Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

3,141 detections

Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user's password is changed or reset by an administrator (or help-desk role) followed within a short time window by that same user registering a new MFA device, potentially indicating a vishing-based account takeover attack (e.g., PREY-0058/UNC6671).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
003
Detects successful Azure AD sign-ins where the user agent identifies as a Python requests library version (2.33.1 or 2.34.2) that has not been observed for that specific user account in the preceding 14 days. This behavior is indicative of anomalous automated or scripted access.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
003
Detects high-volume phishing emails that utilize subjects claiming extreme discounts (e.g., 65% off) and contain links to domains ending in the .shop top-level domain (TLD). The rule correlates email subjects with URL domains and alerts when multiple recipients are targeted by the same sender/domain combination.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume phishing emails that utilize subjects claiming extreme discounts (e.g., 65% off) and contain links to domains ending in the .shop top-level domain (TLD). The rule correlates email subjects with URL domains and alerts when multiple recipients are targeted by the same sender/domain combination.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious email campaigns characterized by discount-themed subject lines containing keywords like '65% off' and links pointing to '.shop' domains. The rule identifies suspicious patterns by aggregating events and flagging instances where multiple users are targeted with similar subjects and domains, excluding those specifically allowlisted.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious email campaigns characterized by discount-themed subject lines containing keywords like '65% off' and links pointing to '.shop' domains. The rule identifies suspicious patterns by aggregating events and flagging instances where multiple users are targeted with similar subjects and domains, excluding those specifically allowlisted.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious email campaigns characterized by discount-themed subject lines containing keywords like '65% off' and links pointing to '.shop' domains. The rule identifies suspicious patterns by aggregating events and flagging instances where multiple users are targeted with similar subjects and domains, excluding those specifically allowlisted.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects anomalous volumes of incoming emails to support aliases that contain keywords related to customer service complaints and include URLs pointing to suspicious '.shop' domains, characteristic of 'DoppelCart' or similar fake-shop impersonation phishing campaigns.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects anomalous volumes of incoming emails to support aliases that contain keywords related to customer service complaints and include URLs pointing to suspicious '.shop' domains, characteristic of 'DoppelCart' or similar fake-shop impersonation phishing campaigns.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
This rule monitors DNS and email traffic for domains ending in .shop that fuzzy-match against a predefined watchlist of corporate brand names. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns, brand impersonation, or typosquatting, where attackers use similar-looking domains to lure users into revealing sensitive information or credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
This rule monitors DNS and email traffic for domains ending in .shop that fuzzy-match against a predefined watchlist of corporate brand names. This behavior is commonly associated with phishing campaigns, brand impersonation, or typosquatting, where attackers use similar-looking domains to lure users into revealing sensitive information or credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
Detects inbound emails masquerading as reputable advisory firms (PwC or KPMG) using lookalike sender domains, combined with wire-transfer fraud phrases in the subject line. Correlates with identity logon telemetry for the same fraudulent WhatsApp Business phone number, enabling detection across both email and authentication channels. Note: message body content is not available in the EmailEvents schema, so fraud-phrase matching is subject-only.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal M&A fraud campaign, requiring co-occurrence of impersonated advisory firm branding, secrecy-clause language restricting communication to personal channels, and M&A-fraud-specific wire/payment indicators rather than secrecy-clause phrasing alone
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects forged NDA documents used in Phantom Deal M&A fraud campaign, requiring co-occurrence of impersonated advisory firm branding, secrecy-clause language restricting communication to personal channels, and M&A-fraud-specific wire/payment indicators rather than secrecy-clause phrasing alone
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
This rule monitors for inbound external emails where the sender requests private communication (e.g., 'private email' or 'personal address') in combination with keywords related to sensitive business topics like M&A, legal, or urgent financial transactions. This pattern is characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or social engineering attempts designed to move sensitive conversations outside of monitored corporate channels.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
101
This rule monitors for inbound external emails where the sender requests private communication (e.g., 'private email' or 'personal address') in combination with keywords related to sensitive business topics like M&A, legal, or urgent financial transactions. This pattern is characteristic of Business Email Compromise (BEC) or social engineering attempts designed to move sensitive conversations outside of monitored corporate channels.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) related to 'Phantom Deal' fraud. The rule identifies email threads where a user receives an urgent request for proof of payment (MT103/UETR) within 72 hours of an email discussion involving both wire transfer/payment keywords and M&A/deal context.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) related to 'Phantom Deal' fraud. The rule identifies email threads where a user receives an urgent request for proof of payment (MT103/UETR) within 72 hours of an email discussion involving both wire transfer/payment keywords and M&A/deal context.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects inbound emails originating from external, non-corporate domains that impersonate an internal executive's display name. The rule flags messages containing common Business Email Compromise (BEC) urgency or confidentiality triggers such as 'wire transfer', 'urgent', 'NDA', or 'private email'.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects inbound emails originating from external, non-corporate domains that impersonate an internal executive's display name. The rule flags messages containing common Business Email Compromise (BEC) urgency or confidentiality triggers such as 'wire transfer', 'urgent', 'NDA', or 'private email'.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
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