Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
539 detections
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Detects the creation or modification of a property list (.plist) file within the /Library/LaunchAgents/ directory on macOS. The rule filters for configurations set to execute at system load, and identifies instances where the program path executed by the launch agent does not reside in standard, trusted system directories. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms utilized by malware or unauthorized background processes.
Detects an AI coding assistant (e.g., Claude, Copilot, Gemini CLI) attempting to checkout a Git repository and subsequently failing a manual verification check (git rev-parse HEAD) against an expected pinned commit hash. This behavior is indicative of a Plugin4Shell-style supply chain attack attempt, where an adversary tries to inject malicious code into a repository that the AI agent is instructed to use.
Detects instances where an unprivileged user executes commands like 'ls -l' or 'stat' on the Parallels dispatcher Unix socket (/var/run/prl_disp_service.socket) specifically when it is world-writable (mode 0777). This behavior indicates an adversary attempting to verify if they can exploit the insecure socket permissions to interact with or hijack the Parallels dispatcher service.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
Detects unauthorized or non-privileged processes attempting to communicate with the Parallels Desktop IPC Unix socket (prl_disp_service.socket). This behavior is indicative of exploitation attempts targeting the ParaShells vulnerability (CVE-2026-90894), where an unprivileged user can leverage the socket's lack of proper signature or identity verification to escalate privileges.
Detects instances where the Parallels dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) is invoked to install an appliance using a local 'file:///tmp/' URL instead of a trusted remote catalog source, which may indicate an attempt to load unauthorized or malicious virtual appliance files.
Detects instances where the Parallels dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) is invoked to install an appliance using a local 'file:///tmp/' URL instead of a trusted remote catalog source, which may indicate an attempt to load unauthorized or malicious virtual appliance files.
Detects network connections to known FLATROOF and ROOFDECK C2 infrastructure used by Jade Sleet/TraderTraitor (UNC4899, Lazarus) in campaigns targeting IT services and DevOps engineers.
Detects network connections to known FLATROOF and ROOFDECK C2 infrastructure used by Jade Sleet/TraderTraitor (UNC4899, Lazarus) in campaigns targeting IT services and DevOps engineers.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects ROOFDECK backdoor persistence via macOS Launch Agents, tightened to require the implant's distinguishing masquerade artifacts (fake Apple-service drop paths, --type=renderer flag, loginwindow.plist impersonation, or the literal 'persist add|remove|check' CLI syntax) rather than generic LaunchAgents plist creation or launchctl load activity, which legitimate macOS software triggers constantly.
Detects macOS shell processes (bash/sh/zsh) executing curl to fetch portable Python bootstrap files from known indicators associated with CRPx0/ClickFix campaigns. This typically involves downloading python-build-standalone environments or staging scripts from external endpoints.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized installation of root certificates on Windows and macOS systems. Attackers use this technique to bypass security warnings, establish adversary-in-the-middle capabilities, or inspect encrypted traffic by adding their own certificates to the system's trust store.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a web browser or common application launcher spawns a terminal or PowerShell process to execute obfuscated, copied, or piped commands. This behavior often indicates a social engineering attack where a user is tricked into manually executing a malicious command script.
Detects instances where an unprivileged user executes commands like 'ls -l' or 'stat' on the Parallels dispatcher Unix socket (/var/run/prl_disp_service.socket) specifically when it is world-writable (mode 0777). This behavior indicates an adversary attempting to verify if they can exploit the insecure socket permissions to interact with or hijack the Parallels dispatcher service.
Detects instances where an unprivileged user executes commands like 'ls -l' or 'stat' on the Parallels dispatcher Unix socket (/var/run/prl_disp_service.socket) specifically when it is world-writable (mode 0777). This behavior indicates an adversary attempting to verify if they can exploit the insecure socket permissions to interact with or hijack the Parallels dispatcher service.
Detects instances where an unprivileged user executes commands like 'ls -l' or 'stat' on the Parallels dispatcher Unix socket (/var/run/prl_disp_service.socket) specifically when it is world-writable (mode 0777). This behavior indicates an adversary attempting to verify if they can exploit the insecure socket permissions to interact with or hijack the Parallels dispatcher service.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where the Parallels Desktop dispatcher service (prl_disp_service) executes a tar command with a compression program flag, followed immediately by the creation or modification of a launch agent (.plist) file in system or user launch directories. This pattern is indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activity attempting to achieve persistence.
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