Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Protocols
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Detects the exploitation primitive of CVE-2026-3102 at the post-injection execution layer. The exploit succeeds when exiftool constructs a /usr/bin/setfile command line containing attacker-injected shell metacharacters (single quotes for command injection, backticks or $() for command substitution, semicolons for command chaining). Detecting setfile invocations spawned by exiftool with these characters in arguments is the smoking-gun signal. Even future variants of this vulnerability class (or related n-day exploits in the same family) would produce this same parent/child + metacharacter pattern.
This rule detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-4892 by correlating inbound DHCPv6 traffic (UDP/547) with a dnsmasq process crash (SIGSEGV/SIGABRT exit codes 132, 134, 135, 139) on the same host within a 60-second window. This vulnerability involves sending crafted DHCPv6 messages with oversized Client Identifier options to a dnsmasq server configured with --dhcp-script, leading to a denial of service.
Detects the registration of the PLURIBUS Cloud Files sync provider used by the CVE-2023-36036 (cldflt.sys heap overflow) privilege escalation exploit in the Rapid7-documented ModeloRAT incident. The exploit registers a fake sync provider with the specific GUID {904EE598-0511-4664-82A8-22C4A7501044} pointing to %TEMP%\cldflt\, then writes a placeholder file (Link.log) to trigger the vulnerable code path. The provider GUID, name, and registry path are all unique to this exploit variant — legitimate sync providers (OneDrive, Dropbox, Box) use vendor-specific GUIDs and never register under %TEMP%.
This suite of rules detects various activities associated with the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm, including the execution of its payload via bun, network connections to its exfiltration domain, attempts by Node.js or Bun processes to access AWS IMDS for credential theft, access to local HashiCorp Vault instances, identification of known malicious script file hashes, and the installation of its specific malicious GitHub dependency.
This helps identify legitimate DAEMON Tools binaries - DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, or DTShellHlp.exe used as a communication vector to an external domain env-check.daemontools.cc, which sends shell commands to the compromised host.
Cisco Talos observed that attackers used a plugin called Pheno to conduct reconnaissance on the Windows Phone Link App on the victim's PC. IF compromised, Pheno logs the Process IDs and file paths with the filename "phonelink-<COMPUTERNAME>.txt", created in two staging folders:
C:\programdata\Microsoft\feedback\cm
%TEMP%\Microsoft\feedback\cm
C:\programdata\Microsoft\feedback\cm
%TEMP%\Microsoft\feedback\cm
Kubernetes Service Account Token Theft
Cortex XDR
Detects non-legitimate processes attempting to read Kubernetes service account tokens or related sensitive files (ca.crt, namespace) from the standard service account path within containers. This rule filters out common and legitimate Kubernetes system processes to reduce false positives.
Detects suspicious command-line arguments indicative of potential credential access attempts (cmdkey /list), or execution of hidden processes (excluding Java applications), or communication with a known malicious domain (staybud.dpdns.org).
This rule detects the creation of files matching the exfiltration pattern used by the Mini Shai-Hulud malware. Specifically, it looks for files named 'results-<timestamp>-<counter>.json' within a 'results' directory, accounting for both Windows and Unix path separators. This pattern is indicative of data staging or exfiltration activities by the malware.
Identifies potential network tunneling, proxying, and reverse shell activities by correlating process creation with outbound public network connections. This rule looks for known tunneling and proxy tool filenames and specific command-line arguments indicative of such activities, then correlates these process events with successful or attempted outbound network connections to public IP addresses.
This hunt targets a documented Iranian MOIS-affiliated behaviour: re-executing DCSync
(MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006 — OS Credential Dumping: DCSync) after defenders reset
compromised account passwords, allowing actors to recollect current and historical NTLM
hashes and restore domain-wide access without repeating initial access stages.
(MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006 — OS Credential Dumping: DCSync) after defenders reset
compromised account passwords, allowing actors to recollect current and historical NTLM
hashes and restore domain-wide access without repeating initial access stages.
Detects pip or pip3 installation commands targeting the specific compromised version of the elementary-data PyPI package. Installation of v0.23.3 indicates exposure to the supply chain compromise regardless of whether the marker file was subsequently observed. Also catches generic 'pip install elementary-data' without a version pin, which during the active window (2026-04-24 22:20 UTC to 2026-04-25 ~11:51 UTC) would have pulled the malicious version.
Detects regsvr32.exe executing with command-line arguments that indicate an attempt to download and execute a scriptlet from a remote HTTP/HTTPS source. This technique, often referred to as 'Squiblydoo', is used to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
This rule detects the execution of suspicious filenames (FunnyApp.exe, RedSun.exe, undef.exe, z.exe, powershell.exe) from common user download or pictures directories. Adversaries often place malicious executables in these locations to evade detection and execute their payloads.
This rule detects when critical services, including security agents, backup solutions, and remote management tools, are stopped on a host. Adversaries often stop these services to evade detection, disable security controls, or inhibit system recovery during attacks like ransomware.
This rule detects the instantiation of the TieringEngine COM object, identified by the GUID '50d185b9-fff3-4656-92c7-e4018da4361d', via process creation events. This activity is associated with CVE-2026-33825, a zero-day vulnerability that could be exploited by malware like RedSun. The rule specifically looks for this GUID in the command line of newly created processes.
Detects suspicious execution paths for svchost.exe, known malicious SHA256 hashes, or suspicious registry persistence mechanisms. Specifically, it looks for svchost.exe or a file named images.png executing from the 'Users\Public\Windows' directory, known malicious hashes, or a registry run key named 'Windows Update Service' under 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'.
This rule detects the creation or connection to a named pipe with the specific name 'REDSUN'. This activity is associated with the RedSun PoC (Proof of Concept) for CVE-2026-33825, a zero-day vulnerability in Windows Defender. The rule looks for events indicating named pipe creation or connection across various security event sources, including Falcon native events and Sysmon events (Event IDs 17 and 18).
This rule detects the execution of a 'curl' command on macOS that attempts to make a POST request to a file named 'salmonela' within the '/tmp/' directory. This pattern is highly suspicious and could indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data, upload malicious content, or interact with a temporary malicious script.
Detects the creation or modification of registry keys related to SyncRoots containing the hardcoded string 'SERIOUSLYMSFT', which is indicative of the RedSun exploit (CVE-2026-33825) abusing the Cloud Files API.
This rule detects DNS queries made to a list of known malicious domains. These domains are often associated with malware command and control (C2) infrastructure or other malicious activities. Monitoring such queries can help identify compromised systems attempting to communicate with adversary-controlled resources.
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