Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of ServiceModelReg.exe from the standard .NET Framework directories. While this utility is a legitimate tool used for registering and configuring WCF components, its abuse has been observed in the wild by threat actors, including the OnyxC2 malware, to leverage built-in Windows utilities for suspicious activities.
Detects the execution of known malicious MSI files associated with the LegionLoader malware family by monitoring process creation events involving msiexec.exe. The rule matches on specific file hashes and filenames identified in technical analysis of LegionLoader variants.
Detects instances where processes other than standard web browsers attempt to access sensitive browser data files, such as cookies, login data, and browser state files. This behavior is a common indicator of credential theft or browser session hijacking, often performed by stealer malware like OnyxC2.
Detects instances where processes other than standard web browsers attempt to access sensitive browser data files, such as cookies, login data, and browser state files. This behavior is a common indicator of credential theft or browser session hijacking, often performed by stealer malware like OnyxC2.
Detects instances where a process spawns a child process using the exact same executable image path, specifically when the executable is located in user-writable directories such as Downloads or AppData\Local\Temp. This behavior is a common indicator of process hollowing or self-injection techniques used by malware, such as loaders that decrypt payloads in memory and then spawn a new, hollowed instance of themselves to execute the malicious code, frequently observed during post-exploitation activities.
Detects the presence of a specific malicious _socket.pyd Python module associated with LegionLoader dropped into non-standard directories like 'Traiolx Custom Utils'. The detection leverages file path patterns and known file hashes of the malicious component.
Detects the execution of a specific VBScript file 'Telegram_Private_Call_Session.vbs' via WScript, or its execution when spawned as a child process of MSHTA. This behavior is indicative of an HTA-dropped malicious script attempting to execute.
Detects a suspicious process pattern where an executable running from a staging directory (Temp or Downloads) spawns a child process of itself, followed by a registry modification performed by that child process. This behavior is indicative of malicious loaders, such as OnyxC2, that sideload components and establish runtime configurations before C2 communication.
Detects the suspicious initiation of Control Panel applet functionality via the COM object 'COpenControlPanel'. Adversaries may leverage this COM interface or the associated 'CPL_INIT' message to proxy malicious code execution through standard Windows processes like dllhost.exe or rundll32.exe, effectively bypassing security controls that might otherwise flag the direct execution of malicious .cpl files.
Detects the execution of wmic.exe when launched by uncommon parent processes, specifically mshta.exe or wscript.exe. These parent processes are often associated with the execution of malicious scripts (e.g., .hta or .vbs files), which may use wmic.exe for system discovery or execution of commands, a common pattern in file-based living-off-the-land attacks.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe as a child process of mshta.exe, specifically when the wscript.exe command line contains references to .vbs or .js files. This behavioral pattern is often associated with malicious HTA files using mshta.exe as a proxy to execute secondary script payloads, a technique commonly leveraged for initial access and execution.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity associated with the Lightlife RAT, specifically targeting Google Chrome's login data files to steal credentials and performing checks for the presence of cryptocurrency wallets.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run/RunOnce keys that reference msbuild.exe without typical build arguments. This is often used by adversaries to maintain persistence by executing malicious XML-based projects or inline C#/VB code via a trusted system utility.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download the gitlab-runner-windows-amd64.exe binary from the official AWS S3 distribution bucket. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to stage the GitLab Runner service to establish command and control or persistence within a compromised Windows environment.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with flags designed to bypass execution policies (-NoProfile, -NonInteractive, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass) directly spawned by a GitLab Runner process. This behavior is associated with the abuse of GitLab CI/CD runners as a Command and Control (C2) mechanism to execute unauthorized commands on build infrastructure.
Detects the creation or execution of a scheduled task masquerading as a Microsoft Update process. The task is configured to execute potentially malicious components, specifically identified by filenames such as userscreen.exe, UserInerfacePicture, or config.cat. This behavior is indicative of persistence and execution of malicious payloads, as seen in campaigns involving the NarwhalRAT loader.
Detects cmd.exe processes utilizing variable assignment and dynamic substring expansion to reconstruct and execute obfuscated PowerShell commands, a technique frequently observed in malicious LNK file decoy campaigns to evade static signature detection.
Detects unsigned or non-standard Python processes loading core Windows system modules like kernel32.dll or ntdll.dll. This behavior is consistent with NarwhalRAT's fileless execution technique, which utilizes ctypes to interact with low-level Windows APIs (VirtualAlloc, RtlMoveMemory, CFUNCTYPE) for in-memory payload allocation and execution, bypassing traditional disk-based detection.
This rule detects the execution of LNK or HTA files from a WebDAV share (DavWWWRoot) using common Windows binaries like mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or explorer.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with the 'ClickFix' technique, where users are lured into opening malicious files hosted on remote WebDAV shares to achieve code execution.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows binaries (Rundll32, Wscript, Cscript, and Regsvr32) to execute scripts, HTML applications, or remote scriptlets. This pattern is commonly associated with adversary techniques to proxy execution of malicious code, bypass application controls, or retrieve payloads from remote servers.
Detects the execution of Windows Terminal, PowerShell, or pwsh processes spawned directly by explorer.exe that do not originate from standard Start Menu search or navigation host processes. This pattern is indicative of the user triggering the 'Power User' (Win+X) menu, often associated with adversary attempts to leverage ClickFix-style social engineering lures that rely on the user interacting with specific UI elements.
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