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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential dropper activity associated with the TrustSink/XHOPLESS threat actor, specifically involving an 'Evernote.zip' file staged in the C:\Users\Public directory. It monitors for the automated extraction of files (like a repurposed notepad++.exe) using VBScript's Shell.Application or WScript.Shell, which is indicative of a side-loading attack chain.
Detects the presence of ZIP archive files masquerading as 'Evernote.zip' that contain 'notepad++.exe', which is a pattern frequently observed in VBScript-based downloaders utilizing binary sideloading to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the use of WScript or CScript to query the Win32_OperatingSystem WMI class for the InstallDate property. This behavior is commonly used by malware to identify the system installation time, which can serve as a simple heuristic for sandbox evasion or environmental keying.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
This rule correlates email attachment delivery events with subsequent process creation events on the recipient's endpoint. It identifies scenarios where a known document reader or mail client (Outlook, Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Adobe Acrobat/Reader) spawns a suspicious child process (PowerShell, CMD, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Rundll32, or Regsvr32) shortly after a file is delivered via email to the same user. This detects the immediate execution phase of a phishing attack.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
Detects the execution of Windows Script Host (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) loading WMI-related modules (wbemprox.dll, wbemcomn.dll, etc.). This pattern is often indicative of scripts attempting to query WMI for system information, environment configuration, or locale data, which is a common reconnaissance technique used by malware to identify the victim environment.
Detects video and audio conferencing clients (e.g., Zoom, Microsoft Teams, Webex) loading either unsigned DLLs or DLLs commonly associated with virtual camera and audio injection tools (e.g., OBS VirtualCam, Snap Camera). This behavior is characteristic of deepfake injection techniques used to manipulate video conference participants.
Detects instances where a Python-based machine learning framework (identifiable by command-line arguments related to model loading like pickle or PyTorch loading functions) spawns a suspicious child process, such as a shell or network utility. This behavior indicates a potential malicious machine learning model, such as a booby-trapped pickle file, executing arbitrary code upon deserialization.
Detects the creation of browser extension files (manifest.json, .crx, .xpi) within the default user profile directories for Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Mozilla Firefox. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized browser extension installation, which can be used for persistence or data exfiltration.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy sensitive files, specifically the NTDS.dit database or the SYSTEM registry hive, from that shadow copy. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform offline credential theft.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy sensitive files, specifically the NTDS.dit database or the SYSTEM registry hive, from that shadow copy. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform offline credential theft.
Detects the creation of a Volume Shadow Copy followed by an attempt to access or copy sensitive files, specifically the NTDS.dit database or the SYSTEM registry hive, from that shadow copy. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform offline credential theft.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a command shell (cmd.exe) launched by explorer.exe uses curl.exe to download an MSI file from Azure Blob Storage, followed immediately by the installation of that MSI using msiexec.exe. This pattern is indicative of common malware delivery techniques, such as those observed with the RVTools.lnk delivery chain.
Detects a sequence of activity indicative of beacon-like behavior: initial domain reconnaissance using commands such as 'net', 'systeminfo', or 'nltest', followed by the execution of 'rundll32.exe' without command-line arguments, and subsequent LDAP (port 389) communication to a domain controller, all occurring within a short timeframe.
This rule detects the creation of a scheduled task using an XML definition located in the user's AppData\Local\Temp directory, which is a common staging location for malware. This event is correlated with subsequent high-frequency, short-lived execution of pythonw.exe using .pyw scripts, characteristic of automated implant persistence and re-launch mechanisms.
Detects a multi-stage local execution chain associated with the Mirage2FA malware. The activity begins with WinRAR extracting an HTML stager from an Outlook quarantine directory, followed by rundll32.exe invoking shell32.dll to open the stager, and concluding with a spawned Microsoft Edge process executing the local HTML file.
Detects the creation or presence of Windows Shortcut (LNK) files that use deceptive double extensions (e.g., .pdf.lnk) and specific filenames related to South Korean financial reporting, a technique associated with the threat actor Kimsuky to entice users into executing malicious code.
Detects unauthorized or non-standard processes attempting to access sensitive browser cookie storage files, which is a common technique used by credential-stealing malware to exfiltrate session data and bypass multi-factor authentication.
Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe from the standard .NET Framework directories. While this utility is a legitimate tool used for registering and configuring WCF components, its abuse has been observed in the wild by threat actors, including the OnyxC2 malware, to leverage built-in Windows utilities for suspicious activities.
Detects the execution of known malicious MSI files associated with the LegionLoader malware family by monitoring process creation events involving msiexec.exe. The rule matches on specific file hashes and filenames identified in technical analysis of LegionLoader variants.
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