Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
247 detections
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Detects a specific combination of HTTP GET, POST, and PUT requests to the GitHub API (api.github.com) within a short timeframe. This sequence matches the behavior of the AdaptixC2 custom listener used by Tropic Trooper, which uses GitHub issues for beaconing/task polling and the contents API for data exfiltration. The detection has been refined to look for specific AdaptixC2 operational keywords ('beat', 'upload', 'download') to reduce noise.
Detects disabling security tools
Detects EtherRAT-related host and network activity using reported artefacts including a known C2 domain (aurineuroth[.]com), a CDN-like beacon URL pattern, the creation of a svchost.log debug file, and various hidden PowerShell commands for system information discovery (AV, domain, MachineGuid, GPU).
Detects potential NetScaler administrative session hijacking by monitoring for the usage of SESSID or NITRO_SK administrative cookies from multiple source IPs. Attackers leverage CVE-2026-3055 to steal these specific session cookies to gain unauthorized administrative access.
Detects HTTP GET requests to the vulnerable Citrix NetScaler /wsfed/passive?wctx endpoint, specifically looking for the malformed query string used in CVE-2026-3055 exploitation where 'wctx' is present without an associated value or '=' symbol. This rule combines common network appliance and web server logs to identify potential exploit attempts.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to a specific Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) domain and canister ID (tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai.raw.icp0.io or tdtqy-oyaaa-aaaae-af2dq-cai). This pattern is associated with command and control (C2) activity, where compromised systems communicate with an adversary-controlled server.
This rule detects potential indicators of compromise related to CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN systems. It focuses on two main areas: 1) suspicious successful SSH authentications for the 'vmanage-admin' account, and 2) SD-WAN control plane connection events indicating a new 'up' state. The first part looks for specific log entries related to publickey authentication for 'vmanage-admin' from any source IP. The second part identifies control connection state changes to 'up' and extracts peer type, peer system IP, and public IP from the raw logs. The rule aims to surface events that require human confirmation by comparing them against known network designs and change records, as these events can indicate unexpected relationships between devices or unauthorized privileged access.
Detects successful administrative logins ('vmanage-admin') to a Cisco SD-WAN device from an IP address not on the authorized list. This could indicate exploitation of CVE-2026-20127, an authentication bypass vulnerability.
Identifies network connections to known command and control (C2) and dropper distribution infrastructure associated with the EncystPHP web shell campaign.
Monitors for command-line activity indicating the addition of SSH keys to authorized_keys files or the modification of the SSH daemon configuration to permit root login on Cisco SD-WAN devices. This is a common persistence technique used by attackers after gaining initial access, such as through CVE-2026-20127.
Detects the deletion or clearing of critical Cisco SD-WAN log files. This is a common post-exploitation technique used by attackers to cover their tracks after compromising a device, for instance, after exploiting CVE-2026-20127. The rule identifies direct file deletions and commands used to clear or truncate log file content.
This rule detects activity associated with the DYNOWIPER malware, identified by specific SHA256 hashes on endpoint telemetry or by network connections to known command and control (C2) IP addresses. The rule is split into two parts: one for endpoint detection based on file hashes and another for network/authentication logs based on IP addresses.
This rule detects two related activities that could indicate the use of AI webchat services as a covert C2 proxy via WebView2. The first part identifies network connections to specific AI webchat domains (grok.com, copilot.microsoft.com) via proxy or web logs. The second part identifies the creation of the 'msedgewebview2.exe' process by unusual parent processes, excluding common browsers and Microsoft Office applications. This combination aims to catch scenarios where WebView2, often used by AI webchat applications, is leveraged for malicious command and control.
This rule detects various indicators associated with the SSHStalker botnet on Linux systems, including outbound IRC-like network connections, modifications to cron files for persistence, log tampering (specifically utmp/wtmp/lastlog files), and the execution of compilers from suspicious directories like /tmp or /dev/shm. Each section of the rule targets a specific behavior of the botnet.
The following rule detects attempts to tamper with Linux log records by looking for interpreter processes, or common utility commands interacting with critical log files such as /var/log/wtmp, /var/log/btmp, or /var/run/utmp. It also includes scenarios where 'dd' or 'cp' might be used with /dev/null or /dev/zero to effectively clear or overwrite log content.
Detects network connections to known infrastructure associated with the EncystPHP web shell campaign. This IP (45.234.176.202) was observed distributing the 'c' and 'k.php' droppers.
Detects the PeerBlight Linux backdoor masquerading as the '[ksoftirqd]' kernel thread. This is a defense evasion technique used by the malware to blend in with legitimate system processes.
This rule detects the execution of TruffleHog, a tool designed to find secrets in various platforms such as Git, GitHub, Jira, Slack, Confluence, SharePoint, Docker images, and cloud storage services like S3 and GCS. While TruffleHog is a legitimate tool often used in CI pipelines and security assessments, its execution can also indicate malicious activity, as observed in the Shai-Hulud malware campaign targeting npm packages to steal sensitive information. The rule triggers on either the image name ending with '/trufflehog' or a combination of command-line arguments indicating its use to scan specific platforms and the '--results=verified' flag.
The following analytic detects the use of default or publicly known named pipes associated with Cobalt Strike. It leverages Sysmon EventID 17 and 18 to identify specific named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike's Artifact Kit and Malleable C2 Profiles. This activity is significant because Cobalt Strike is a popular tool for adversaries to conduct post-exploitation tasks, and identifying its named pipes can reveal potential malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate an active Cobalt Strike beacon, leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This detection identifies signs of SSH brute-force attacks by monitoring for a high number of failed login attempts within a short time frame. Such activity may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access through password guessing.
This detection identifies SSH being enabled on ESXi hosts. Enabling SSH on ESXi can be an early indicator of malicious activity, as threat actors often use SSH to gain persistent remote access after compromising credentials or exploiting vulnerabilities. The rule specifically looks for syslog messages indicating that SSH access has been enabled.
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