Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

40,050 detections

Detects the GOST tunnel binary deployed as svchost.exe from a staging directory, identified by its known hash, or by an unsigned PE importing config.dll with a matching MZ header and embedded config.dll reference (reduces FPs from legitimately signed software that imports a DLL of the same name)
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
30 days ago
003
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known command and control (C2) and staging domains associated with the STAC4924 campaign. The rule performs strict matching on domain names to ensure that subdomains are identified while avoiding false positives from partial string matches within URLs.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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SlimKQL
1 month ago
5016
Detects historical network connections, URL clicks, browser launches, email URLs, and process command lines associated with Wazza phishkit infrastructure IOCs including boegl-krysl.eu, coppietersrecherche.eu, and beacon-surge-sync.workers.dev.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
28 days ago
002
Detects indicators of compromise associated with malicious Firefox wallet-clone extensions (Rabby/OKX clones) by checking for known file hashes, extension file names in Firefox profile directories, and network connections to known C2 domains and workers.dev subdomains.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
28 days ago
002
Detects indicators of compromise associated with malicious Firefox wallet-clone extensions (Rabby/OKX clones) by checking for known file hashes, extension file names in Firefox profile directories, and network connections to known C2 domains and workers.dev subdomains.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
28 days ago
002
Detects indicators of compromise associated with malicious Firefox wallet-clone extensions (Rabby/OKX clones) by checking for known file hashes, extension file names in Firefox profile directories, and network connections to known C2 domains and workers.dev subdomains.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
28 days ago
002
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
28 days ago
002
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MATCHBOIL campaign, identifying instances where a registry run key and a scheduled task pointing to an application data (%LOCALAPPDATA%) path are created by the same process within a short window, or where known specific scheduled task names and run value names are observed.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
28 days ago
002
Detects the execution of MATCHBOIL malware variants (PlannerAssistantManager.exe or RegularExpressionExplorer.exe) using specific command-line arguments (-auto, -plans, -renew) which trigger C&C logic.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
28 days ago
002
The following analytic detects the loading of known vulnerable Windows drivers, which may indicate potential persistence or privilege escalation attempts. It leverages Windows System service install EventCode 7045 to identify driver loading events and cross-references them with a list of vulnerable drivers. This activity is significant as attackers often exploit vulnerable drivers to gain elevated privileges or maintain persistence on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration. This detection is a Windows Event Log adaptation of the Sysmon driver loaded detection written by Michael Haag.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
1 month ago
105
The following analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package.
It detects EventCode 4624 with LogonType 3 and source address 127.0.0.1, indicating a login to the built-in local Administrator account.
This activity is significant as it may suggest a Kerberos relay attack, a method attackers use to escalate privileges.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, execute arbitrary code, or create new accounts in Active Directory, leading to potential system compromise.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
1 month ago
005
This rule detects various malicious indicators including known file hashes, IP addresses, domains, and specific URLs associated with threat activity. It consolidates hits from process, file, and network telemetry to alert on potential compromise or communication with identified command-and-control (C2) infrastructure.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
18130
This rule detects known-malicious activity associated with Warlock ransomware and the ToolShell malware campaign (linked to Storm-2603). It monitors for process, file, and image-load events matching identified malicious file hashes, as well as network connection attempts to known malicious domains and URLs. It also includes monitoring for traffic to 'oastify.com', a domain commonly used for Burp Collaborator, which requires correlation with other indicators to confirm malicious intent.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
209
This rule performs an IOC sweep over the past 30 days using DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to detect indicators associated with PoeLLM / Canto Incognito malware campaigns, specifically scanning for known C2 IP addresses, Kryptex cryptomining pool endpoints/domains, and specific file hashes (SHA256).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
29 days ago
002
This rule performs an IOC sweep over the past 30 days using DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to detect indicators associated with PoeLLM / Canto Incognito malware campaigns, specifically scanning for known C2 IP addresses, Kryptex cryptomining pool endpoints/domains, and specific file hashes (SHA256).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
29 days ago
002
This rule performs an IOC sweep over the past 30 days using DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to detect indicators associated with PoeLLM / Canto Incognito malware campaigns, specifically scanning for known C2 IP addresses, Kryptex cryptomining pool endpoints/domains, and specific file hashes (SHA256).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
29 days ago
002
This analytic detects unexpected outbound network connections initiated by known webserver processes such as `httpd.exe`, `nginx.exe`, or `tomcat.exe` to common file sharing or public content hosting services like GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
Webservers are rarely expected to perform outbound downloads, especially to dynamic or anonymous file hosting domains. This behavior is often associated with server compromise,
where an attacker uses a reverse shell, webshell, or injected task to fetch malware or tools post-exploitation.
The detection leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module flow data, enriched with process context, to identify this highly suspicious behavior.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
30 days ago
303
This rule monitors for the presence of the PoperBlocker browser extension or network traffic directed to associated domains, which are often used by potentially unwanted programs (PUP) or adware.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
209
This rule detects unauthorized directory replication requests (DRSUAPI) using Active Directory Event ID 4662. It specifically monitors for access requests to sensitive directory replication object GUIDs (Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All) where the requesting user account is not a domain controller computer account. This behavior is a common indicator of DCSync credential dumping attacks performed by tools like Mimikatz or Impacket.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
3016
Detects the execution of rundll32 with a command line that doesn't contain a common extension
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
24 days ago
000
Detects the execution of known tunneling binaries (ngrok, cloudflared) or network connections to tunneling service domains (ngrok.io, ngrok-free.app, trycloudflare.com), which are frequently used to establish unauthorized remote access or bypass perimeter security controls.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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SlimKQL
1 month ago
17236
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