Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands used in service creation events, specifically looking for patterns indicative of Invoke-Obfuscation's VAR++ LAUNCHER technique. The rule identifies service creations where the ImagePath contains specific keywords like '&&set', 'cmd', '/c', '-f', and format specifiers like '{0}', '{1}', etc., which are characteristic of highly obfuscated PowerShell commands often used for defense evasion.
Detects the creation of a new service where the ImagePath contains 'mshta' and 'vbscript:createobject', indicating potential obfuscated PowerShell execution via MSHTA. This technique is often used for defense evasion and execution.
Detects the installation of a service by PAExec, a remote administration tool. This rule specifically looks for Event ID 7045 from the Service Control Manager, indicating a service installation, and then filters for service names or image paths starting with 'PAExec-'. This is a common indicator of PAExec being used to execute commands or deploy tools remotely.
This rule detects the installation of the 'Remote Utilities - Host' service on a Windows system. It specifically looks for Event ID 7045 from the 'Service Control Manager' provider, which indicates a service installation. The detection is further refined by checking for the presence of 'rutserv.exe' and '-service' in the ImagePath, or the exact service name 'Remote Utilities - Host'. This activity is often associated with remote access tools, which can be used legitimately for IT administration but also by adversaries for persistence and remote control.
This rule detects the installation of a TAP (Tunnel Adapter) driver, specifically looking for 'tap0901' in the service's ImagePath. TAP drivers are commonly used by VPN software like OpenVPN to create virtual network interfaces, which can be leveraged for tunneling and data exfiltration. The detection aims to identify potential preparation for data exfiltration using tunneling techniques.
This rule detects the creation of new Windows services with suspicious or uncommon image paths. It specifically looks for paths containing references to named pipes, common temporary directories like `Users\Public\` or `Windows\Temp\`, or image paths that include patterns indicative of encoded PowerShell commands (e.g., `-e` followed by specific base64 encoded strings). This behavior is often associated with adversaries establishing persistence or escalating privileges by creating malicious services.
This rule detects the termination of important Windows services, such as antivirus, firewall, Microsoft Defender components, BitLocker, and Encrypting File System (EFS). It specifically looks for Event ID 7023 from the 'Service Control Manager' provider, indicating a service termination with an error. The rule identifies critical services by their display names (which can be language-specific) or by their wide hex-encoded service names in the 'Binary' field of the event.
Detects the installation of a new Windows service where the executable path contains suspicious patterns, specifically executables located directly under 'ProgramData' or the root of the C: drive with a short, potentially obfuscated name (e.g., 'C:\ProgramData\.{1,9}\.exe' or 'C:\.{1,9}\.exe'). This pattern is often used by malware for persistence and to evade detection by hiding in less common locations.
This rule detects when the Sysmon service crashes, indicated by an 'Application Popup' event with EventID 26 and a caption explicitly mentioning 'sysmon.exe - Application Error' or 'sysmon64.exe - Application Error'. This could signify an attempt to impair or disable Sysmon, which is a critical defense mechanism for endpoint monitoring.
Detects events from the Kernel-General ETW indicating that the access bits of a hive with a system like hive name (SAM or SECURITY) located in the temporary directory have been reset. This behavior can occur when an application attempts to access a hive that has not been recognized for a period (default 7 days). Registry hive dumping utilities such as QuarksPwDump have been observed to exhibit this behavior, which is often associated with credential dumping.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains highly obfuscated PowerShell commands. Specifically, it looks for 'cmd' executing a 'set' command to define an environment variable, followed by PowerShell execution with the '-f' format operator, which is characteristic of Invoke-Obfuscation's VAR+ launcher technique. This method uses environment variables and string manipulation to hide malicious PowerShell code.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045 from 'Service Control Manager') where the 'ImagePath' contains patterns indicative of obfuscated PowerShell execution via standard input (stdin). Specifically, it looks for the presence of 'set' and '&&' along with keywords like 'environment', 'invoke', or 'input' within the service's executable path, suggesting an attempt to execute obfuscated commands.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named "WerFaultSvc" with a specific ImagePath pattern, which has been identified as a persistence mechanism used by the SNAKE malware (also known as EKANS) as described in CISA reports. The rule specifically looks for Event ID 7045 from the Service Control Manager, indicating a service installation, where the service name contains 'WerFaultSvc' and the ImagePath starts with 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\' and ends with '\WerFault.exe'.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains 'rundll32.exe', 'shell32.dll', 'shellexec_rundll', and 'powershell'. This specific combination is indicative of an attempt to execute obfuscated PowerShell code via rundll32.exe, a common technique for defense evasion and execution.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045 from 'Service Control Manager') where the service's ImagePath contains specific PowerShell commands indicative of Invoke-Obfuscation's COMPRESS obfuscation technique. Specifically, it looks for the presence of 'new-object', 'text.encoding]::ascii', 'readtoend', and either ':system.io.compression.deflatestream' or 'system.io.streamreader' within the ImagePath. This combination suggests an attempt to decompress and execute obfuscated PowerShell code as part of a service.
Detects the creation of a new service where the ImagePath contains 'rundll32' and 'shell32.dll' along with obfuscation indicators like '&&', 'value', 'invoke', 'comspec', or 'iex'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to execute obfuscated PowerShell commands via rundll32, specifically leveraging 'shellexec_rundll'.
Detects the creation of new Windows services using either the 'sc.exe' command-line utility or the PowerShell 'New-Service' cmdlet. The rule specifically looks for suspicious binary paths associated with the newly created service, including common scripting interpreters (powershell, wscript, cscript, cmd), system binaries (svchost, dllhost, rundll32), and suspicious user-writable directories (Public, Downloads, Desktop, Startup, Temp). This activity is often indicative of persistence or privilege escalation attempts by adversaries.
Detects tampering with the 'File' key within the Windows EventLog service registry path. This modification can be used by adversaries to change the default location of an EVTX log file, thereby hindering log collection and alerting mechanisms. The rule specifically looks for changes to the 'File' value in any EventLog service subkey, excluding changes that merely point to the default 'System32\Winevt\Logs\' directory.
This rule is designed to detect attempts to exploit Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability using mimikatz zerologon module or other exploits from machine with "kali" hostname.
Detects RemCom service installation and execution events
Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie. This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on WebDav Server) or potentially a sign of exploitation of CVE-2023-23397
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