Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The following analytic identifies a suspicious modification to the Windows registry that disables automatic updates. It detects changes to the registry path `SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU\NoAutoUpdate` with a value of `0x00000001`. This activity is significant as it is commonly used by adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, to evade detection and maintain persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to bypass security updates, leaving the system vulnerable to further exploitation and potential zero-day attacks.
This analytic is developed to detect suspicious registry modifications targeting the "scforceoption" key. Altering this key enforces smart card login for all users, potentially disrupting normal access methods. Unauthorized changes to this setting could indicate an attempt to restrict access or force a specific authentication method, possibly signifying malicious intent to manipulate system security protocols.
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the Windows registry keys related to file compression color and information tips. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to the "ShowCompColor" and "ShowInfoTip" values under the "Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced" path. This activity is significant as it was observed in the Hermetic Wiper malware, indicating potential malicious intent to alter file attributes and user interface elements. If confirmed malicious, this could signify an attempt to manipulate file visibility and deceive users, potentially aiding in further malicious activities.
The following analytic detects suspicious modifications to the EventLog security descriptor registry value for defense evasion. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to the "CustomSD" value within the "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Eventlog\<Channel>\CustomSD" path. This activity is significant as changes to the access permissions of the event log could blind security products and help attackers evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to block users and security products from viewing, ingesting and interacting event logs.
The following analytic detects changes in the ScManager service security descriptor settings. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for any process execution involving the "sc.exe" binary with the "sdset" flag targeting the "scmanager" service. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate their privileges.
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool quser.exe, commonly used to gather information about user sessions on a Remote Desktop Session Host server. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as quser.exe is often abused by post-exploitation tools like winpeas, used in ransomware attacks to enumerate user sessions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this information to further compromise the system, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges.
The following analytic identifies the use of `wmic.exe` to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs, including command-line details. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate reconnaissance efforts by an attacker to understand group memberships, which could be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out privileged groups, aiding in further exploitation and persistence within the environment.
This analytic detects Windows processes such as cmd.exe, PowerShell, and common Windows LOLBINs being spawned by React or Next.js application servers.
In the context of CVE-2025-55182 / React2Shell / CVE-2025-66478 for Next.js, successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server, which in turn is used to invoke Node's child_process APIs (for example child_process.execSync) to run OS-level commands.
This detection focuses on suspicious child processes where a Next/React server process spawns an uncommon process.
Such activity might be a strong indicator of exploitation of the aforementioned vulnerability.
In the context of CVE-2025-55182 / React2Shell / CVE-2025-66478 for Next.js, successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary JavaScript execution on the server, which in turn is used to invoke Node's child_process APIs (for example child_process.execSync) to run OS-level commands.
This detection focuses on suspicious child processes where a Next/React server process spawns an uncommon process.
Such activity might be a strong indicator of exploitation of the aforementioned vulnerability.
Detects a process other than XBootMgr.exe spawned by XBootMgrSleep.exe.
XBootMgrSleep.exe is a Microsoft-signed Windows Performance Toolkit binary that can execute an arbitrary executable after a delay.
XBootMgrSleep.exe is a Microsoft-signed Windows Performance Toolkit binary that can execute an arbitrary executable after a delay.
The following analytic detects the spawning of a PowerShell process as a child or grandchild of commonly abused processes like services.exe, wmiprvse.exe, svchost.exe, wsmprovhost.exe, and mmc.exe.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process names, as well as command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it could indicates lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute code remotely, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects curl.exe writing an MSI package into the ProgramData
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
directory. Chaos ransomware stages a trojanized installer this way, fetching
update_ms.msi from an attacker-controlled host over plain HTTP on port 443 so
the traffic reads as TLS to port-based inspection. The match is on the
behaviour rather than on that filename: curl is a signed in-box binary and has
no legitimate reason to drop an installer package into ProgramData.
Detects cmd.exe spawned by a python.exe or pip.exe process with a command line invoking netstat or calc.exe. Matches the payload behavior described for the malicious redpy_demo PyPI package, whose __main__.py used Python's subprocess module to execute these commands via cmd.exe automatically at module invocation, without any direct victim interaction with the payload.
Detects a setx.exe process launched by python.exe or pip.exe with a command line referencing the PYTHONPATH environment variable. This matches setup.py build-time tampering that persistently rewrites the user's PYTHONPATH, redirecting future module resolution for the affected user to an attacker-controlled directory across all subsequent Python invocations.
The following analytic identifies the use of a `for /f` loop with the `delims=` option within `cmd.exe`, a technique commonly used to parse and extract data from the output of other commands.
Adversaries and malicious scripts leverage this pattern to programmatically process command output for discovery, data extraction, or execution purposes while evading simpler detection logic.
Adversaries and malicious scripts leverage this pattern to programmatically process command output for discovery, data extraction, or execution purposes while evading simpler detection logic.
The following analytic detects the creation of an lsass.exe process dump using Windows Task Manager.
It leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to identify file creation events where the target filename matches *lsass*.dmp.
This activity is significant because creating an lsass dump can be a precursor to credential theft, as the dump file contains sensitive information such as user passwords.
It leverages Sysmon EventID 11 to identify file creation events where the target filename matches *lsass*.dmp.
This activity is significant because creating an lsass dump can be a precursor to credential theft, as the dump file contains sensitive information such as user passwords.
The following analytic detects attempts to read LSASS memory, indicative of credential dumping.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for "PROCESS_VM_READ" with query information access on lsass.exe.
It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 and checks for "PROCESS_VM_READ" with query information access on lsass.exe.
The following analytic identifies potential DLL search order hijacking or DLL sideloading by detecting known Windows libraries loaded from non-standard directories. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL loads and cross-references them with a lookup of known hijackable libraries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code by exploiting DLL search order vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the use of protocol handlers executed via the command line. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because protocol handlers can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands or launch applications, potentially leading to unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects the deletion of shadow copies using the vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe utilities. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because deleting shadow copies is a common tactic used by attackers to prevent recovery and hide their tracks. If confirmed malicious, this action could hinder incident response efforts and allow attackers to maintain persistence and cover their activities, making it crucial for security teams to investigate promptly.
The following analytic detects the use of Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to make remote HTTP or HTTPS connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments containing URLs. This activity is significant because adversaries often use mshta.exe to download and execute remote .hta files, bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network infiltration.
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