Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects non-interactive sign-in events to common Microsoft 365 applications (OfficeHome, Outlook, My Sign-Ins, My Profile) where the User-Agent identifies as an automated HTTP client library (Axios or Python-requests). This behavior is often indicative of programmatic access via stolen session cookies or application tokens, commonly seen in adversary activity such as payroll-related business email compromise.
Detects OfficeHome sign-in events featuring the 90014 error code (missing OAuth nonce). The rule looks for a specific mismatch where mobile browser User Agents are observed on a system reported as Windows 10, a pattern consistent with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session token replay attacks attempting to access Microsoft 365 environments.
Detects anomalous sign-in attempts to the OfficeHome application where an OAuth 90014 error (nonce mismatch/invalid) is returned. The detection specifically monitors for requests originating from mobile browsers on Windows 10 user agents, which is indicative of potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing activity attempting to bypass or intercept authentication tokens.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity where a single Microsoft 365 or Entra ID user account successfully authenticates from multiple distinct residential or mobile-carrier ASNs within a 24-hour window. This behavior is highly indicative of an adversary replaying stolen session tokens (AiTM) through rotating residential proxy networks to blend into legitimate user traffic and circumvent location-based or datacenter IP-based access restrictions.
Detects sign-in events using the OAuth 2.0 device code flow, which is a mechanism often abused in phishing campaigns (such as GhostCode) to lure users into authorizing malicious applications or granting access tokens without needing their actual credentials.
Detects a suspected EvilTokens attack sequence where a user clicks a phishing URL and subsequently initiates a browser session to the Microsoft device-code authorization page (devicelogin) within 15 minutes, with the phishing lure domain appearing in the browser context.
Detects potentially malicious OAuth device code sign-ins by identifying sign-in events that exhibit anomalous characteristics, such as atypical geographic locations, rare client-application combinations, unmanaged/noncompliant device status, or elevated risk signals associated with the account. This detection helps identify account compromise or malicious OAuth consent activity often associated with 'EvilTokens' or device-code phishing attacks.
Detects potential device code phishing patterns where a successful OAuth device-code authentication is rapidly followed by Microsoft Graph resource access from the same account. The rule identifies suspicious polling sessions (e.g., EvilTokens) by monitoring for successful device-code sign-ins and immediate, subsequent Graph API activity. It filters known first-party applications and incorporates risk-based triggers and reconnaissance behavioral patterns to minimize false positives.
Detects potential abuse of stolen OAuth session tokens, where refresh tokens are used to authenticate after a user has performed a password reset. This rule identifies accounts that continue to sign in from previously unseen devices or IP addresses within 24 hours post-password reset, a technique consistent with session persistence mechanisms used by adversary tools and platforms like EvilTokens.
Detects sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that asserts specific possession or inherence claims (e.g., 'hwk' - hardware key). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or forge MFA responses via a rogue EAM provider.
Detects the scripted, non-human-paced registration of a rogue external authentication method by monitoring a sequence of specific Azure Audit Log operations (Add application, Add service principal, Add delegated permission grant) occurring within 60 seconds of each other by the same actor. The detection is further corroborated by analyzing Microsoft Graph Activity Logs for associated Python requests to specific Graph API URIs.
Detects the scripted, non-human-paced registration of a rogue external authentication method by monitoring a sequence of specific Azure Audit Log operations (Add application, Add service principal, Add delegated permission grant) occurring within 60 seconds of each other by the same actor. The detection is further corroborated by analyzing Microsoft Graph Activity Logs for associated Python requests to specific Graph API URIs.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
This rule detects potential security configuration tampering by correlating the modification of a Conditional Access policy (e.g., changing users or conditions) with the registration of a new external authentication method configuration by the same user within a 3-hour window. This behavior may indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence or facilitate bypass of authentication requirements by modifying CA policies and adding a rogue authentication method.
Detects the scripted, non-human-paced registration of a rogue external authentication method by monitoring a sequence of specific Azure Audit Log operations (Add application, Add service principal, Add delegated permission grant) occurring within 60 seconds of each other by the same actor. The detection is further corroborated by analyzing Microsoft Graph Activity Logs for associated Python requests to specific Graph API URIs.
Detects when a user has been elevated to manage all Azure Subscriptions.
This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
This change should be investigated immediately if it isn't planned.
This setting could allow an attacker access to Azure subscriptions in your environment.
This rule monitors authentication activity within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) involving the Device Code flow. This flow is often abused by attackers through phishing to obtain access tokens. The rule detects and lists occurrences of authentication attempts leveraging the device code grant, facilitating the investigation of potentially malicious token acquisition or replay attacks.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects high-volume, automated enumeration of cloud resources (SharePoint, OneDrive, or Exchange) via Graph API or search queries immediately following a user sign-in event. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking (token replay) followed by unauthorized scripted discovery, as opposed to legitimate user browsing activity.
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