Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies when a service account is modified or deleted.
This analytic aggregates and summarizes alerts from Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. It extracts details such as source, file name, severity, process command line, IP address, registry key, signature, description, and unique ID. The detection is not intended to identify new activity from raw data but rather to leverage existing Microsoft Defender for Endpoint alerts for correlation and risk-based alerting. It filters out alerts with a 'clean' verdict and dynamically maps MITRE techniques and assigns risk scores based on the alert's severity.
This detection identifies when a new Microsoft Intune device management configuration policy has been created. Intune device management configuration policies are used by administrators to remotely manage policies and settings on Intune-managed devices. This functionality can be abused by adversaries to disable defenses and evade detection.
The following analytic identifies when a new device is enrolled on an Okta account. It uses OktaIm2 logs ingested via the Splunk Add-on for Okta Identity Cloud to detect the creation of new device enrollments. This activity is significant as it may indicate a legitimate user settinging up a new device or an adversary adding a device to maintain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to potential account takeover, unauthorized access, and persistent control over the compromised Okta account. Monitoring this behavior is crucial for detecting and mitigating unauthorized access attempts.
This correlation rule identifies when a user exceeds a predefined risk threshold based on multiple suspicious Okta activities within a 24-hour period. It aggregates risk events from "Suspicious Okta Activity," "Okta Account Takeover," and "Okta MFA Exhaustion" analytic stories. The detection is significant as it highlights potentially compromised user accounts exhibiting multiple tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate a serious security breach, allowing attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
The following analytic detects attempts to disable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory AuditLogs to identify the "Disable Strong Authentication" operation. This activity is significant because disabling MFA can allow adversaries to maintain persistence using compromised accounts without raising suspicion. If confirmed malicious, this action could enable attackers to bypass an essential security control, potentially leading to unauthorized access and prolonged undetected presence in the environment.
The analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for an Azure AD account. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify when a user registers new security information. This activity is significant because adversaries who gain unauthorized access to an account may add their own MFA method to maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass existing security controls, maintain long-term access, and potentially escalate their privileges within the environment.
The following analytic identifies suspicious command-line parameters associated with the use of Impacket's smbexec.py for lateral movement. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns indicative of Impacket tool usage. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use Impacket for remote code execution and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to execute commands on remote endpoints, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.
The following analytic detects suspicious database file and directory discovery activities, which may signal an attacker attempt to locate and assess critical database assets on a compromised system. This behavior is often a precursor to data theft, unauthorized access, or privilege escalation, as attackers seek to identify valuable information stored in databases. By monitoring for unusual or unauthorized attempts to locate database files and directories, this analytic aids in early detection of potential reconnaissance or data breach efforts, enabling security teams to respond swiftly and mitigate the risk of further compromise.
The following analytic identifies instances where admin consent is granted to an application within an Azure AD tenant. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically events related to the admin consent action within the ApplicationManagement category. This activity is significant because admin consent allows applications to access data across the entire tenant, potentially exposing vast amounts of organizational data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive and persistent access to sensitive data, leading to data exfiltration, espionage, further malicious activities, and potential compliance violations.
The following analytic detects the addition of a new custom domain within an Azure Active Directory (AD) tenant. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs to identify successful "Add unverified domain" operations. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence by setting up identity federation backdoors, allowing them to impersonate users and bypass authentication mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, this could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access to the Azure AD environment, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic identifies AWS console login attempts by users from a new region. It leverages AWS CloudTrail events and compares current login regions against a baseline of previously seen regions for each user. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access attempts or compromised credentials. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially leading to data breaches, resource manipulation, or further lateral movement within the cloud environment.
This analytic detects file transfers flagged as malware that occurred over non-standard ports (other than 80 and 443) from Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense logs. Adversaries may attempt to bypass protocol-based detection or use alternate ports to blend in with other traffic. This analytic identifies these non-conventional flows and surfaces potential evasion techniques. If confirmed malicious, this indicates potential malware delivery or other nefarious activity.
The analytic detects the assignment of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user is added as an eligible member to a PIM role. This activity is significant because PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and their assignment should be closely monitored to prevent unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could exploit this to gain privileged access, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the environment.
The analytic detects the addition of new credentials to Service Principals and Applications in Azure AD. It leverages Azure AD AuditLogs, specifically monitoring the "Update application*Certificates and secrets management" operation. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the Azure environment. If confirmed malicious, attackers could use these new credentials to log in as the service principal, potentially compromising sensitive accounts and resources, leading to unauthorized access and control over the Azure environment.
This analytic detects the activation of an Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM) role. It leverages Azure Active Directory events to identify when a user activates a PIM role assignment, indicated by the "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)" operation. Monitoring this activity is crucial as PIM roles grant elevated privileges, and unauthorized activation could indicate an adversary attempting to gain privileged access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized administrative actions, data breaches, or further compromise of the Azure environment.
The analytic identifies a successful single-factor authentication event against Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure SignInLogs data, specifically focusing on events where single-factor authentication succeeded. This activity is significant as it may indicate a misconfiguration, policy violation, or potential account takeover attempt. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized access to the account, potentially leading to data breaches, privilege escalation, or further exploitation within the environment.
The following analytic detects `spoolsv.exe` writing a `.dll` file, which is unusual behavior and may indicate exploitation of vulnerabilities like CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare). This detection leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to monitor file creation events in the `\spool\drivers\x64\` directory. This activity is significant because `spoolsv.exe` typically does not write DLL files, and such behavior could signify an ongoing attack. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised system.
The following analytic detects a suspicious registry modification aimed at disabling security audit logs by adding a specific registry entry. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "Control\\MiniNt" registry path. This activity is significant because it can prevent Windows from logging any events to the Security Log, effectively blinding security monitoring efforts. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow an attacker to operate undetected, making it difficult to trace their actions and compromising the integrity of security audits.
The analytic detects the assignment of the 'full_access_as_app' permission to an application within Office 365 Exchange Online. This is identified by the GUID 'dc890d15-9560-4a4c-9b7f-a736ec74ec40' and the ResourceAppId '00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000'. The detection leverages the azure_monitor_aad data source, focusing on AuditLogs with the operation name 'Update application'. This activity is significant as it grants broad control over Office 365 operations, including full access to all mailboxes and the ability to send emails as any user. If malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
This analytic identifies potential privilege escalation activities within an organization's Active Directory (AD) environment by correlating multiple analytics from the "Active Directory Privilege Escalation" analytic story within a specified time frame. This is significant for a SOC as it helps identify coordinated attempts to gain elevated privileges, which could indicate a serious security threat. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data, leading to potential data breaches and further compromise of the network.
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