Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
This rule monitors process creation, file system activity, and HTTP logs for indicators associated with the 'GHOST-VAULT' or 'GHOST-CRED' threat activity. It specifically triggers on files or paths containing 'GHOST-VAULT-', processes named 'ghost_' or containing 'ghost_' in the command line, and HTTP requests containing 'GHOST-CRED/3.0', 'GHOST-VAULT/', or 'GHOST/0day'.
Detects OtterCookie JavaScript-based RAT/infostealer malware artifacts associated with WaterPlum/Contagious Interview campaign
Detects BeaverTail JavaScript-based loader malware hidden inside NPM packages, distributed via GitHub or Bitbucket during fake technical interviews
Detects access to sensitive cryptocurrency wallet files (wallet.dat, seed phrases, keys) or the execution of Python processes from sensitive or commonly exploited directories (AppData, tmp, Public folders) associated with known malicious naming conventions (sys_service).
Detects access, reading, or modification of sensitive credential files (such as KeePass databases, VPN profiles, private SSH keys, and certificates) by a process. This behavior is often associated with pre-encryption staging for data exfiltration during ransomware attacks.
Detects browser-based network requests to 'script.google.com'. This can indicate usage of Google Apps Scripts, which are sometimes abused by attackers for Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, data exfiltration, or as a proxy for malicious payloads, by blending in with legitimate Google traffic.
This rule monitors for interactions with known malicious files (by SHA256 hash), connections to confirmed C2 infrastructure (specific IP address and domains), or requests to known malicious URLs. It aggregates indicators across file, process, network, and web browsing telemetry to identify potential threats or compromised systems communicating with known attacker infrastructure.
Detects the installation or configuration of a browser extension that combines 'declarativeNetRequest' (network manipulation) and 'content_scripts' (DOM injection) capabilities while targeting sensitive AI-assistant domains such as gemini.google.com, perplexity.ai, opera.com, or claude.ai. This configuration is indicative of potential AI agent hijacking, allowing unauthorized code execution and traffic interception on trusted vendor websites.
Detects the execution of an ONVIF-related tool or process with flags indicating credential retrieval. This is often associated with the reconnaissance or credential access phase targeting IoT devices such as cameras that support the Open Network Video Interface Forum (ONVIF) protocol.
Detects PNG image files containing an 'iTXt' metadata chunk and a specific byte marker (FF 89 AD 4A). This signature is characteristic of LausivLoader, which hides an encrypted payload within the image using steganographic techniques, intended for subsequent extraction via XOR decryption and DEFLATE decompression.
This rule monitors for two distinct stages of potential account recovery abuse. First, it detects the execution of suspected Python scripts on an endpoint that contain command-line arguments related to password recovery or authentication codes. Second, it monitors network proxy/web logs for a high volume of API requests to the 'easy4ipcloud.com' domain associated with password reset or device probe endpoints, which may indicate automated credential stuffing or unauthorized device account recovery attempts.
Detects the execution of the OnvifUser utility with the -u flag, a technique observed in post-exploitation scenarios on Dahua network video recorder (NVR) devices to dump cached credentials.
This rule detects various system events (including process execution and user account creation) that contain the specific string 'p2pwn' in combination with the string 'p2password'. This pattern suggests the activity involves potentially malicious credential testing, hardcoded credential usage, or suspicious account interaction activity.
Detects the presence of PNG image files containing a specific steganographic marker embedded within the iTXt metadata chunk, often used by the LausivLoader malware for C2 communication or payload delivery. The rule looks for the specific marker 0xFF89AD4A or known C2 indicators (yapw.life, stego_zrgaixkku8.png) within PNG files.
Detects the presence of PNG image files containing a specific steganographic marker embedded within the iTXt metadata chunk, often used by the LausivLoader malware for C2 communication or payload delivery. The rule looks for the specific marker 0xFF89AD4A or known C2 indicators (yapw.life, stego_zrgaixkku8.png) within PNG files.
This rule detects the execution of processes where the command line contains suspicious obfuscated substrings. These substrings, which include segments like 'inASISFHfo', 'geASISFHutarvs', 'scASISFHuren', 'fiASISFHu_lsz', 'afASISFHile', or 'ruASISFHunf', are characteristic of command-line obfuscation techniques designed to bypass security monitoring by concealing the true intent of the command.
This rule monitors network HTTP traffic containing specific strings related to gym-membership APIs and client IDs, alongside process or file activity referencing 'getFitnessProfile'. This combination is a behavioral fingerprint associated with a specific Golang-based remote access trojan (RAT) attempting to exfiltrate or interact with fitness profile data.
Detects file creation events involving the 'SmartUploader' configuration file or process execution events referencing the tool, which may indicate unauthorized data collection or staging activity.
Detects automated searching (via grep, findstr, or select-string) for sensitive strings (e.g., API keys, private keys, wallet data) across multiple occurrences on a single host, or the creation of suspicious sensitive files (e.g., .env, credentials, wallet.dat) on devices where such automated sweeping activity has been observed. This pattern indicates an adversary staging data for exfiltration.
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