Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
199 detections
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Detects attempts to perform a container escape using path traversal via the 'docker cp' command. This rule monitors for malicious directory traversal sequences, the creation of specific artifacts used in known PoC exploits for container escapes, and the subsequent execution of scripts or shell interpreters by container management processes.
This rule detects potentially malicious activities within or involving Docker containers on Linux systems. It specifically monitors for the use of 'docker cp' with archive flags, the execution of custom scripts ('poc.sh') involving docker-related commands, or the use of 'docker-cp-copyout' strings, which may indicate data staging, exfiltration, or container-based persistence and lateral movement.
This rule detects potentially malicious attempts to escape a container or manipulate the host filesystem using the 'docker cp' command. It identifies commands that contain directory traversal patterns (e.g., '../', '..\') or direct references to the host filesystem via '/proc/self/root'.
Detects attempts to perform a container escape using the 'docker cp' command, where a maliciously crafted source path with traversal sequences allows the container daemon to write files outside of the container boundary. The rule monitors for suspicious 'docker cp' command executions and the creation of artifacts associated with known path traversal escape techniques in the host filesystem by the Docker daemon.
Detects the use of 'docker cp' to copy files to or from sensitive host paths, such as cron, password files, SSH keys, or system directories, which often indicates attempts to escape container isolation or establish persistence on the host.
Detects the execution of 'docker pull' or 'docker run' commands, excluding common base images like Microsoft, Ubuntu, Debian, and Alpine. This rule aims to identify potentially unauthorized container deployments or image pulls that could indicate malicious activity within a containerized environment.
Detects the use of 'docker cp' commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., '..') in the destination argument. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to escape the container environment and write files to the host filesystem, potentially exploiting the 'docker-cp-copyout' vulnerability.
Detects the execution of container-related binaries (act_runner, docker, dockerd) using sensitive command-line flags that indicate potential container escape or high-privilege configuration, such as mounting the host namespace, running in privileged mode, or leaking CI/CD tokens.
Detects Gitea Act Runner spawning Docker containers with high-risk security options (e.g., --privileged, --pid=host, --ipc=host, --cap-add=ALL, or security profile unconfined). These flags are often used to attempt a container escape, allowing a process running within a Gitea CI/CD workflow to gain unauthorized access to the underlying host or other container resources.
Detects anomalous process execution and filesystem access patterns originating from Gitea Act Runner that indicate an attempted container-to-host escape. This includes the injection of dangerous container flags (e.g., --pid=host, --privileged, --cap-add=ALL) into workflow commands, the execution of nsenter, or direct access to the host's filesystem structures (e.g., /host or /proc/1/root).
Detects the Gitea Act Runner CI/CD tool executing Docker containers with dangerous security flags (such as --privileged, --pid=host, or --cap-add=ALL) or spawning nsenter to interact with host namespaces. This behavior indicates a potential attempt to escape the container boundary and gain unauthorized root-level access on the underlying CI/CD runner host.
Detects anomalous process execution patterns associated with the Gitea Act Runner that indicate attempts to break out of container isolation. This includes the use of sensitive Docker flags like --privileged, --pid=host, or --ipc=host, the mounting of the Docker daemon socket, or the execution of nsenter to gain access to the host namespace, which are indicative of container escape techniques.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving container runtimes (e.g., Docker) that indicates potential container escape attempts or unauthorized host interaction. It flags scenarios where container processes spawn administrative shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) with SYSTEM privileges, instances of privileged container creation, or direct access to physical drives from container management tools, which are common indicators of host filesystem manipulation.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving container runtimes (e.g., Docker) that indicates potential container escape attempts or unauthorized host interaction. It flags scenarios where container processes spawn administrative shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) with SYSTEM privileges, instances of privileged container creation, or direct access to physical drives from container management tools, which are common indicators of host filesystem manipulation.
Detects attempts to perform a container escape via the docker cp command by abusing path traversal vulnerabilities or suspicious file write operations performed by the Docker daemon to the host filesystem outside of standard container paths, often associated with symbolic link extraction exploits.
This rule detects potential container escape attempts on Linux systems by monitoring suspicious file system access patterns to the host's root directory or process creation events involving 'mount', 'nsenter', or 'chroot' commands with parameters indicative of host interaction. Specifically, it looks for file operations on '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1/cwd', '/proc/1/exe', '/proc/1/fd', '/proc/1/ns', '/proc/1/environ', '/proc/1/mounts' or paths starting with '/host', '/hostroot', '/host-root', '/node-root'. It also flags 'mount' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/proc/1', 'nsenter', '--target 1', 'hostpath', or '/host', 'nsenter' commands with namespace manipulation arguments, and 'chroot' commands targeting '/proc/1/root', '/host', or '/hostroot'. These activities are commonly associated with adversaries trying to break out of a containerized environment to gain access to the underlying host.
Detects the command line sequence used by Miasma to restore passwordless sudo for the 'runner' user in GitHub Actions by overwriting sudoers via a Docker container. This specific pattern targets the Miasma Alpine container payload.
Detects pulling of potentially malicious container images from registries
Detects the command line sequence used by Miasma to restore passwordless sudo for the 'runner' user in GitHub Actions by overwriting sudoers via a Docker container. This specific sequence involves echoing 'runner ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' into a file within the /mnt/runner directory and then changing its permissions to 0440, indicative of a privileged modification to the sudoers file within a containerized GitHub Actions runner environment.
Detects shell execution inside Docker containers
Detects unauthenticated access to Docker daemon API for container escape
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