Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the gitlab-triage automation tool being invoked with a personal access token scoped to the broad 'api' permission rather than a narrower issue/MR-only scope, inflating the blast radius if the token leaks.
Detects a single GitLab token/account holding Owner-level access across an unusually large number of projects (50+), the standing-privilege condition that turned one leaked token into a 55-project supply-chain exposure.
Detects CI/CD job activity referencing shell commands that redirect the entire environment to a file (e.g. 'env > out.tmp'), the exact pattern that caused a GitLab CI job in the openconnect/ocserv project to dump secrets into a public build artifact, leaking a high-privilege personal access token with Owner access to GnuTLS and 55 other critical projects.
Detects CI/CD job activity referencing shell commands that redirect the entire environment to a file (e.g. 'env > out.tmp'), the exact pattern that caused a GitLab CI job in the openconnect/ocserv project to dump secrets into a public build artifact, leaking a high-privilege personal access token with Owner access to GnuTLS and 55 other critical projects.
Detects a GitLab personal access token/response indicating Owner-level (access_level 50) group access combined with the broad 'api' scope on the sensitive gnutls/gnutls project -- the excessive standing-privilege pattern that turned one leaked token into a 55-project exposure.
Detects the sensitive project-wide CI/CD variable API_TOKEN being exposed to job scopes other than the gitlab-triage automation job that is its only intended consumer, expanding the blast radius of the credential.
Detects unauthenticated GET requests to GitLab CI/CD job artifact download endpoints on a public repository, which can expose leaked secrets bundled into build artifacts.
Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2023-2825, a path traversal vulnerability in GitLab. The rule monitors HTTP GET requests to the /uploads/ endpoint containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../ or encoded variants) in the URI, indicating an effort to access restricted files on the system.
Detects a direct push to the protected 'gnutls_3_7_x' release branch with no associated merge request, bypassing code review even when the pusher's role technically satisfies branch-protection rules.
Detects a direct push to the protected 'gnutls_3_7_x' release branch with no associated merge request, bypassing code review even when the pusher's role technically satisfies branch-protection rules.
Detects a GitLab personal access token used from multiple distinct source IPs or from IPs associated with the leaked gitlab-triage token, inconsistent with expected CI runner infrastructure.
Detects a GitLab personal access token used from multiple distinct source IPs or from IPs associated with the leaked gitlab-triage token, inconsistent with expected CI runner infrastructure.
Detects protected-branch configuration changes on the gnutls_3_7_x release branch that weaken push/merge controls (developers_can_push/merge enabled), reducing supply-chain code-review protections.
Detects protected-branch configuration changes on the gnutls_3_7_x release branch that weaken push/merge controls (developers_can_push/merge enabled), reducing supply-chain code-review protections.
Detects protected-branch configuration changes on the gnutls_3_7_x release branch that weaken push/merge controls (developers_can_push/merge enabled), reducing supply-chain code-review protections.
Detects GitLab's personal_access_tokens/self endpoint being queried via GET, the reconnaissance step a leaked token uses to confirm its own scopes and privilege level.
Detects GitLab's personal_access_tokens/self endpoint being queried via GET, the reconnaissance step a leaked token uses to confirm its own scopes and privilege level.
Detects an Owner-role GitLab account or token modifying merge-request approval rules, protected-branch settings, or project membership -- controls that, if weakened, defeat code-review safeguards.
Detects an Owner-role GitLab account or token modifying merge-request approval rules, protected-branch settings, or project membership -- controls that, if weakened, defeat code-review safeguards.
Detects an Owner-role GitLab account or token modifying merge-request approval rules, protected-branch settings, or project membership -- controls that, if weakened, defeat code-review safeguards.
Detects the sensitive project-wide CI/CD variable API_TOKEN being exposed to job scopes other than the gitlab-triage automation job that is its only intended consumer, expanding the blast radius of the credential.
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