Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous, high-volume reconnaissance activity against multiple Microsoft Graph API endpoints (users, groups, roles, authentication methods, service principals, sites, and drives) by a single identity within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of post-compromise enumeration, often associated with threats like UNC6671/Storm-3121.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized access to Microsoft Graph API resources (Mail or Files) following a device-code authentication event for the same user. It identifies scenarios where a previously unknown application client performs read operations within 24 hours of a device-code login, which is characteristic of 'ARToken' or 'EvilProxy' type device-code phishing and session proxy attacks.
Detects anomalous activity where a user performs a device-code authentication followed rapidly by a device registration event and the subsequent issuance of a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) or x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential. This pattern is often indicative of OAuth device-authorization flow abuse, where an adversary attempts to register a malicious device to gain persistent access.
Detects administrative role assignments or additions, such as 'Global Administrator', occurring for a user shortly after a device code authentication event. This pattern is indicative of ARToken-based post-compromise activity where an adversary uses an illicitly obtained device code to escalate privileges within a cloud environment.
Detects instances where a user signs in via a Device Code authentication flow and subsequently adds a member to a highly privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins, Global Administrators) within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential account compromise where an attacker uses an OAuth device code flow to establish access and then escalates privileges.
Detects suspicious device registration or join events occurring within 60 minutes of a Device Code authentication flow. This pattern is consistent with the ARToken post-compromise technique, where an adversary uses an intercepted authentication code to register a new device to maintain persistent access to an Entra ID (Azure AD) environment.
Detects access to Microsoft Graph API endpoints related to mail, contacts, drive, or messages from a device that was registered within the last 24 hours. This behavior may indicate an adversary using stolen session tokens or credentials to access cloud-based email and data shortly after device registration or enrollment.
Detects successful authentication events using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code flow, which is frequently leveraged by adversaries to perform phishing attacks and bypass traditional interactive login requirements.
Detects interactive sign-ins to Microsoft Entra ID using the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow. Attackers commonly abuse this flow in 'device code phishing' campaigns to capture access and refresh tokens, effectively bypassing MFA requirements.
Detects potential privilege escalation in Entra ID (Azure AD) by monitoring for the assignment of high-privileged administrative roles to users or the granting of admin consent to applications, which can be leveraged to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects non-interactive sign-in events to the Microsoft Graph API by applications that are not part of a known set of standard Microsoft applications. This pattern may indicate the use of stolen access tokens or compromised sessions (e.g., via device code phishing) to access M365 data without user interaction.
Detects anomalous, non-interactive Microsoft 365 sign-in events where an authentication session bypasses MFA via a previously issued token claim or device-code flow, indicative of ARToken or similar session hijacking and token replay attacks.
Detects suspicious Entra ID (Azure AD) events related to device registration, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) issuance, and account-level flags (such as 'enforceMfa' or broker mode) that are indicative of persistence techniques used in device code phishing campaigns, such as the ARToken platform.
Detects high-frequency, diverse access patterns against the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated enumeration or discovery of SharePoint, OneDrive, or search resources. The rule monitors for distinct paths (e.g., sites, drives, children) requested by a single actor within a 20-minute window.
Detects multiple consecutive MFA challenge events (ResultCode 50074 or 50140) for a single user session occurring on unmanaged devices (trustType is null or unknown) while using the Chrome browser. This pattern may indicate an attempt to bypass or exhaust MFA mechanisms, or credential abuse on non-compliant devices.
Detects the addition of a new strong authentication method (MFA/authenticator device) to an account. This activity is a common indicator of persistence following a successful AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing attack or initial account compromise, as attackers establish their own MFA device to maintain long-term access.
This rule is a placeholder intended to detect abuse of the OAuth device code authentication flow. The current logic attempts to identify successful logins associated with authentication failure reasons; however, the rule author notes that the necessary data source (Azure AD/Entra ID logs) is missing from the SentinelOne SDL event lake, making this detection non-functional for its stated purpose.
This rule detects successful authentication to Azure/M365 identity and security management portals (My Sign-Ins, My Apps, My Profile) shortly after a risky or suspicious sign-in event for the same user. This pattern often indicates an account takeover scenario where an adversary, having potentially compromised credentials, immediately accesses account settings to perform further malicious actions, such as registering MFA devices or updating security proofs.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency cloud management API requests across multiple sensitive paths (such as directory roles, applications, and service principals) from a single account. This pattern is indicative of automated enumeration or discovery of cloud infrastructure, permissions, and identity configurations, which is often a precursor to further exploitation.
Detects the use of the OAuth device code authentication flow in Azure AD/Entra ID sign-in events. This flow is frequently abused by attackers who use vishing or SMS phishing pretexts to trick users into authorizing a device login, enabling the attacker to obtain a valid session token without direct credential harvesting or cookie theft.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by monitoring specific Azure AD sign-in failure codes (50074: strong authentication is required, 50140: interruption of sign-in) in conjunction with logins from unmanaged devices.
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