Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects exploitation attempts against Microsoft SharePoint leveraging the ToolShell exploit chain, as well as subsequent post-exploitation webshell activity involving anomalous 'layoutNsp.aspx' naming conventions. This covers initial exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2025-49704 and associated variants, followed by the deployment of webshells associated with the ToolShell campaign.
This rule identifies installations of TeamViewer software that are vulnerable to specific CVEs (CVE-2026-19743, CVE-2026-92368, CVE-2026-92369, CVE-2026-92370, CVE-2026-92371) by analyzing the 'DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory' dataset. It checks for versioning patterns against known vulnerable build numbers across Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms to pinpoint systems requiring patching.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Detects the execution of MSP360 or generic RMM-labeled binaries originating from common user download directories (Downloads or Temp folders) when the filename mimics common phishing lures such as invoice, e-card, RSVP, or document-related naming conventions. This activity indicates a potential social engineering attempt to execute remote monitoring and management tools.
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
Detects the installation or execution of known MALFEX malicious packages via npm or Node.js, which are used as entry points for polyglot or disguised payload delivery.
Detects a sequential pattern where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, or Safari) accesses an AI chat platform's conversation API, followed within 5 minutes by a network connection to a known unauthorized exfiltration destination (api.pbapi.xyz). This pattern suggests the potential use of a browser-based tool or extension (e.g., Poper Blocker or similar) to intercept and exfiltrate AI chat history.
This rule monitors for the presence of the PoperBlocker browser extension or network traffic directed to associated domains, which are often used by potentially unwanted programs (PUP) or adware.
Detects the execution of a ScreenConnect installer executable followed by the deployment or startup of its associated client components (WindowsClient.exe or ClientService.exe) within a 30-minute window on the same device. This rule is designed to identify the unauthorized installation or deployment of remote access software.
Detects the loading of WPF/XAML-related assemblies (PresentationFramework.dll, System.Xaml.dll, or PresentationCore.dll) by the SharePoint web server process (w3wp.exe). This behavior is highly irregular for typical SharePoint web worker processes and may indicate an exploitation attempt targeting deserialization vulnerabilities leading to remote code execution.
Detects DNS lookups and outbound network connections to known command and control (C2) and staging domains associated with the STAC4924 campaign. The rule performs strict matching on domain names to ensure that subdomains are identified while avoiding false positives from partial string matches within URLs.
Detects network connection attempts by known AI agent or development-related runtime processes (python, node, etc.) to external endpoints that are not contained within a defined allowlist of LLM and infrastructure providers. This is intended to identify potential data exfiltration or unauthorized command and control communication originating from LLM-powered applications.
Detects suspicious process-injection related API calls (such as CreateRemoteThread, VirtualAllocEx, and WriteProcessMemory) where the source or target process is a common AI agent runtime environment (e.g., python.exe, node.exe, java.exe, dotnet.exe). This detects potential malicious code execution or reflective loading initiated by or targeting these runtime processes.
This rule detects the execution of node.exe or a specific binary named 'ProfileQuickHost.exe' spawned by wscript.exe. This activity is indicative of a VBScript-based loader (often referred to as 'ChainScript') executing a staged Node.js RAT or secondary payload from user-writable application folders (AppData).
A July 2026 incident used Polygon smart contracts (EtherHiding) for dynamic payload routing/C2 following a ClickFix/FileFix-style lure driven by compromised WordPress credentials.
Detects suspicious npm preinstall activity or node_modules execution patterns involving the execution of the Bun JavaScript runtime. This behavior is often indicative of supply chain compromise where malicious npm packages attempt to drop and run unauthorized binaries to facilitate secondary payload execution.
This rule monitors for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with known malware and C2 infrastructure, including specific IP:port combinations, malicious domains, URLs for file downloads, and SHA256 hashes of known malware. The rule correlates data across device network events, file events, and process execution events to identify potential infections or communication with malicious infrastructure.
This rule detects known malicious activity including network connections to a specific C2 IP address (69.48.229.140), downloading files from specific C2 URLs, the presence of known malicious file hashes (SHA256), and communications involving specific actor-associated email addresses.
Detects a potential post-compromise lateral movement sequence where a host, previously identified as accessing sensitive browser credential files by an unauthorized process, subsequently initiates RDP or WinRM connections to other internal hosts using an account not previously observed performing interactive logons on that source host.
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