Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, "Exchange Server zero-days exploited in the wild".
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query detects 7-zip activity associated with this threat. 7-ZIP is a legitimate tool used for file archiving; however, unusual 7-ZIP activity combined with other evidence might indicate that an attacker is compressing data for exfiltration.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
In early March 2021, Microsoft released patches for four different zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Exchange Server. The vulnerabilities were being used in a coordinated attack. For more information on the vulnerabilities, visit the following links:
1. CVE-2021-26855
2. CVE-2021-26857
3. CVE-2021-26858
4. CVE-2021-27065
The following query detects 7-zip activity associated with this threat. 7-ZIP is a legitimate tool used for file archiving; however, unusual 7-ZIP activity combined with other evidence might indicate that an attacker is compressing data for exfiltration.
More queries related to this threat can be found under the See also section of this page.
Reference - https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/03/02/multiple-security-updates-released-for-exchange-server/
EmojiHunt
KQL
Did you know you can use Emojis in Windows?.
Read more here: https://davidzych.com/abusing-emoji-in-windows.
Check-out who in your organization has renamed his or her computer to a Pizza or to a smiling poop.
You might be amused by the results, or perhaps angry if one of your systems or scripts was broken by this...
Note: this query will also return some machines with non-English charcters that are not Emojis.
Credit for this query goes to miflower - thanks for bringing joy to our lives! :).
Read more here: https://davidzych.com/abusing-emoji-in-windows.
Check-out who in your organization has renamed his or her computer to a Pizza or to a smiling poop.
You might be amused by the results, or perhaps angry if one of your systems or scripts was broken by this...
Note: this query will also return some machines with non-English charcters that are not Emojis.
Credit for this query goes to miflower - thanks for bringing joy to our lives! :).
This query looks for the DGA pattern of the domain associated with the Nobelium campaign, in order to find other domains with the same activity pattern.
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
Reference - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Hunting%20Queries/DnsEvents/Solorigate-DNS-Pattern.yaml
This query is inspired by an Azure Sentinel detection.
Reference - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Hunting%20Queries/DnsEvents/Solorigate-DNS-Pattern.yaml
Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service running on an endpoint.
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
This query provides insights into AIR investigation actions in Microsoft Defender for Office 365.
Action "PnpDeviceConnected" reports the connection of any plug and play device.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
'Provides the Anti virus mode and device count falling under that AV mode.'
Find attempts to stop System Restore and.
Prevent the system from creating restore points.
Prevent the system from creating restore points.
This query will identify the Microsoft Defender Antivirus Engine version and Microsoft Defender Antivirus Security Intelligence version (and timestamp), Product update version (aka Platform Update version) as well as the Microsoft Defender Antivirus Mode on the endpoint (Active, Passive, etc.).
This query identifies use of wmic.exe to delete shadow copy snapshots prior to encryption.
This query looks for signs of impacket wmipersist usage and should work for other wmi based persistence methods. Requires analysis.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/impacket-part-2/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
More info: https://threathunt.blog/impacket-part-2/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ransomware continues to hit healthcare, critical services. There is also a related blog.
In April of 2020, security researchers observed multiple ransomware campaigns using the same set of techniques.
The following query detects the use of the tool cipher.exe to delete indicators of malicious activity right before encrypting a drive.
The See also section below lists more queries related to techniques shared by these campaigns.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
In April of 2020, security researchers observed multiple ransomware campaigns using the same set of techniques.
The following query detects the use of the tool cipher.exe to delete indicators of malicious activity right before encrypting a drive.
The See also section below lists more queries related to techniques shared by these campaigns.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
'This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Dev-0530 actors.
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'
In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'
'Provides the Engine version and total count of up to date devices, not up to date devices and count of devices whose status is not available relevant to the Engine version.'
Microsoft has observed threat actors exploiting vulnerabilities associated with Log4J.
LemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives. First discovered in 2019, LemonDuck has since adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations in 2021. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Ransomware continues to hit healthcare, critical services. There is also a related blog.
Robbinhood is ransomware that has been involved in several high-profile incidents, including a 2019 attack on the city of Baltimore, Maryland. Robbinhood operators often employ a distinctive defense evasion technique, where they load a vulnerable driver on to a target and exploit it, in order to turn off security software -- essentially using the driver as malware.
The following query detects a late stage of this technique, when the operator is issuing commands to turn off the driver.
For a query that detects an earlier stage of this technique, see Detect loading of vulnerable drivers by Robbinhood ransomware campaign.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Robinhood.A&ThreatID=2147735370
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/baltimore-ransomware.html
Robbinhood is ransomware that has been involved in several high-profile incidents, including a 2019 attack on the city of Baltimore, Maryland. Robbinhood operators often employ a distinctive defense evasion technique, where they load a vulnerable driver on to a target and exploit it, in order to turn off security software -- essentially using the driver as malware.
The following query detects a late stage of this technique, when the operator is issuing commands to turn off the driver.
For a query that detects an earlier stage of this technique, see Detect loading of vulnerable drivers by Robbinhood ransomware campaign.
References:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/
https://www.microsoft.com/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/Robinhood.A&ThreatID=2147735370
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/us/baltimore-ransomware.html
Establishes a baseline SystemGuardSecurityLevel and show the devices that are below that baseline.
See https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Microsoft-Defender-ATP/How-insights-from-system-attestation-and-advanced-hunting-can/ba-p/969252 for full details on this query.
And Device Boot Attestation Info and feel free to ping @DepletionMode or @flyingbluemonki on twitter.
See https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Microsoft-Defender-ATP/How-insights-from-system-attestation-and-advanced-hunting-can/ba-p/969252 for full details on this query.
And Device Boot Attestation Info and feel free to ping @DepletionMode or @flyingbluemonki on twitter.
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