Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Correlates a successful OAuth device-code sign-in with a subsequent Device Registration Service event for the same user within 30 minutes, excluding known legitimate device-code applications (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and requiring both events to have succeeded. The registration match is scoped strictly to the Device Registration Service resource (not the broader Microsoft Authentication Broker app, which fires on routine token refresh/broker activity unrelated to registering a new device). The correlation is further restricted to cases where the device-registration event originates from a different IP address or city than the original device-code sign-in -- the pattern expected when an attacker uses a stolen token to register their own device and mint a Primary Refresh Token, versus a legitimate user completing device enrollment from their own network shortly after a CLI/developer login.
Correlates a successful OAuth device-code sign-in with a subsequent Device Registration Service event for the same user within 30 minutes, excluding known legitimate device-code applications (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and requiring both events to have succeeded. The registration match is scoped strictly to the Device Registration Service resource (not the broader Microsoft Authentication Broker app, which fires on routine token refresh/broker activity unrelated to registering a new device). The correlation is further restricted to cases where the device-registration event originates from a different IP address or city than the original device-code sign-in -- the pattern expected when an attacker uses a stolen token to register their own device and mint a Primary Refresh Token, versus a legitimate user completing device enrollment from their own network shortly after a CLI/developer login.
Correlates a successful OAuth device-code sign-in with a subsequent Device Registration Service event for the same user within 30 minutes, excluding known legitimate device-code applications (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and requiring both events to have succeeded. The registration match is scoped strictly to the Device Registration Service resource (not the broader Microsoft Authentication Broker app, which fires on routine token refresh/broker activity unrelated to registering a new device). The correlation is further restricted to cases where the device-registration event originates from a different IP address or city than the original device-code sign-in -- the pattern expected when an attacker uses a stolen token to register their own device and mint a Primary Refresh Token, versus a legitimate user completing device enrollment from their own network shortly after a CLI/developer login.
This rule identifies successful OAuth 2.0 device code authentication attempts originating from both an IP address and country not previously seen for that specific user, using a 90-day baseline that requires at least 5 prior non-device-code sign-ins to be established (reducing noise from sparse-history/new accounts). It excludes known legitimate device-code applications (e.g., Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and sign-ins from devices already marked compliant/managed. This tightened logic reduces false positives from routine travel or home/office network changes while still catching device code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into entering a device code on a malicious site to obtain an access token.
This rule identifies successful OAuth 2.0 device code authentication attempts originating from both an IP address and country not previously seen for that specific user, using a 90-day baseline that requires at least 5 prior non-device-code sign-ins to be established (reducing noise from sparse-history/new accounts). It excludes known legitimate device-code applications (e.g., Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and sign-ins from devices already marked compliant/managed. This tightened logic reduces false positives from routine travel or home/office network changes while still catching device code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into entering a device code on a malicious site to obtain an access token.
Correlates a successful OAuth device-code sign-in with a subsequent Microsoft Authentication Broker / Device Registration Service event for the same user within 30 minutes, excluding known legitimate device-code applications (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and requiring both events to have succeeded. The correlation is further restricted to cases where the device-registration event originates from a different IP address or city than the original device-code sign-in -- the pattern expected when an attacker uses a stolen token to register their own device and mint a Primary Refresh Token, versus a legitimate user completing device enrollment from their own network shortly after a CLI/developer login.
Correlates a successful OAuth device-code sign-in with a subsequent Microsoft Authentication Broker / Device Registration Service event for the same user within 30 minutes, excluding known legitimate device-code applications (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and requiring both events to have succeeded. The correlation is further restricted to cases where the device-registration event originates from a different IP address or city than the original device-code sign-in -- the pattern expected when an attacker uses a stolen token to register their own device and mint a Primary Refresh Token, versus a legitimate user completing device enrollment from their own network shortly after a CLI/developer login.
Correlates a successful OAuth device-code sign-in with a subsequent Microsoft Authentication Broker / Device Registration Service event for the same user within 30 minutes, excluding known legitimate device-code applications (Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, Visual Studio, VS Code) and requiring both events to have succeeded. The correlation is further restricted to cases where the device-registration event originates from a different IP address or city than the original device-code sign-in -- the pattern expected when an attacker uses a stolen token to register their own device and mint a Primary Refresh Token, versus a legitimate user completing device enrollment from their own network shortly after a CLI/developer login.
This detection identifies enabled user accounts that have not had a successful sign-in for the last 90 days, highlighting potential security risks from dormant accounts.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior where a device code authentication flow is initiated from one location, but the resulting session is replayed from a different IP address in a different country within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary capturing an authentication token via a device code phishing or relay attack and attempting to use it from their own infrastructure to bypass conditional access policies and MFA.
This rule detects activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with recent Russian espionage campaigns, including malicious domains, IP addresses, email senders, file names, and file hashes. It monitors network, sign-in, email, process, and file events across enterprise systems.
Detects successful device code authentication flows involving applications that are not part of a known list of standard Microsoft and Azure client applications. Device code flows are frequently abused in phishing attacks to bypass traditional credential-based authentication.
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
This rule detects scenarios where a device registration event occurs within 15 minutes of a device-code authentication sign-in for the same user. This pattern is indicative of potential account manipulation where an adversary registers their own device to an existing account to maintain persistent access or bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).
No description available.
Detects potential N0va-style phishing or token-exchange abuse where a user completes a device-code authentication flow, followed immediately by an access token usage from a different IP address or device. This sequence indicates an adversary has captured the resulting token/session and is attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources.
Detects instances where a user account experiences multiple failed sign-in attempts followed by a successful sign-in from a different, geographically distant location within a short timeframe, indicating impossible travel and potential credential compromise.
Detects anomalous privilege reconnaissance activity where an account queries Microsoft Graph API endpoints (such as directory roles or member/transitive member lists) multiple times in a short window, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to enumerate Global or Exchange Administrator role memberships.
Detects anomalous privilege reconnaissance activity where an account queries Microsoft Graph API endpoints (such as directory roles or member/transitive member lists) multiple times in a short window, which may indicate a compromised account attempting to enumerate Global or Exchange Administrator role memberships.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
Detects high-frequency, multi-action data access events through the Microsoft Graph API, indicative of automated exfiltration of Exchange, SharePoint/OneDrive, and Teams data. This behavior is consistent with an adversary using stolen OAuth access tokens to perform bulk enumeration and extraction of sensitive cloud-hosted data.
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