Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential abuse of the device code authentication flow by correlating a successful device code login with a subsequent non-interactive sign-in using the 'python-requests' user agent for the same user within 10 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker programmatically accessing resources or APIs immediately after gaining authorization via a device code phishing or relay attack.
Detects suspicious Microsoft Intune device enrollment activities characterized by the use of a spoofed User-Agent (matching Microsoft Office/Outlook strings) and rapid, multiple enrollment attempts within a short timeframe. This behavior is associated with adversary use of device-code phishing kits to enroll rogue devices using stolen session tokens.
This rule detects potential abuse of the device code authentication flow by correlating a successful device code login with a subsequent non-interactive sign-in using the 'python-requests' user agent for the same user within 10 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker programmatically accessing resources or APIs immediately after gaining authorization via a device code phishing or relay attack.
Detects rapid rotation of multiple unique IP addresses originating from the same user account shortly after a device code authentication event. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using proxy rotation services (like FlashProxy) to obfuscate their origin and bypass location-based security controls or impossible-travel detections after hijacking a session.
Detects rapid rotation of multiple unique IP addresses originating from the same user account shortly after a device code authentication event. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using proxy rotation services (like FlashProxy) to obfuscate their origin and bypass location-based security controls or impossible-travel detections after hijacking a session.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity originating from the Microsoft Authentication Broker or utilizing the OAuth device code flow, which are frequently abused by adversaries to perform OAuth phishing and obtain access tokens.
Detects a successful user authentication event following a Microsoft OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow. This detection identifies scenarios where a user may have been phished into entering an attacker-supplied device code on a malicious Microsoft device login page, resulting in the attacker successfully obtaining OAuth tokens.
Detects malicious OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant requests directed at Microsoft services. This rule identifies usage of specific App IDs associated with the Microsoft Authentication Broker combined with the 'offline_access' Graph scope, a pattern indicative of GhostCode-style phishing campaigns designed to steal access and refresh tokens.
Detects inbound emails containing keywords associated with known ransomware extortion tactics (e.g., mention of specific ransomware names, data leaks, and payment demands). The rule filters for inbound traffic to identify external threats while excluding potential internal-generated traffic.
This rule monitors network connections, DNS resolutions, and email URLs to detect traffic communicating with a known adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure panel. By correlating security logs, DNS events, and email URL data against this specific indicator of compromise, it identifies potential interaction with phishing sites designed to capture credentials or session tokens.
Detects interaction with known infrastructure associated with the PREY-0058 campaign, which utilizes Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing lures mimicking passkey or MFA registration pages to target Microsoft 365 and other SaaS applications.
This rule detects email activity involving DocuSign-themed messages that contain attachments and also coincide with URL click events that redirect users to Microsoft-related login portals (e.g., login.microsoftonline.com or teams.microsoft.com) containing 'redirect' or 'redirect_uri' parameters. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attempt designed to capture credentials or perform OAuth consent phishing by mimicking legitimate document-signing workflows.
Detects emails delivering links to IronToll government-impersonation traffic-fine/payment portals (Egyptian and Moroccan justice-ministry lures), correlated with Safe Links click-through telemetry for the same URLs.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
This rule identifies emails containing URLs associated with known suspicious or malicious domains (secboxes.com, msbenefit.com, attcdn.com, brianwilli.com). It filters for instances where the sender's domain is not one of the identified suspicious domains to reduce noise from potential email spoofing or miscategorized communications, flagging potential phishing attempts.
Detects rapid, successive successful interactive sign-ins for the same user account that each satisfy MFA requirements, but originate from geographically and technically distinct environments (different IP locations, ASNs, and device IDs) within a 2-minute window. This behavior is indicative of session hijacking via Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) or Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) frameworks.
Detects anomalous, non-interactive sign-in activity in Microsoft 365 that suggests session cookie replay (Pass-the-Cookie). The rule correlates successful, MFA-validated interactive sign-ins against subsequent, non-interactive sign-ins that lack MFA, occur from a different device and IP address within a short time window, and bypass standard interactive re-authentication.
Detects anomalous data access or collection activity across multiple M365 workloads (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange). The rule identifies users exhibiting high volumes of file or mail access across at least two distinct workloads within a one-hour window, which may indicate account compromise, bulk data exfiltration, or unauthorized persistence via mailbox rules.
This rule monitors Office 365 activity for anomalous search behavior, specifically targeting high volumes of distinct search queries involving site collections, web structures, or index ID patterns. Such patterns are indicative of automated data discovery or enumeration activities performed against SharePoint or OneDrive environments.
Detects a privilege escalation technique where an attacker with application management permissions adds a credential to the 'Office 365 Exchange Online' service principal (SP). The attacker then leverages the SP's 'Domain.ReadWrite.All' permission to add or modify a federated domain, allowing them to forge tokens for any hybrid user.
This rule correlates successful Microsoft 365 sign-in events with preceding network events involving identified NovaCookies AiTM phishing infrastructure (specifically targeting .vu domains or specific URL patterns). It triggers when a user successfully authenticates using MFA shortly after accessing a known phishing link, which is a strong indicator of an active AiTM session hijacking attempt.
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