Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modification or creation of .htaccess files within WordPress directory structures followed within 24 hours by the creation or modification of .cache files in the same directory. This behavioral pattern is often indicative of web shell deployment or persistence installation via compromised web applications.
This detection flags a parent and child process pair on internet-facing Windows servers, where the parent is a web server process and the child is the process it launched. The web server processes covered are w3wp, httpd, nginx and Tomcat, including versioned Tomcat service executables such as tomcat9.exe and Tomcat running under java.exe, which is identified by the Catalina bootstrap class in its command line. A server is treated as internet-facing based on the most recent status recorded for it.
Instead of matching known web shell names, the query builds a baseline from the previous 30 days of process activity on each device and alerts when a pair appears in the latest window that has never been seen on that device before, so it can catch web shell activity it has never seen before. Because the baseline is held per device, a pair that is normal on one server does not hide the same pair appearing on another.
The rule runs every 24 hours, as this is the only Defender custom detection frequency with a 30-day lookback, and the alert window covers the last 25 hours so that a slightly delayed run does not leave a gap.
The baseline and alert windows are separated by ingestion time rather than event time, so events that arrive late are still evaluated.
Instead of matching known web shell names, the query builds a baseline from the previous 30 days of process activity on each device and alerts when a pair appears in the latest window that has never been seen on that device before, so it can catch web shell activity it has never seen before. Because the baseline is held per device, a pair that is normal on one server does not hide the same pair appearing on another.
The rule runs every 24 hours, as this is the only Defender custom detection frequency with a 30-day lookback, and the alert window covers the last 25 hours so that a slightly delayed run does not leave a gap.
The baseline and alert windows are separated by ingestion time rather than event time, so events that arrive late are still evaluated.
Detects repeated Ollama application error events as a possible availability issue. Ollama application logs do not reliably record process termination, so this search cannot confirm a service crash without operating system or service manager telemetry.
Detects data staging and exfiltration preceding Play double extortion: WinRAR/RAR adding files to an archive (recursive or password-protected) followed within 4 hours by a WinSCP transfer from the same host and user.
Detects the execution of Linux encryptors or binaries via the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), utilizing tools like wsl.exe, wslhost.exe, or bash.exe with execution arguments or referencing ELF files, mount paths, and permission modifications.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects the execution of reverse engineering and decompilation tools such as JADX or Blutter against Android APK files or Flutter application binaries (libapp.so), as well as the creation of their typical output artifacts and staging folders.
Detects schtasks.exe creating a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service" that launches defender.exe (a renamed Sangfor executable abused for DLL sideloading) with SYSTEM privileges at startup. This is the exact persistence mechanism HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) uses to relaunch the CoolClient backdoor chain from the fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" directory on every boot.
Detects the default scheduled task activity of the hacktool Defendnot, which is used to disable Windows Defender Security.
It abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to register itself as a fake antivirus product, allowing it to disable Windows Defender.
During installation, Defendnot creates a scheduled task named 'defendnot' with the argument '--from-autorun' for persistence.
It abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to register itself as a fake antivirus product, allowing it to disable Windows Defender.
During installation, Defendnot creates a scheduled task named 'defendnot' with the argument '--from-autorun' for persistence.
Detects creation of a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects processes accessing sensitive files and configurations associated with multiple AI coding assistants (such as Claude, Codex, Grok, and Cursor) within a short time window, potentially indicating unauthorized access or credential theft from AI tools.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects the AdFection multi-stage infection chain where a device sequentially contacts advertising infrastructure, Candiru validator servers, exploit servers, and Candiru Command and Control domains within a short time window.
The following analytic detects the creation of files associated with the NirSoft tool bundles on Windows endpoints.
NirSoft is a well-known provider of free, portable utilities that can be used for various system and network tasks. However, threat actors often leverage these tools for malicious purposes, such as credential harvesting, network reconnaissance, and data exfiltration.
The detection focuses on the creation of specific NirSoft tool bundle files, which may indicate that an attacker is preparing to use these utilities on a compromised system.
Security teams should investigate any instances of these files being created, especially if they are found in unexpected locations or on systems that should not be using such tools.
NirSoft is a well-known provider of free, portable utilities that can be used for various system and network tasks. However, threat actors often leverage these tools for malicious purposes, such as credential harvesting, network reconnaissance, and data exfiltration.
The detection focuses on the creation of specific NirSoft tool bundle files, which may indicate that an attacker is preparing to use these utilities on a compromised system.
Security teams should investigate any instances of these files being created, especially if they are found in unexpected locations or on systems that should not be using such tools.
Detects the use of curl or wget commands targeting the Cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) at 169.254.169.254 for credential theft, or performing file uploads and data exfiltration patterns.
Detects the creation of the "PSScriptPolicyTest" PowerShell script by an uncommon process. This file is usually generated by Microsoft Powershell to test against Applocker.
Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to query reconnaissance information from the registry. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about credentials, the system, configuration, and installed software.
Detects an uncommon svchost parent process
The following analytic detects suspicious file downloads by the Telegram application on a Windows system. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 15 to identify instances where Telegram.exe creates files with a Zone.Identifier, indicating a download. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary using Telegram to download malicious tools, such as network scanners, for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to network mapping, lateral movement, and potential compromise of additional systems within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of a DNS query by a process to the associated Telegram API domain, which could indicate access via a Telegram bot commonly used by malware for command and control (C2) communications. By monitoring DNS queries related to Telegram's infrastructure, the detection identifies potential attempts to establish covert communication channels between a compromised system and external malicious actors. This behavior is often observed in cyberattacks where Telegram bots are used to receive commands or exfiltrate data, making it a key indicator of suspicious or malicious activity within a network.
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