Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
7,128 detections
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Detects a Unix-based (Linux or macOS) browser process spawning a Unix shell that establishes an outbound connection to an external destination.
This browser-to-shell execution chain may indicate malicious browser content, drive-by execution, a compromised website, or abuse of a browser extension on Linux or macOS systems.
The behavior may also occur during legitimate development, installation, automation, or enterprise software workflows.
This browser-to-shell execution chain may indicate malicious browser content, drive-by execution, a compromised website, or abuse of a browser extension on Linux or macOS systems.
The behavior may also occur during legitimate development, installation, automation, or enterprise software workflows.
Detects creation of a JSP/JSPX/WAR server-side script inside
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
Detects execution of the XMRig Monero cryptominer or a miner
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
launched with XMRig-specific pool and tuning arguments. In the AhsayCBS
exploitation campaign attackers dropped XMRig onto compromised backup
servers to hijack CPU resources for Monero mining, severely degrading
server performance. Detection keys on XMRig binary names and the mining
command-line grammar (stratum pool URLs, donate-level and thread-hint flags).
Detects suspicious command-line execution patterns involving Unix shells (bash, zsh, sh) spawned from terminal applications where tools like curl or wget are piped directly into a shell, base64 decoding is performed, osascript executes dialogs, or quarantine attributes are removed.
Summarizes and counts devices based on their system enclosure model and SKU.
Summarizes the total physical memory in gigabytes across reporting devices to assist with hardware inventory and capacity planning.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Detects a system shell interpreter being spawned directly by a Celery worker process.
This behavior indicates a Python background task execution framework is evaluating raw string input through a shell execution context,
which is highly indicative of successful command or prompt injection exploitation against an LLM agent task.
This behavior indicates a Python background task execution framework is evaluating raw string input through a shell execution context,
which is highly indicative of successful command or prompt injection exploitation against an LLM agent task.
Detects the Shai-Hulud supply chain attack dead-man's switch: a gh-token-monitor persistence component followed by a recursive forced deletion of the user home directory, or the presence of the specific kill-switch string in a command line.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Sweeps proxy, firewall and endpoint network telemetry for requests to the three published BraZetsu Pastebin dead-drop raw URLs used to retrieve the XOR-encrypted C2 config.
Sweeps endpoint and firewall telemetry for connections to the two high-confidence BraZetsu infrastructure IPs. Review hits against the IP's first-seen date before blocking because the Njalla host has changed service.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
Detects when a device connects to a wireless network SSID that has not been observed in the baseline over the previous 14 days.
Detects the use of vim and its siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.\nSuch behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or breaking out from restricted environments.
Detects a process launch whose command line both references a cron persistence path (crontab, /etc/cron.d/, /etc/crontab, /etc/cron.{hourly,daily,weekly,monthly}/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) and contains a download-and-execute or reverse-shell marker (curl/wget piped to a shell, /dev/tcp/ redirection, base64-decoded payload, nc -e) or installs the crontab from a file staged under /tmp/. Attackers commonly install a scheduled cron entry so a malicious command re-executes on a fixed interval, surviving reboots and process kills (T1053.003).
Detects creation of a JSP/JSPX/WAR server-side script inside
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
an AhsayCBS installation or web application directory. In this campaign the
actors exploited critical AhsayCBS vulnerabilities and dropped webshells into
the application web directories to maintain persistent remote access. Legitimate
deployment writes scripts from the AhsayCBS updater, not ad-hoc into web roots.
Detects creation of a new local administrative account on or through a
BeyondTrust Remote Support / Privileged Remote Access appliance. Post-exploitation of
the pre-auth vulnerability, attackers create local admin accounts (T1136.001) to
maintain persistent access to the appliance and connected managed endpoints.
Follows CISA's urgent patch advisory for BeyondTrust appliances.
BeyondTrust Remote Support / Privileged Remote Access appliance. Post-exploitation of
the pre-auth vulnerability, attackers create local admin accounts (T1136.001) to
maintain persistent access to the appliance and connected managed endpoints.
Follows CISA's urgent patch advisory for BeyondTrust appliances.
Detects when an SAP process opens an FTP session to a host that is not on the approved server list.
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