Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a user has consented to an OAuth application that requests high-privilege Microsoft Graph scopes (Directory.Read.All, User.Read.All, Mail.Read). This pattern is indicative of consent phishing attacks where adversaries trick users into granting applications excessive permissions, bypassing administrative consent workflows when tenant configurations allow user-level consent.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege application permissions (e.g., Mail.ReadWrite, full_access_as_app, Files.ReadWrite.All, Sites.FullControl.All) to a service principal. This pattern is indicative of an attacker who has compromised an Application Administrator account and is attempting to establish long-term, unattended access to cloud resources such as mailboxes and SharePoint sites via OAuth client-credential flows.
Detects when a high-privileged administrative role is assigned to an Azure Service Principal. This technique is often used for persistent, stealthy control over a tenant, as service principals are not subjected to user-centric access reviews or MFA challenges. The rule triggers on both permanent and PIM-eligible role assignments.
Detects the addition of a new federated domain or a modification to an existing domain's authentication settings to Federated, where the domain was not previously verified within a standard verification window. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence and perform self-issued token forgery (e.g., SAML/JWT) by trusting an attacker-controlled identity provider.
Detects changes to federation settings on an Entra ID domain, including modifications to IssuerUri, ActiveLogOnUri, MetadataExchangeUri, or SigningCertificate, as well as transitions between Managed and Federated authentication types. Such changes can facilitate 'Golden SAML' attacks by allowing an adversary to forge authentication tokens for the tenant.
Detects the addition of a new federated domain or a modification to an existing domain's authentication settings to Federated, where the domain was not previously verified within a standard verification window. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence and perform self-issued token forgery (e.g., SAML/JWT) by trusting an attacker-controlled identity provider.
Detects when a user is added as an owner to an Azure AD Application or Service Principal, specifically highlighting instances where the new owner does not currently hold a privileged directory role. This pattern is often used as a persistence mechanism to maintain long-term access to an environment without requiring high-level administrative credentials.
Detects when a Service Principal is assigned to a highly privileged administrative role in Azure Active Directory (Entra ID). This activity can be an indicator of an adversary establishing persistence or escalating privileges by leveraging non-human identities.
This rule detects when new credentials (secrets or certificates) are added to an Azure Active Directory Service Principal. It flags this activity as suspicious if it occurs outside of typical business hours or if it exhibits signs of 'rapid re-keying', where multiple credentials are added to the same service principal within a 24-hour window. This behavior is a common indicator of persistence maintenance or credential rotation to support unauthorized access.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling policies, switching them to report-only mode, removing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or grant control requirements, or expanding exclusion lists to exempt users, groups, or locations from security controls. Such modifications are often indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects the assignment of highly privileged Azure AD/Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator, Application Administrator) to a service principal. Assigning such roles to service principals is a common persistence technique, as these identities can be used to bypass conditional access policies and MFA through non-interactive authentication methods like client credentials.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) Conditional Access policies that lower security posture. This includes disabling policies, switching them to report-only mode, removing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or grant control requirements, or expanding exclusion lists to exempt users, groups, or locations from security controls. Such modifications are often indicative of an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access or bypass MFA requirements.
Detects the addition of suspicious redirect URIs, such as those containing wildcards, non-HTTPS protocols, or known URL-shortening services, to an OAuth application registration. Such configurations can be exploited by attackers to perform OAuth authorization code or token interception (e.g., through adversary-controlled endpoints).
This rule detects administrative changes that weaken cloud identity security, specifically the disabling of Entra ID Security Defaults, per-user MFA enforcement, or tenant-wide authentication-methods policies. These actions remove critical second-factor authentication requirements, significantly increasing the risk of unauthorized access via password-spraying or credential-stuffing attacks.
Detects modifications to application secrets or certificates in Azure that are performed by a user who is not the registered owner of the application, or when a new credential is added to an application that already has credentials configured, potentially indicating persistent access establishment.
Detects modifications or deletions of Azure AD Conditional Access policies that weaken security, such as disabling policies, removing MFA requirements, or adding user/group/application exclusions. This behavior can be indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass authentication controls.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator) to a user account, where the initiator's sign-in session is identified as anomalous. Anomalous indicators include non-interactive sign-in, unknown/untrusted device state, elevated risk score, or activity occurring outside of configured business hours.
This rule correlates events across the end-to-end kill chain of an enterprise intrusion, specifically tracking the progression from initial endpoint-based infostealer activity (credential access), through anomalous or non-interactive sign-in activity, into privilege escalation or mailbox delegation within the cloud environment, and finally to mass data exfiltration or mail access. It detects accounts involved in at least three distinct stages of this progression within a 72-hour window.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user performs a device-code authentication flow from a previously unseen application, followed within a two-hour window by sensitive account activities such as OAuth application consent/registration or mailbox-related administrative operations. This behavior is characteristic of passkey-phishing campaigns designed to steal access tokens and achieve persistence or data access via malicious OAuth applications.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator) to identities that either have a recent risky sign-in history or were created within the last 48 hours. This pattern is indicative of privilege escalation following account compromise or the creation of backdoored accounts by an attacker. Assignments including change management tracking tags are excluded to reduce noise.
This rule detects potentially malicious OAuth application consent grants where a user authorizes an application with high-privilege scopes (such as mail or directory access). The detection flags consent grants for applications that are either unverified by the publisher or newly created within the last 30 days, and correlates these events with suspicious sign-in activity (high/medium risk or failures) for the same user within a two-hour window.
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