Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) writes a new .aspx file into the 'MemberFiles' directory. This behavior is highly characteristic of webshell deployment following a successful file upload exploitation.
Detects DLLs potentially associated with the 'Lorem Ipsum Loader' malware family. These DLLs are designed to sideload into legitimate applications and contain embedded shellcode that is encoded as a sequence of English words to bypass entropy-based detection. The rule looks for the presence of the word-encoded blob alongside specific filenames commonly used in this sideloading technique.
Detects a multi-stage activity where PowerShell is used to download a ZIP file, followed by the execution of a batch script (1.bat) that subsequently launches LockScreenContentServer.exe. This behavior is indicative of a DLL side-loading chain designed to execute malicious code via legitimate processes.
Detects unauthorized access or modification attempts to common web browser credential storage files (such as 'Login Data' or 'key4.db') by processes other than standard, trusted web browsers (e.g., Chrome, Edge, Firefox). This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting, where an adversary attempts to steal saved login information from browser data stores.
The following analytic detects instances of 'svchost.exe' spawning Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to monitor child processes of 'svchost.exe' that match known LOLBAS executables. This activity is significant as adversaries often use LOLBAS techniques to execute malicious code stealthily, potentially indicating lateral movement or code execution attempts.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects the launch of common .NET-related utilities—aspnet_compiler.exe, msbuild.exe, regasm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, or vbc.exe when the parent appears to be a script (batch, CMD, PowerShell, JScript, VBScript, or HTML) running from an unusual or user-writable Windows location (for example Public, Temp, Fonts, Debug, Recycle Bin, Prefetch, or similar paths), and the child process shows little or no command-line variation from the image path or name.
That pattern is consistent with adversaries using trusted .NET binaries as a proxy to run code while hiding execution behind script parents in low-trust folders, behavior associated with techniques such as signed binary proxy execution.
That pattern is consistent with adversaries using trusted .NET binaries as a proxy to run code while hiding execution behind script parents in low-trust folders, behavior associated with techniques such as signed binary proxy execution.
Detects execution of common script interpreters (mshta, powershell, cmd, wscript) from typical UI-based process launch sources (explorer, RunDlg) when the command line includes indicators of malicious activity such as hidden window flags, obfuscated content, or remote URL downloads. This pattern is characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and executing malicious commands.
This rule detects a node.exe process initiating a network connection to a specific remote IP (69.48.229.140) on port 8080, followed by the termination of that same process within 45 seconds of the connection. This behavior is indicative of a short-lived beaconing process or an ephemeral network task associated with command-and-control activity.
This rule detects successful network connections to known malicious IP addresses or the domain 'forgitlab.com', which are associated with the Azazel malware threat infrastructure.
This rule detects successful network connections to known malicious IP addresses or the domain 'forgitlab.com', which are associated with the Azazel malware threat infrastructure.
Detects anomalous process execution and loopback network activity associated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP) 'exec_in_session' method. This pattern indicates an adversary potentially abusing the AI coding assistant's MCP server capabilities to execute arbitrary commands as a C2 channel.
Detects HTTP GET requests for files with a .hta extension, utilizing a legacy Internet Explorer User-Agent string. This pattern is commonly associated with SideCopy threat group activities where mshta.exe is used to proxy the execution of remotely hosted malicious HTA files, often as part of an initial infection chain.
Detects the use of legitimate data transfer utilities (s5cmd, rclone) configured to exfiltrate sensitive document types (.doc, .pdf, .sql, etc.) to S3-compatible cloud storage. The rule correlates this activity with recent access to files containing sensitive credentials or configuration data, a pattern observed in double-extortion campaigns.
Detects a specific multi-stage exfiltration pattern characterized by initial reconnaissance/fingerprinting probes against sensitive service endpoints (/health, /docs, /openapi.json) followed by unauthorized access to artifact storage endpoints (/files or /file?name=) from the same device against the same host within a short timeframe.
This rule detects instances of 'javaw.exe' executing from unusual directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Users\Public) while loading a 'jli.dll' file from a related non-standard path, or simultaneously being associated with a scheduled task execution involving 'GlobalTellurSync'. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading or a persistence mechanism where a legitimate Java executable is repurposed to run malicious code.
Matches distinctive DragonForce TURN/MQTT campaign artifact filenames only when combined with byte-level markers unique to the malware (PE structure, TURN/MQTT C2 infrastructure strings, or the loader's pipe-caret-pipe thread-trigger byte pattern), to avoid false positives on unrelated benign files sharing these names.
This rule performs a multi-source correlation (network, DNS, file, and process telemetry) to detect artifacts associated with the Coruna campaign. It looks for known malicious file hashes (SHA1), C2 IP addresses, and specific domain/URL patterns in process command lines and network connections.
This rule performs a multi-source correlation (network, DNS, file, and process telemetry) to detect artifacts associated with the Coruna campaign. It looks for known malicious file hashes (SHA1), C2 IP addresses, and specific domain/URL patterns in process command lines and network connections.
Detects the execution of known tunneling and reverse proxy tools (ngrok, cloudflared, localtunnel) commonly abused by adversaries to create outbound tunnels for C2, bypass firewalls, or exfiltrate data.
Detects indicators associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix campaign across process, network connection, DNS, and HTTP telemetry: known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, the chattypetty.com domain, and known payload-hosting URLs.
This rule detects the modification of Windows Registry Run keys, specifically targeting a value named 'MicrosoftUpdate' within the 'Run' registry path. This is a common persistence technique used by adversaries to ensure malicious programs or scripts automatically execute upon user logon by mimicking a legitimate system update process.
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