Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic detects the registration of a new Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) method for a user account in Azure Active Directory. It leverages Azure AD audit logs to identify changes in MFA configurations. This activity is significant because adding a new MFA method can indicate an attacker's attempt to maintain persistence on a compromised account. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could bypass existing security measures, solidify their access, and potentially escalate privileges, access sensitive data, or make unauthorized changes. Immediate verification and remediation are required to secure the affected account.
The following analytic detects the creation of a Service Principal in an Azure AD environment. It leverages Azure Active Directory events ingested through EventHub, specifically monitoring the "Add service principal" operation. This activity is significant because Service Principals can be used by adversaries to establish persistence and bypass multi-factor authentication and conditional access policies. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain single-factor access to the Azure AD environment, potentially leading to unauthorized access to resources and prolonged undetected activity.
The analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.
The following analytic detects when the risk-based step-up consent security setting in Azure AD is disabled. It monitors Azure Active Directory logs for the "Update authorization policy" operation, specifically changes to the "AllowUserConsentForRiskyApps" setting. This activity is significant because disabling this feature can expose the organization to OAuth phishing threats by allowing users to grant consent to potentially malicious applications. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to user data and sensitive information, leading to data breaches and further compromise within the organization.
The following analytic identifies instances where a single user creates more than three unique OAuth applications within a 10-minute timeframe in Azure AD. It detects this activity by monitoring the 'Add service principal' operation and aggregating data in 10-minute intervals. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary rapidly creating multiple service principals to stage an attack or expand their foothold within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or access sensitive information within the Azure environment.
The following analytic detects cloud provisioning activities originating from previously unseen IP addresses. It leverages cloud infrastructure logs to identify events where resources are created or started, and cross-references these with a baseline of known IP addresses. This activity is significant as it may indicate unauthorized access or potential misuse of cloud resources. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain unauthorized control over cloud resources, leading to data breaches, service disruptions, or increased operational costs.
The analytic detects an Azure AD account successfully authenticating from multiple unique IP addresses within a 30-minute window. It leverages Azure AD SignInLogs to identify instances where the same user logs in from different IPs in a short time frame. This behavior is significant as it may indicate compromised credentials being used by an adversary, potentially following a phishing attack. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow unauthorized access to corporate resources, leading to data breaches or further exploitation within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of the `Find-LocalAdminAccess` cmdlet using PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). This cmdlet is part of PowerView, a toolkit for Windows domain enumeration. Identifying the use of `Find-LocalAdminAccess` is crucial as adversaries may use it to find machines where the current user has local administrator access, facilitating lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to target and compromise additional systems within the network, significantly increasing their control and access to sensitive information.
The following analytic detects the assignment of the Privileged Authentication Administrator role to an Azure AD user. It leverages Azure Active Directory audit logs to identify when this specific role is assigned. This activity is significant because users in this role can set or reset authentication methods for any user, including those in privileged roles like Global Administrators. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could change credentials and assume the identity and permissions of high-privilege users, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive information and critical configurations.
The analytic detects the addition of a new owner to a Service Principal within an Azure AD tenant. This activity is significant because Service Principals do not support multi-factor authentication or conditional access policies, making them a target for adversaries seeking persistence or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to maintain access to the Azure AD environment with single-factor authentication, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over critical resources.
This analytic detects the execution of the 'shred' command on a Linux machine, which is used to overwrite files to make them unrecoverable. It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because the 'shred' command can be used in destructive attacks, such as those seen in the Industroyer2 malware targeting energy facilities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to the permanent destruction of critical files, severely impacting system integrity and data availability.
This rule detects when an Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) conditional access policy has been modified. It specifically looks for 'USER_RESOURCE_UPDATE_CONTENT' events within Office 365, targeting the 'AzureActiveDirectory' application, where the 'extendedAuditEventCategory' is 'Policy' and the 'product_event_type' is 'Update policy.'. This indicates a change to a conditional access policy, which could be a legitimate administrative action or a malicious attempt to alter security controls.
This rule detects when a user is added to an administrative role within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). It specifically looks for events where the event type is 'USER_CHANGE_PERMISSIONS', the product event type is 'Add member to role', and the product name is 'Azure AD Directory Audit'. The rule is configured to trigger when a user is assigned to a role with the TemplateId '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10', which corresponds to the Global Administrator role in Azure AD. This activity is sensitive and warrants validation due to the high privileges associated with administrative roles.
This rule detects when a user is added to a role in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) outside of a Privileged Identity Management (PIM) process. While adding users to roles is a normal administrative action, performing it outside of PIM can indicate a potential security risk, as PIM provides just-in-time access and approval workflows for privileged roles. This rule specifically looks for "Add member to role outside of PIM (permanent)" events, which are often triggered via PowerShell API calls.
Detects when a new user is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) and subsequently assigned administrative or other specified roles within a 90-minute window. This rule aims to identify potential privilege escalation or suspicious account setup activities.
This rule detects when a client secret is added to an application within Azure AD. While this action can be legitimate for application configuration and integration, it can also be abused by adversaries to establish persistence within the environment. By adding a secret, an attacker can maintain access to the application and potentially associated resources, even if their initial access method is remediated. The rule specifically looks for 'Update application' events related to 'Certificates and secrets management' in Azure AD Directory Audit logs.
This rule detects a sequence of events where a new user account is created in Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) and then, shortly after, that same user is assigned an administrative-level role. This behavior can indicate an attacker establishing persistence or escalating privileges by creating a new account and immediately granting it high-level access.
Adding users to administrative roles is needed but due to sensitivity of these roles, validation should occur when this occurs
Detect users who are newly created and then immediately assigned administrator level roles
This rule detects suspicious user-agent strings associated with the GraphRunner tool. GraphRunner is a PowerShell script used for interacting with Microsoft Graph API and other Microsoft services, often for malicious purposes like token manipulation or brute-forcing client IDs. The rule specifically looks for a predefined set of user-agent strings that are hardcoded within GraphRunner's functions. Detection is focused on Azure Activity, Office 365, Azure AD, Azure AD Directory Audit, and Microsoft Graph Activity logs. The rule aggregates detections by principal IP or user ID over a 5-minute window.
This rule detects GET requests to the Microsoft Graph API's '/v1.0/groups' endpoint. This activity can indicate an adversary enumerating groups within an Azure Active Directory environment, potentially using tools like GraphRunner's 'Get-DynamicGroups' function or similar custom scripts. Successful requests (HTTP 200) are specifically targeted.
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