' header, indicating an executable file (likely a Windows executable or DLL). This combination suggests an attacker is trying to upload a malicious executable to a web server's module/plugin directory for persistence or further compromise.
Detects the initial access attempt for the Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerability CVE-2025-61882. This involves a crafted POST request to the UiServlet component containing a malicious XML payload.
Detects exploitation attempts against Oracle WebLogic via suspicious HTTP requests and command execution patterns. The rule identifies WebLogic-specific endpoints combined with RCE payload indicators such as cmd, bash, powershell, wget, curl, or encoded payloads within the URI query.
Detects attempts to exploit a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2025-40553) in SolarWinds Web Help Desk. Attackers use hex-encoded escape sequences (`\xNN`) and other JSON parsing gotchas to bypass security filters and achieve deserialization of malicious objects.
Detects a web server process spawning tools commonly used for data staging and exfiltration, such as rar.exe, certutil.exe, and type.exe. This behavior is characteristic of the CL-UNK-1068 actor's exfiltration TTP, often performed via a web shell.
This rule is meant to catch a very specific web request pattern tied to the SolarWinds Web Help Desk issue described in the report. The attack sends a crafted request to a known application path and includes a small group of values that are unusual in normal traffic but important in the exploit chain. The rule stays tight by requiring the request method, the path, and the special body values together. That matters because web applications often have busy and messy traffic, and loose matching on only one keyword would create noise. In plain language, this rule tries to spot a request that is not just using the help desk site, but is trying to abuse it to make the server handle attacker-controlled data in a dangerous way. It is best used as a high-confidence lead for review rather than a generic web alert. When it fires, it should be treated as a focused sign of attempted abuse rather than normal help desk.
This rule detects activity associated with UNC6201 exploiting Dell RecoverPoint VM (CVE-2026-22769), which involves the SLAYSTYLE/BRICKSTORM/GRIMBOLT malware. It identifies attempts to deploy WAR files via Tomcat Manager, suspicious WAR file uploads or modifications in Tomcat directories on Linux appliances, modifications to a persistence script named 'convert_hosts.sh', network communication with a GRIMBOLT C2 endpoint (149.248.11.71), and specific file hashes linked to the threat actor.
This rule detects activities associated with UNC6201 exploitation of Dell RecoverPoint VM, specifically looking for three distinct phases: Tomcat Manager WAR file deployment, modification of a persistence script on Linux, and communication with a GRIMBOLT C2 endpoint. The first part identifies WAR file deployments via Tomcat Manager. The second part looks for modifications to a specific persistence script file. The third part identifies network connections to a known GRIMBOLT C2 IP address or URL pattern.
Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-22769 by identifying PUT requests directed at the Tomcat Manager application deployment endpoint. This is used by UNC6201 to deploy malicious WAR files containing the SLAYSTYLE webshell.
Detects suspicious web requests to the Tomcat Manager on Dell RecoverPoint appliances. This technique is used by UNC6201 to exploit CVE-2026-22769 and upload malicious WAR files.
This rule detects potential exploitation attempts targeting Ivanti EPMM vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-4427/4428) and subsequent post-exploitation activities. It has two main parts:
1. Web Request Analysis: It identifies web requests to the `/api/v2/featureusage` endpoint that contain suspicious patterns indicative of command injection or expression language injection attempts.
2. Process Creation Analysis: It looks for unusual process creations where Java or Tomcat-related processes (`java.exe`, `javaw.exe`, `catalina.bat`, `catalina.sh`) spawn command-line interpreters (`cmd.exe`, `bash`, `sh`, `powershell.exe`) or processes whose command lines contain keywords like `sliver` or `implant`, suggesting the deployment of malicious implants or sleeper shells.
1. Web Request Analysis: It identifies web requests to the `/api/v2/featureusage` endpoint that contain suspicious patterns indicative of command injection or expression language injection attempts.
2. Process Creation Analysis: It looks for unusual process creations where Java or Tomcat-related processes (`java.exe`, `javaw.exe`, `catalina.bat`, `catalina.sh`) spawn command-line interpreters (`cmd.exe`, `bash`, `sh`, `powershell.exe`) or processes whose command lines contain keywords like `sliver` or `implant`, suggesting the deployment of malicious implants or sleeper shells.
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