Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IOC sweep for the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword, covering Sentinel lake/auxiliary tables only (CommonSecurityLog and DnsEvents). Matches firewall/proxy URLs and destination hosts, DNS query names, and IOC IPs against the attacker domains and IPs, using boundary-safe domain matching. Companion to the Defender tables query, which covers Defender network, DNS and file events and the file hashes. The query has no time filter in its body: set the time picker or API timespan to 14 days.
This rule performs an IOC sweep across multiple telemetry sources (DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceEvents, DeviceFileEvents, CommonSecurityLog, DnsEvents) to detect network connections, DNS queries, and file activity associated with the Optimizely supply chain attack distributing Coruna/DarkSword malware.
Detects outbound network connection initiated by Microsoft Dialer.
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
The Microsoft Dialer, also known as Phone Dialer, is a built-in utility application included in various versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system. Its primary function is to provide users with a graphical interface for managing phone calls via a modem or a phone line connected to the computer.
This is an outdated process in the current conext of it's usage and is a common target for info stealers for process injection, and is used to make C2 connections, common example is "Rhadamanthys"
The following analytic detects a binary located in a user-writable directory
(C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that registers itself for persistence by
writing its own path into a CurrentVersion Run registry key. This activity is significant
because malware delivered through ClickFix-style remote MSI installations (such as
NodeJS based loaders or DeElevate64.exe) commonly drops its payload into the user
profile and then adds itself to the Run key to survive reboots. If confirmed malicious,
this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access to the endpoint every time
the user logs in.
(C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that registers itself for persistence by
writing its own path into a CurrentVersion Run registry key. This activity is significant
because malware delivered through ClickFix-style remote MSI installations (such as
NodeJS based loaders or DeElevate64.exe) commonly drops its payload into the user
profile and then adds itself to the Run key to survive reboots. If confirmed malicious,
this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access to the endpoint every time
the user logs in.
Detects a sequence where a device exhibits scr.ts plugin file or execution activity followed within 1 hour by unauthorized access or command execution targeting WhatsApp sensitive data files such as keys or databases.
Detects potential process injection where a process queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) into another process, followed shortly by memory allocation, mapping, writing, or remote thread creation actions by the same initiating process.
Detects RelayTrap persistence staging activities associated with SCKit, including HKLM Run keys, scheduled tasks, command execution for the TrapWatch watcher, and script files created or modified under C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap. The rule correlates distinct persistence steps per device within a 1-hour window.
Detects execution chains where a web server process (w3wp.exe) spawns a command shell and utility tools (vistare.exe, curl.exe, ind.exe) which subsequently execute system reconnaissance commands such as ipconfig, quser, or net user /domain.
Detects a sequence where an account executes PowerShell to enumerate Exchange ApplicationImpersonation role assignments via Get-ManagementRoleAssignment, followed within 1 hour by granting FullAccess permissions to a mailbox using Add-MailboxPermission on the same device.
Detects executables located in user-writable directories (such as Downloads, AppData, Temp, or ProgramData) that use decoy naming conventions resembling PDF or GlobalProtect installers. These processes drop both a document/installer and a separate executable on the same device, indicative of malware staging or user execution techniques.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe utilizing comsvcs.dll to dump process memory, specifically targeting LSASS or creating a memory dump file. Common automated tools or legitimate utilities (such as Windows Error Reporting) are excluded.
Detects a sequence where a command shell (cmd.exe) launches PowerShell with WScript.Shell and a hidden window flag, followed within 10 minutes by PowerShell spawning the C# compiler (csc.exe) for runtime code compilation.
Detects non-browser, user-writable or temporary path processes interacting with web browser credential, cookie, or session data files (e.g., Login Data, Cookies, logins.json, key4.db), which is a common technique used by credential stealers.
Detects changes in Sysmon driver altitude value.
If the Sysmon driver is configured to load at an altitude of another registered service, it will fail to load at boot.
If the Sysmon driver is configured to load at an altitude of another registered service, it will fail to load at boot.
Detects DarkVigil RegistryPlugin writing a compressed plugin hash under the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME registry path followed by the same process subsequently reading or interacting with it to load the plugin.
Detects Impacket atexec-style remote task execution where the Task Scheduler spawns cmd.exe via a non-canonical path using path traversal (..), followed by a gpupdate /force command on the same host within a short window.
Detects PowerShell execution registering a logon scheduled task at the highest run level, executing a binary from the ProgramData Oracle Java path (such as jhost.exe or Java rpchost agent).
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using schtasks.exe with a name mimicking Microsoft Edge Update, but executing a binary from the C:\Users\Public directory, often spawned by Secs.exe or command shell.
Detects registry run key persistence mechanism utilized by the CoffeeLoader downloader, which writes a Run key invoking rundll32.exe to execute a specific exported function ('SetCodecs') from a DLL residing in a directory matching specific structural patterns within ProgramData or AppData.
Detects removable-media worm behavior by identifying the creation of multiple LNK shortcut files on a removable drive followed by the execution of processes directly from that same removable drive within a specified time window.
An attacker who controls a centralized execution channel (GPO, script, scheduled task, management tool) can disable the built-in Administrator account on many hosts within a short time.
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