Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects process execution patterns and DNS requests associated with the GHAPPIER malware staging infrastructure. The rule monitors for specific command-line arguments involving known malicious scripts, temporary files, and deployment infrastructure (e.g., Vercel) often used for delivering or executing malicious payloads via node.js environments.
Detects a process that deletes its own executable file immediately after launching. This anti-forensic behavior is commonly utilized by remote access trojans (RATs) and other malware to minimize their footprint and evade file-based forensic analysis.
Detects malicious JavaScript/npm payloads that attempt to evade static analysis and string-based detection signatures by dynamically reconstructing sensitive strings at runtime using V8 string-object construction or obfuscated string tables.
This rule monitors for the presence of a specific, known malicious package (@dforge-core/dforge-mcp version 0.2.21) being referenced in file paths, indicative of a software supply chain compromise or the distribution of malicious dependency artifacts.
Detects the creation of a hidden file named '.git-checker' within system temporary directories (e.g., /tmp or \Temp\). This filename is often associated with adversary activity attempting to stage files, maintain persistence, or perform reconnaissance.
Detects instances where a process attempts to delete its own executable file on disk. This behavior is often associated with malware or adversary tools attempting to remove their footprint post-execution or as part of a cleanup routine.
Detects instances where npm processes (install, preinstall, or postinstall) spawn suspicious child processes such as shell interpreters (cmd, powershell, bash, sh), network utilities (curl, wget), or scripting interpreters (python). This behavior is often associated with malicious npm package installation or software supply chain compromise where post-install scripts are used to gain persistence or download secondary payloads.
Detects when AI-powered development tools or coding assistants (such as Claude, Copilot, Gemini, or Codex) spawn suspicious child processes like command shells (cmd, powershell, bash, sh) or networking utilities (curl, wget, python). This behavior is highly atypical for integrated development environments and may indicate exploitation of the assistant's integration or malicious code execution.
This rule detects Terraform CLI activity interacting with suspicious domains or modules, specifically targeting known repositories or namespaces (e.g., gocommunity.io, gogets.dev). It monitors for Terraform initialization or application patterns referencing these domains in process command lines, as well as the creation of Terraform provider files within these specific namespaces. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain compromise involving malicious Terraform modules or dependencies.
Detects the execution of 'go' or 'go.exe' with 'run' commands originating from infrastructure automation or orchestration tools such as Terraform, Docker, or other related automation processes. This pattern may indicate the execution of arbitrary Go code or modules in environments where infrastructure code is being managed or deployed.
Detects the execution of the Graphalgo RAT second-stage payload. The rule identifies the spawning of a detached 'go run .' process, which performs an ephemeral key exchange using a hardcoded public key before C2 establishment. It also correlates this activity with parent processes common in software build environments (npm, terraform, go) to differentiate malicious staging from developer activity.
Detects network navigation to Google Sites pages that match patterns associated with known Ledger-impersonating phishing campaigns. These sites are often reached through redirect chains involving Google Ads, cloud storage, and rotating domains.
Detects unauthorized modifications to SSH authorized_keys files. Attackers often modify these files to inject their own public keys, ensuring persistent access to a compromised Linux host. This rule excludes known configuration management and provisioning tools to reduce noise.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
This rule detects the execution of the MeshAgent remote administration tool from a temporary directory followed by a network connection to known malicious infrastructure within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized remote access setup or C2 activity using a legitimate remote management utility.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects Node.js processes executing system-level reconnaissance (e.g., CPU, memory, hostname, uptime enumeration) followed by network connections to known exfiltration endpoints (Slack, Telegram API). This behavior aligns with identified npm malware campaigns using host fingerprinting for target selection and data exfiltration.
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