Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects incoming HTTP requests to the WSO2 admin API endpoint that utilize a JSON Web Token (JWT) with the 'alg=none' algorithm, indicating an attempt to bypass authentication via JWT token forgery (CVE-2026-5430).
Detects attempts to exploit a vulnerability in WSO2 API Manager and Traffic Manager that allows for authentication bypass by utilizing a malformed JWT with the 'alg=none' header. Attackers can leverage this to impersonate users or bypass security controls by providing a crafted Bearer token in the Authorization header.
Detects high-frequency outbound TCP connection attempts from a WSO2 API Gateway or Traffic Manager host to multiple sensitive internal management and administrative ports (22, 445, 3389, 5985, 5986). This behavior is indicative of a compromised gateway being used for lateral movement across the network.
Detects HTTP traffic proxying Microsoft authentication paths (OAuth 2.0 authorization or CDN assets) via non-Microsoft domains. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack using typosquatted infrastructure to intercept user sessions.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack targeting Microsoft 365. The rule identifies HTTP response bodies containing 'login.microsoftonline.com' and 'Enter Password' being served from a web server identified as 'openresty'. This configuration is common for phishing kits that proxy traffic between the victim and the legitimate service to harvest credentials and session cookies.
Detection rules designed to identify various stages of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing campaign, including malicious redirect chains (e.g., Google Meet/Ads redirects, AWS S3-hosted assets) and common lure patterns in SMTP traffic referencing voicemail portals.
Detection of suspicious DNS queries associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rules monitor for suspicious subdomains and TLD patterns targeting Microsoft login services, as well as behavioral sequences involving initial Google Ads traffic redirection followed by rapid lookups of suspected malicious or newly registered domains and external geolocation services.
Detects the abuse of the Google Meet 'linkredirect' service to facilitate phishing attacks, commonly used to bypass security filters and redirect users to Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing landing pages.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to api.telegram.org containing 'sendMessage' patterns in the URI and suspicious query parameters like 'VIEW' or 'MOBILE'. This behavior is characteristic of malicious scripts or applications using the Telegram Bot API as a command-and-control (C2) or exfiltration channel.
Detects network activity associated with the GhostCode phishing kit, specifically communication with its geolocation harvester API, DNS lookups for the FlashProxy.io residential proxy service used for geolocation evasion, and identification of the proxy_ip in HTTP responses.
Detects outbound network traffic from internal hosts to the known MoneroOcean mining pool over TLS (port 443). This behavior is indicative of XMRig or other cryptomining software communicating with a mining pool to exchange job data, often a sign of unauthorized resource hijacking.
Detects network activity associated with SilkParasite infrastructure, including the use of specific self-signed TLS certificates (swarm ca, proxy.local, 127.0.0.1) and connections to known malicious pivot domains such as socket.ayakliborsa.net or certificate subjects like *.scalefast.ninja.
Detects network traffic consistent with the download of XMRig cryptocurrency miner release tarballs from GitHub, typically used in malicious deployment scenarios including automated cron-triggered installations.
Detects a malicious command sequence targeting Redis instances where an attacker uses 'CONFIG SET' to modify the 'dir' and 'dbfilename' configuration directives followed by a 'SLAVEOF' or 'REPLICAOF' command. This is a common exploit pattern used to achieve remote code execution by forcing the Redis instance to load a malicious database file (often containing binary webshells or cron jobs) from an attacker-controlled server.
Detects outbound HTTP GET requests containing a specific '/ping' URI pattern and 'h=' query string parameter, characteristic of Redis-based cryptomining botnet C2 heartbeat check-ins.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
Detects a multi-stage phishing redirect chain used in 'EvilTokens' attacks. The rule identifies communication with common serverless hosting platforms (Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda/Execute-API) followed by interaction with anti-bot/CAPTCHA gates (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, Google reCAPTCHA) and finally reaching known Microsoft device code phishing endpoints (/devicelogin or /common/oauth2/deviceauth).
Detects a multi-stage phishing redirect chain used in 'EvilTokens' attacks. The rule identifies communication with common serverless hosting platforms (Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda/Execute-API) followed by interaction with anti-bot/CAPTCHA gates (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, Google reCAPTCHA) and finally reaching known Microsoft device code phishing endpoints (/devicelogin or /common/oauth2/deviceauth).
Detects a multi-stage phishing redirect chain used in 'EvilTokens' attacks. The rule identifies communication with common serverless hosting platforms (Vercel, Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda/Execute-API) followed by interaction with anti-bot/CAPTCHA gates (Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, Google reCAPTCHA) and finally reaching known Microsoft device code phishing endpoints (/devicelogin or /common/oauth2/deviceauth).
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
Detects malicious activities associated with the SilkParasite campaign targeting Redis servers. The rules identify the initiation of a 'SLAVEOF' command to a rogue replication host, subsequent handshake (PSYNC/REPLCONF) with an external attacker-controlled node, and the modification of server configuration ('CONFIG SET dbfilename') to potentially facilitate unauthorized file persistence or data exfiltration through the Redis replication mechanism.
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