Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies network share discovery and collection activities performed on Windows systems using the Net command. Attackers often use network share discovery to identify accessible shared resources within a network, which can be a precursor to privilege escalation or data exfiltration. By monitoring Windows Event Logs for the usage of the Net command to list and interact with network shares, this detection helps identify potential reconnaissance and collection activities.
The following analytic identifies non-SYSTEM accounts requesting access to lsass.exe. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs to monitor access attempts to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) by non-SYSTEM users. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential dumping attempts or unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could potentially extract credentials from memory, leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the access request and to mitigate any potential threats.
The following analytic identifies a suspicious `explorer.exe` process with the `/root` command-line parameter. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process and command-line data. The presence of `/root` in `explorer.exe` is significant as it may indicate parent process spoofing, a technique used by malware to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to operate undetected, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment.
The following analytic detects the usage of PowerShell Cmdlets - New-WebGlobalModule, Enable-WebGlobalModule, and Set-WebGlobalModule, which are used to create, enable, or modify IIS Modules. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically monitoring EventCode 4104 for these cmdlets. This activity is significant as adversaries may use these lesser-known cmdlets to manipulate IIS configurations, similar to AppCmd.exe, potentially bypassing traditional defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to persist in the environment, manipulate web server behavior, or escalate privileges.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainSPNTicket` commandlet, part of the PowerView tool, by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This commandlet requests Kerberos service tickets for specified service principal names (SPNs). Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts to perform Kerberoasting, a technique used to extract SPN account passwords via cracking tools like hashcat. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive accounts, potentially leading to privilege escalation and further network compromise.
The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys related to the Windows Proxy settings via netsh.exe. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the registry path "*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4\\tcp*". This activity is significant because netsh.exe can be used to establish a persistent proxy, potentially allowing an attacker to execute a helper DLL whenever netsh.exe runs. If confirmed malicious, this could enable the attacker to maintain persistence, manipulate network configurations, and potentially exfiltrate data or further compromise the system.
The following analytic detects the installation of a root CA certificate by monitoring specific registry paths for SetValue events. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on registry paths containing "certificates" and registry values named "Blob." This activity is significant because unauthorized root CA certificates can compromise the integrity of encrypted communications and facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to intercept, decrypt, or manipulate sensitive data, leading to severe security breaches.
The following analytic detects a registry modification that disables the ETW for the .NET Framework.
It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the COMPlus_ETWEnabled registry value under the "Environment" registry key path for both user (HKCU\Environment) and machine (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment) scopes.
This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs.
If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.
It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the COMPlus_ETWEnabled registry value under the "Environment" registry key path for both user (HKCU\Environment) and machine (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Environment) scopes.
This activity is significant because disabling ETW can allow attackers to evade Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools and hide their execution from audit logs.
If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to operate undetected, potentially leading to further compromise and persistent access within the environment.
The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map out domain policies, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by identifying the creation of a Windows service using sc.exe with a binary path that includes tscon.exe. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates an attacker may be trying to hijack a disconnected RDP session, posing a risk of unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain control over an existing user session, leading to potential data theft or further system compromise.
The following analytic detects the modification of registry keys that define Windows services using reg.exe. This detection leverages Splunk to search for specific keywords in the registry path, value name, and value data fields. This activity is significant because it indicates potential unauthorized changes to service configurations, a common persistence technique used by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, escalate privileges, or move laterally within the network, leading to data theft, ransomware, or other damaging outcomes.
The following analytic identifies the creation of a .crmlog file within the %windows%\Registration directory, typically with a format of <RANDOM_GUID>.<RANDOM_GUID>.crmlog. This detection leverages the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel to monitor file creation events in the specified directory. This activity is significant as it is associated with the Snake malware, which uses this file for its operations. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate the presence of Snake malware, leading to potential data exfiltration, system compromise, and further malicious activities. Immediate investigation is required to mitigate the threat.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'export-certificate' executed via the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. Exporting certificates is significant as it may indicate credential theft or preparation for man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive communications, or gain unauthorized access to systems and data.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet `export-pfxcertificate` on the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate authentication certificates, which can be used to impersonate users or decrypt sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and potential data breaches.
The following analytic detects the use of the decompile parameter with the HTML Help application (HH.exe). This behavior is identified through Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on command-line executions involving the decompile parameter. This activity is significant because it is an uncommon command and has been associated with APT41 campaigns, where it was used to unpack HTML help files for further malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows built-in tool netsh.exe to display the state, configuration, and profile of the host firewall. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. Monitoring this activity is crucial as netsh.exe can be used by adversaries to bypass firewall rules or discover firewall settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate firewall configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized network access or data exfiltration.
The following analytic detects the execution of Syncappvpublishingserver.vbs via wscript.exe or cscript.exe, which may indicate an attempt to download remote files or perform privilege escalation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can signify malicious use of a native Windows script for unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized file downloads or elevated privileges, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic identifies the use of the w32tm.exe utility with the /stripchart function, which is indicative of DCRat malware delaying its payload execution. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line arguments used by w32tm.exe. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to evade detection by delaying malicious actions such as C2 communication and beaconing. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to maintain persistence and execute further malicious activities undetected.
The following analytic detects the use of WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) for reconnaissance and system information discovery on Windows endpoints.
It identifies command-line queries targeting common Win32 WMI classes such as Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor, csproduct, Win32_DiskDrive, and Win32_PhysicalMemory, which are frequently leveraged to enumerate hardware, operating system details, and system configuration. Adversaries often use these queries during post-exploitation to fingerprint hosts, assess virtualization, and tailor follow-on activity. While WMIC usage can be legitimate for administrative and inventory tasks, suspicious or unexpected execution—particularly by non-administrative users or uncommon parent processes—may indicate malicious reconnaissance aligned with system discovery techniques.
It identifies command-line queries targeting common Win32 WMI classes such as Win32_OperatingSystem, Win32_Processor, csproduct, Win32_DiskDrive, and Win32_PhysicalMemory, which are frequently leveraged to enumerate hardware, operating system details, and system configuration. Adversaries often use these queries during post-exploitation to fingerprint hosts, assess virtualization, and tailor follow-on activity. While WMIC usage can be legitimate for administrative and inventory tasks, suspicious or unexpected execution—particularly by non-administrative users or uncommon parent processes—may indicate malicious reconnaissance aligned with system discovery techniques.
This analytic detects the use of WMIC to delete volume shadow copies, which is a common technique used by ransomware actors to prevent system recovery. Ransomware like Cactus often delete shadow copies before encrypting files to ensure victims cannot recover their data without paying the ransom. This behavior is particularly concerning as it indicates potential ransomware activity or malicious actors attempting to prevent system recovery.
Sweeps network connection, HTTP/proxy, file, and process telemetry for exact matches against known Cling botnet indicators: dedicated STUN C2/operator IPs, Cling MIPS loader staging URLs, and known Cling sample SHA256 hashes. Tightened to exclude broad domain-level matching on stun.l.google.com (legitimate, ubiquitous Google STUN infrastructure that Cling spoofs/abuses rather than owns) and to match payload-staging hosts only by full URL rather than bare IP, reducing false positives from shared/compromised hosting and unrelated legitimate STUN traffic.
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