Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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'This query combines different Storage alerts with CommonSecurityLogs and AuditLogs helping analysts investigate any possible storage related attacks faster
thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
thus reducing Mean Time To Respond'
'Identifies a match across various data feeds for domains, hashes and IP IOC related to Mercury
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
Looks for a logon domain in the Microsoft Entra ID logs, encoded with the same DGA encoding used in the Nobelium campaign.
See Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks for more on the Nobelium campaign (formerly known as Solorigate).
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Hunting%20Queries/DnsEvents/Solorigate-Encoded-Domain-URL.yaml
See Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks for more on the Nobelium campaign (formerly known as Solorigate).
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/12/13/customers-protect-nation-state-cyberattacks/
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Hunting%20Queries/DnsEvents/Solorigate-Encoded-Domain-URL.yaml
'Finds instances where a file uploaded to blob or file storage and it is seen on an endpoint by Microsoft Defender XDR.'
'This query looks for unfamiliar Sign-in's thats not seen recently for the given user
with azure portal login attempts and audit logs to help detect and reduce the analysis timeline for defenders'
with azure portal login attempts and audit logs to help detect and reduce the analysis timeline for defenders'
'This query searches for failed attempts to log in from more than 15 various users within a 5 minute timeframe from the same source. This is a potential indication of a password spray attack
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimAuthentication)'
'Any Alerts that fired related to a given IpAddress during the range of +6h and -3d'
'This hunting query looks for queries that appear to be looking for secrets or passwords in tables.'
This query will find applications that have been granted Mail.Read or Mail.ReadWrite permissions in which the corresponding user recently consented to. It can help identify applications that have been abused to gain access to user email.
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
The actor, Nobelium, was observed modifying existing tenant application permissions to allow them to read user email through the Microsoft Graph API. See Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks.
This query is insprired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/MailPermissionsAddedToApplication.yaml
'This query look for accounts that have not been successfully logged into recently who then add or update an MFA method before logging in.
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed. This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel UEBA features.
Ref: [LINK TO BLOG]'
Threat actors may look to re-activate dormant accounts and use them for access by adding MFA methods in the hope that changes to such dormant accounts may go un-noticed. This query uses the Microsoft Sentinel UEBA features.
Ref: [LINK TO BLOG]'
This query visualises total emails with Phish detections over time summarizing the data daily by Phish detection technologies/controls used for detecting unknown-unique phish
This will show Active Directory Security Token Service (STS) refresh token modifications by Service Principals and Applications other than DirectorySync. Refresh tokens are used to validate identification and obtain access tokens. This event is most often generated when legitimate administrators troubleshoot frequent Entra ID user sign-ins but may also be generated as a result of malicious token extensions. Confirm that the activity is related to an administrator legitimately modifying STS refresh tokens and check the new token validation time period for high values.
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/StsRefreshTokenModification.yaml
Query insprired by Azure Sentinel detection https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/StsRefreshTokenModification.yaml
Attackers can use Adfind which is administrative tool to gather information about domain controllers or ADFS servers. They may also rename executables with other benign tools on the system.
The below query will look for Adfind usage in command line arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
1. AdFind Recon
2. Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents
3. Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers
This query is inspired by a Azure Sentinel detection.
The below query will look for Adfind usage in command line arguments irrespective of executable name in short span of time. You can limit query this to your DC and ADFS servers.
Below references talk about suspicious use of adfind by adversaries.
1. AdFind Recon
2. Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents
3. Analyzing Solorigate, the compromised DLL file that started a sophisticated cyberattack, and how Microsoft Defender helps protect customers
This query is inspired by a Azure Sentinel detection.
'Any Alerts that fired related to a given File during the range of +6h and -3d'
'This query looks for sign ins by the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Sync account to Azure where properties about the logon are anomalous.
This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be
reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.'
This query uses Microsoft Sentinel's UEBA features to detect these suspicious properties.
A threat actor may attempt to steal the Sync account credentials and use them to access Azure resources. This alert should be
reviewed to ensure that the log in came was from a legitimate source.'
'Any Alerts that fired related to a given account during the range of +6h and -3d'
'Any Alerts that fired on a given host during the range of +6h and -3d'
'This query looks for messages related to file downloads of suspicious file types on an Exchange Server. This could indicate attempted deployment of webshells.
This query uses the Exchange HttpProxy AOBGeneratorLog, you will need to onboard this log as a custom log under the table http_proxy_oab_CL before using this query.
This log is commonly found at C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Logging\OABGeneratorLog on the Exchange server. Details on collecting custom logs into Sentinel
can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/connect-custom-logs
This query uses the Exchange HttpProxy AOBGeneratorLog, you will need to onboard this log as a custom log under the table http_proxy_oab_CL before using this query.
This log is commonly found at C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Logging\OABGeneratorLog on the Exchange server. Details on collecting custom logs into Sentinel
can be found here: https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/connect-custom-logs
'This hunting query looks for new Service Principals running queries that have not previously been seen running queries.'
'This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Europium actor.
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government '
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.
Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government '
'Identifies the host and account that executed AdFind by hash and filename in addition to common and unique flags that are used by many threat actors in discovery.
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
To use this analytics rule, make sure you have deployed the [ASIM normalization parsers](https://aka.ms/ASimProcessEvent)'
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