Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects automated post-compromise mailbox reconnaissance following an anomalous OAuth device code sign-in that exhibits high-risk indicators. The rule identifies programmatic access to a high volume of mail items within a short window following suspicious token issuance, which is characteristic of automated scanning or data exfiltration tooling.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects an administrator account rapidly granting mailbox permissions (Add-MailboxPermission, Add-RecipientPermission, Set-MailboxFolderPermission) to a large number of objects within a short timeframe (15 minutes). The rule correlates this activity with a prior 'risky' sign-in or a sign-in using device-code flow, indicative of potential EvilToken or similar adversary-in-the-middle proxy-based session hijacking.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user modifies the Entra Authentication Methods Policy to register an external authentication method (EAM) provider, followed immediately by the same user associating a new FIDO key with their account. This behavior can be indicative of an adversary setting up a persistence mechanism via a malicious or unauthorized MFA provider.
Detects sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that asserts specific possession or inherence claims (e.g., 'hwk' - hardware key). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or forge MFA responses via a rogue EAM provider.
Detects the scripted, non-human-paced registration of a rogue external authentication method by monitoring a sequence of specific Azure Audit Log operations (Add application, Add service principal, Add delegated permission grant) occurring within 60 seconds of each other by the same actor. The detection is further corroborated by analyzing Microsoft Graph Activity Logs for associated Python requests to specific Graph API URIs.
Detects sign-in events where Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) was satisfied using an External Authentication Method (EAM) that asserts specific possession or inherence claims (e.g., 'hwk' - hardware key). This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or forge MFA responses via a rogue EAM provider.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
This rule hunts for indicators associated with the TrustSink technique, which involves using rogue External Authentication Methods (EAM) or malicious OIDC providers to bypass authentication or maintain persistence within a cloud environment. It monitors Azure AD sign-in and audit logs, alongside DNS and network events, for references to known malicious domains and URLs used for EAM-based attacks.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects anomalous privilege reconnaissance activity where an account queries Microsoft Graph API endpoints (such as directory roles or member/transitive member lists) multiple times in a short window, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to enumerate Global or Exchange Administrator role memberships.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
Detects high-volume access to Microsoft Graph API endpoints related to messages, mail folders, and attachments by a single user account within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated, unauthorized email and attachment scraping, often associated with remote email collection attempts.
This rule monitors for OAuth device-code authentication flow completions initiated from devices flagged as non-compliant or unmanaged in Azure AD. This behavior is indicative of potential token theft via vishing or SMS-based phishing lures (consistent with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 TTPs), where an adversary tricks a user into completing a device authorization grant to facilitate MFA bypass and persistence.
Detects the registration of a new MFA authentication method (such as an authenticator app, phone, or software OTP) by a user, specifically flagging cases where the action occurs from an unfamiliar location or device context within 24 hours of a prior sign-in event. This pattern is often associated with post-compromise persistence efforts where attackers register their own MFA devices to maintain access to a compromised account.
Detects sign-in failures in Azure Active Directory specifically linked to MFA error codes 50074 (MFA required) or 50140 (MFA interruption/continuation). This logic monitors for users who are unable to complete the MFA challenge during the OfficeHome sign-in process, which may indicate issues with MFA registration, configuration, or an attempt to bypass MFA requirements.
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