Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
507 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
174
86
74
69
35
Contributors
147
94
79
60
32
Categories
377
347
319
94
91
Platforms
492
8
7
3
2
Products / Services
10,665
9,773
6,704
4,421
3,749
507
MITRE Techniques
333
272
136
127
104
CVEs
3
3
1
1
IDS Classtypes
8
3
2
1
IDS Protocols
9
5
Detects the use of administrative utilities 'wmic.exe' and 'schtasks.exe' to execute commands or create scheduled tasks on remote systems, excluding local execution scenarios.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects the execution of native Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin) used by the Monkey ransomware C++ variant to delete volume shadow copies, clear the backup catalog, and disable system recovery boot policies. This activity is a characteristic precursor to data encryption.
Detects the use of offensive security tools like Evil-WinRM or winrm-fs, which are often used by threat actors for remote administration, lateral movement, or backdoor delivery via the Windows Remote Management (WinRM) protocol.
Detects the use of Evil-WinRM or WinRM-fs command-line utilities combined with network connections over the WinRM ports (TCP 5985/5986). This activity is indicative of remote administrative tools being used for potential lateral movement or agent delivery, specifically observed in the context of the Toy Ghouls threat activity involving the Bird Agent.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe with command-line arguments related to querying antivirus products or security centers (e.g., AntiVirusProduct, SecurityCenter2). The rule focuses on executions originating from non-standard system paths (e.g., Temp, Users, AppData) or processes that lack a valid code signing signature, which is often indicative of reconnaissance by malicious actors.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, wbadmin.exe) to delete volume shadow copies or backup catalogs. This behavior is a common tactic employed by ransomware actors to inhibit system recovery and prevent restoration of encrypted data.
Detects lateral movement activities involving the use of WMIC to remotely create processes or Schtasks to remotely create scheduled tasks. These techniques are often used by threat actors, including those associated with DragonForce and CRPx0 ransomware, to propagate across a network by executing commands on remote systems.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to delete individual Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) snapshots. This technique is commonly used by ransomware families to inhibit system recovery by preventing users from restoring files from shadow copies.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects PowerShell commands or script blocks that enumerate running processes and query WMI/CIM classes (such as Win32_ComputerSystem or Win32_BIOS) to identify indicators of virtualization, sandboxing, or the presence of security analysis tools. This behavior is indicative of anti-analysis and sandbox-evasion techniques, commonly used by threat actors like Kimsuky to verify their execution environment before proceeding with malicious activity.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting volume shadow copies or modifying backup/boot recovery configurations. The rule monitors for the execution of vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, and bcdedit with flags known to facilitate system recovery inhibition, often observed as a precursor to ransomware activity.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects the execution of common Windows command-line tools (such as cmd, powershell, or wmic) being used to query system information related to security configurations, antivirus status, firewall status, or installed security products. This behavior is indicative of an adversary performing reconnaissance to understand the defensive landscape of a compromised host.
Detects attempts to install or modify the 'WMI Provider Host' (WmiPrvSE) service, which is a common technique used by adversaries for persistence or to masquerade malicious activity. The rule monitors process execution, registry modifications, and service installation events specifically targeting this service name.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the manipulation of Windows services using 'sc.exe' to stop or delete services, combined with the forceful termination of 'svchost.exe' processes via 'wmic.exe'. This pattern is often associated with adversaries attempting to disable security tools, logging agents, or other defensive mechanisms on an endpoint.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying suspicious child processes (such as cmd, powershell, or rundll32) spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe shortly after a remote interactive or network logon on the same device.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying suspicious child processes (such as cmd, powershell, or rundll32) spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe shortly after a remote interactive or network logon on the same device.
Page 5 of 25