Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the creation of XML files matching the 'export_batch_*.xml' naming convention, which is consistent with the output pattern of the Dahua DeviceManager utility. Attackers often use this tool to export camera configuration files containing sensitive credentials (IP, Port, Username, Password). The rule flags activity where multiple such files are created in a short duration, suggesting potential mass exfiltration of camera credentials.
Detects the execution of known privilege escalation tools and the use of specific Windows privilege keywords (such as SeImpersonatePrivilege) often associated with access token manipulation and token impersonation attacks to elevate privileges to SYSTEM.
Detects instances where rundll32.exe is executed with suspicious command-line parameters that are often associated with malicious activity. This includes attempts to dump memory (comsvcs.dll), utilize specific protocols (url.dll), execute JavaScript, or leverage common writeable directories for payload staging, all of which are common techniques used by attackers to proxy execution and evade defenses.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender features via PowerShell, terminate critical security services using administrative tools like sc.exe or net.exe, or inject/patch AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) within a process context to evade detection.
Detects instances where the Terraform process initiates a 'go run' command or references specific Go-based provider source files, which may indicate an attempt to run malicious or unauthorized Go code within the infrastructure-as-code environment. This behavior is indicative of supply chain compromise where providers are leveraged to execute arbitrary logic.
Detects instances where explorer.exe (the Windows Shell) spawns a PowerShell process with suspicious flags, commonly associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and paste malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects web or application server processes (Apache, Nginx, IIS, Tomcat, PHP) spawning command interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is indicative of a post-exploitation activity where an attacker executes commands following a remote code execution exploit against the web application.
This rule detects potential Windows token manipulation by correlating logon events containing sensitive privileges (SeDebugPrivilege/SeImpersonatePrivilege) with subsequent process creation events under a different user context within a short timeframe. It further validates the activity by incorporating Sysmon Event ID 10 alerts that identify process access patterns commonly associated with token duplication or impersonation techniques used in post-exploitation frameworks like Cobalt Strike.
Detects the creation of Windows scheduled tasks that include suspicious interpreters (PowerShell, cmd.exe, rundll32) or execution paths located in common attacker-writable directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData), which is a common technique for persistence and command-and-control re-establishment.
Detects techniques associated with LSASS process credential dumping, including direct handle access to the LSASS process with specific access masks (common in tools like Mimikatz), the use of rundll32.exe to invoke comsvcs.dll for memory dumping, and the creation of LSASS dump files on disk.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes employing common obfuscation and evasion techniques frequently associated with fileless malware loaders and malicious script execution. This includes the use of EncodedCommand, Base64 strings, IEX/Invoke-Expression download cradles, and stealth execution flags (e.g., hidden windows combined with non-interactive modes).
Detects persistence attempts by monitoring modifications to Windows registry run keys (Run, RunOnce, Winlogon Shell/Userinit) or file creation within the Startup folder. It alerts when these locations are updated to reference suspicious file paths (Temp/AppData) or execute scripts (vbs, ps1, js, wsf, bat, hta).
Detects the loading of known-vulnerable signed drivers typically associated with 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attacks. These drivers are frequently abused to gain kernel-mode privileges, allowing attackers to disable or terminate EDR, antivirus, and other security processes.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry persistence keys (Run, RunOnce, RunServices, RunServicesOnce) where the referenced executable or script path resides in low-trust locations such as AppData, Temp, or Public directories. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence after initial execution.
KQL Query
Detects suspicious behavior where an identical executable (same path and SHA256) is launched twice within a short window (60 minutes) following a system reboot, utilizing two distinct persistence methods: one triggered via the Task Scheduler (under svchost.exe -k netsvcs) and one via a user logon autostart mechanism (spawned by explorer.exe).
Detects instances where the Node.js runtime environment (node.exe) deletes a file named 'sharedLoad.min.js' located within a 'node_modules' directory. This behavior is indicative of anti-forensic cleanup activities where malicious npm packages attempt to remove their own footprints or temporary artifacts post-execution.
Detects the modification of registry keys under HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\...\InProcServer32, which is a common method for achieving persistence. The rule flags when these registry keys point to file paths within the local user profile (AppData), which is frequently used by malicious actors to load custom DLLs when the corresponding COM object is initialized.
Detects the execution of the RUSTYSHADE Rust-based backdoor, observed during Operation RapidRust, associated with the threat group APT36 (Transparent Tribe). The rule monitors for the specific 'DriverInstaller.exe' filename, known malicious file hashes, and suspicious command-line patterns involving PowerShell-based downloads of 'DriverInstaller.zip' from Backblaze cloud storage.
Detects the launch or execution of common remote access tools such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, Quick Assist, or Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) on an endpoint, excluding instances where these tools act as the parent process. This rule serves as one component of a broader detection chain for potentially unauthorized remote access.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events suggesting potential technical support scam or social engineering activity: a rapid influx of emails (email bombing) followed by an external Microsoft Teams call, and subsequently the execution of a common remote access tool on the same host within a short timeframe.
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