Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
734 detections
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Detects successful cloud console login events across AWS, Azure, and GCP where multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not utilized, combined with impossible travel indicators (login from different countries within an 8-hour window for the same principal).
Detects anomalous cross-account AssumeRole activities, including chained role assumptions, which are often used by cloud-native intrusion sets to launder access, evade single-account logging detection, and move laterally across AWS environments. The rule identifies AssumeRole events targeting non-allowlisted accounts or sequences where credentials are immediately used to perform further cross-account assumptions.
Detects modifications to EBS or RDS snapshot permissions that grant access to the public 'all' group or an external AWS account ID. This activity is a common method for exfiltrating sensitive data via unauthorized cross-account sharing, bypassing standard VPC egress monitoring and DLP controls.
Detects unauthorized attempts to stop, delete, or reduce the scope of AWS CloudTrail logging. Attackers frequently perform these actions to blind defenders before conducting large-scale resource abuse or ransomware activities. This rule monitors for StopLogging, DeleteTrail, and configuration changes (UpdateTrail, PutTrail) that weaken log integrity such as disabling multi-region tracking, global service events, or log file validation.
Detects the creation of a new AWS IAM access key by a user for an account other than their own. This is a common persistence technique where an attacker, having obtained sufficient permissions, creates a new credential set for an existing, potentially dormant user account to maintain long-term access while blending in with legitimate activity.
Detects anomalous, large-scale provisioning of GPU-intensive cloud instances (such as p3, p4, g4dn, g5, and trn1 families) in AWS. This activity is indicative of cloud cryptojacking campaigns where adversaries hijack resources to rapidly spin up compute clusters for cryptomining, potentially incurring significant financial damage within a short period.
Detects attempts to tamper with or disable AWS security monitoring controls, specifically GuardDuty detectors and AWS Config recording. Attackers frequently disable these services to evade detection after gaining administrative permissions in a cloud environment.
This rule detects the creation of compute resources (EC2 instances, launch templates, or spot instances) within AWS regions that are designated as dormant or rarely used. This behavior is a common indicator of regional 'region-hopping,' used by attackers for cryptojacking or establishing C2 infrastructure to evade detection, particularly in regions where monitoring and cost-based alerts are less mature.
Detects potential privilege escalation sequences in AWS where an identity uses 'iam:PassRole' in conjunction with resource-creation APIs (such as 'lambda:CreateFunction', 'ec2:RunInstances', or 'cloudformation:CreateStack'). This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to attach a higher-privileged role to a newly created resource under their control, allowing them to perform actions beyond their current scope.
Detects modifications to AWS IAM trust relationships, specifically the creation or update of SAML providers, OIDC providers, or the update of role trust policies containing wildcard principals. These actions are indicative of an attacker attempting to establish a durable, credential-less persistence mechanism via federated identity manipulation.
Detects modifications to AWS Lambda functions that indicate potential backdooring, specifically unauthorized resource policy grants (lambda:InvokeFunction with a wildcard principal) or unexpected function code/configuration updates. This activity enables persistent, low-visibility execution by leveraging existing function permissions.
Detects modifications to AWS Lambda functions that indicate potential backdooring, specifically unauthorized resource policy grants (lambda:InvokeFunction with a wildcard principal) or unexpected function code/configuration updates. This activity enables persistent, low-visibility execution by leveraging existing function permissions.
Detects the creation or modification of credentials (access keys or login profiles) for the AWS root account or identities explicitly named to imply high-privilege administrative access. This is a high-fidelity indicator of persistence or unauthorized privilege escalation within an AWS environment.
Detects unauthorized cross-account copying of AWS EC2 or RDS snapshots, a key indicator of data exfiltration or staging as part of a snapshot-theft attack chain. The rule correlates copy events where the source snapshot owner is different from the destination account ID.
Detects the deletion of AWS CloudWatch log groups, log streams, metric filters, CloudWatch alarms, and VPC Flow Logs. Such actions are often indicative of an adversary attempting to destroy forensic evidence or disable security alerting prior to further unauthorized activity, such as data exfiltration or resource abuse.
Detects modifications to AWS CloudTrail event selectors that result in a loss of audit coverage (e.g., stopping management event logging or narrowing the ReadWriteType), which is a technique used by sophisticated actors to silently evade detection while keeping the trail status as enabled.
Detects the creation of an AWS IAM access key (CreateAccessKey) for the root account or identities with administrative naming conventions. This activity can indicate persistence establishment by an attacker who has gained high-privileged access, as new access keys provide a durable way to maintain programmatic control that bypasses standard session-based security controls.
Detects unauthorized attempts to stop CloudTrail logging or delete existing CloudTrail configurations within an AWS environment. Disabling logging is a significant indicator of defense evasion, often used by attackers to mask subsequent malicious activities such as data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or resource abuse.
Detects the creation of a new AWS IAM role with a trust policy that permits access from an external or wildcard principal, which is often used as a persistence mechanism to allow unauthorized cross-account access. The rule also triggers if an AdministratorAccess policy is attached to a newly created role, as these actions are commonly chained in cloud intrusions.
Detects AWS CloudTrail events where VPC Flow Logs are disabled or deleted, potentially indicating an adversary attempting to evade network monitoring by blinding detection mechanisms for lateral movement or data exfiltration.
Detects the attachment of the 'AdministratorAccess' managed policy or custom policies with wildcard actions and resources to AWS IAM users, roles, or groups. This activity is a critical indicator of privilege escalation, often serving as the final step in gaining full control of an AWS account by an adversary.
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