Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
Detects when a user registers or adds a new device to Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) that has not been previously seen used by that user within the last 7 days. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to enroll an unauthorized device to bypass MFA or maintain persistent access.
This rule detects potentially malicious outbound email activity sent through Microsoft Graph or Exchange APIs using unknown or infrequently seen client applications. It identifies scenarios where these applications send emails containing financial keywords (e.g., 'invoice', 'wire transfer'), which is a common indicator of Business Email Compromise (BEC) and 'EvilTokens' style mail-vault activity where attackers intercept or inject themselves into existing financial threads.
Detects anomalous privilege reconnaissance activity where an account queries Microsoft Graph API endpoints (such as directory roles or member/transitive member lists) multiple times in a short window, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to enumerate Global or Exchange Administrator role memberships.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
This rule monitors Office 365 SharePoint file operations and search queries for patterns indicative of automated discovery and exfiltration of sensitive content. It specifically identifies high-frequency search queries involving wildcard parameters used in SharePoint content indexing, which may suggest an adversary is systematically crawling or enumerating organizational documents.
This rule identifies emails containing URLs associated with known suspicious or malicious domains (secboxes.com, msbenefit.com, attcdn.com, brianwilli.com). It filters for instances where the sender's domain is not one of the identified suspicious domains to reduce noise from potential email spoofing or miscategorized communications, flagging potential phishing attempts.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
This rule monitors for suspicious OAuth Device Code flow authentication attempts in Azure AD sign-in logs. It detects activity involving the device code protocol combined with specific error flags or indicators of potentially compromised or non-compliant devices (such as missing device IDs, non-compliant status, or empty trust types), which are indicative of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing or token interception attacks.
Detects high-volume or multi-mailbox activity in Exchange Online, indicative of automated mailbox collection or unauthorized bulk data access via Graph or REST APIs. The rule monitors for a threshold of operations across multiple mailboxes or high event counts originating from specific API clients.
Detects signs of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks targeting cloud authentication. The rule monitors for access to suspicious domain patterns often used in AiTM phishing kits, specific MFA interruption errors (50074/50140) characteristic of proxy-based flows, and rapid successful logins from different IP addresses within a 15-minute window, suggesting session token theft and replay.
Detects potential lateral phishing attempts within Microsoft Teams by identifying a single user account sending messages containing common credential-harvesting lures (e.g., 'passkey', 'SSO', 'MFA', 'security update') to multiple internal recipients in a short timeframe.
This rule detects administrative updates to a user account in Azure Active Directory (Microsoft Entra ID) that involve modifying authentication methods to include 'SoftwareTokenActivated' associated with HMAC-SHA1 and specific authentication type configurations. Such modifications may indicate an adversary attempting to register a new MFA device or method to maintain persistence or bypass existing security controls.
This rule detects potentially malicious, automated enumeration of Microsoft Graph API endpoints. It monitors for high volumes of requests (>= 8 within a 15-minute window) that utilize multiple OData pagination, filtering, and search parameters such as $top, $skip, $skiptoken, $count, /delta, and /search. Such activity is often indicative of automated reconnaissance, data scraping, or unauthorized bulk enumeration of cloud directory resources.
Detects individual access events to sensitive Microsoft Graph control-plane endpoints, including directory roles, role management, authentication methods, applications, service principals, and OAuth permissions. This rule is designed to be paired with a broader correlation rule to identify potential reconnaissance or persistence activities involving high-privilege configuration changes.
This rule detects cloud file access (Download, Accessed, or Sync) originating from a Python-based user-agent (python-httpx) associated with specific Microsoft 365 applications, flagged by either an uncommon ISP or an uncommon user-agent for that specific user. This behavior is indicative of potential automated data collection or exfiltration attempts using programmatic access against cloud storage services.
This rule detects a correlation between an incoming email, SMS, or message containing phishing lure keywords related to 'passkey' or 'SSO' and 'update' requests, followed by a successful or attempted user sign-in from that recipient within a 2-hour window. This behavior is indicative of a social engineering campaign aimed at credential or token theft.
This rule detects suspicious cloud user activity by identifying a single user account engaging in diverse, multi-stage actions (Authentication, MFA updates, Reconnaissance, and Exfiltration) originating from a high number of distinct source IP addresses. This behavioral pattern is indicative of a compromised account where an adversary is rotating IPs while performing a coordinated, multi-stage attack sequence.
Detects cloud data access or file download operations in Microsoft 365 (SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange) performed by a user agent string associated with the python-httpx library. This pattern is often indicative of automated data exfiltration using custom scripts.
Detects multiple authentication failures in Azure AD (specifically error codes 50074: strong authentication required/MFA failure and 50140: interruption of MFA completion) originating from devices identified as either unmanaged or non-compliant. This pattern often indicates an adversary attempting to brute force or bypass conditional access policies by leveraging credentials where the device security posture is insufficient.
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