Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a successful self-service password reset followed shortly by an authentication method change on the same account -- the exact SSPR-then-MFA-reregistration sequence used by Storm-3068 and Storm-2949 for persistence.
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Detects inbound phishing emails containing brand mentions for Signal, WhatsApp, or Telegram alongside lure phrases related to verification, 2FA, or device linking. The rule specifically filters for emails containing URLs while excluding messages originating from official domains associated with these services.
Detects inbound phishing emails containing brand mentions for Signal, WhatsApp, or Telegram alongside lure phrases related to verification, 2FA, or device linking. The rule specifically filters for emails containing URLs while excluding messages originating from official domains associated with these services.
Detects inbound emails that have been delivered to the user's Inbox or Junk folder despite failing SPF authentication checks. The detection logic triggers when these emails also lack a valid DMARC policy (none or not available), which prevents the mail server from enforcing rejection or quarantine, allowing spoofed or unauthenticated mail to bypass standard security filters.
Detects MFA-fatigue style attacks (push-bombing) against Microsoft 365 accounts. The rule identifies a pattern where a user experiences a high frequency of MFA challenges or denials (at least 5 within a 10-minute window) immediately followed by a successful sign-in from a previously unseen IP and device, excluding phishing-resistant authentication methods and break-glass accounts.
The following analytic detects potential privilege escalation threats in Azure Active Directory (AD). This detection is important because it identifies instances where privileged roles that hold elevated permissions are assigned to service principals. This prevents unauthorized access or malicious activities, which occur when these non-human entities access Azure resources to exploit them. False positives might occur since administrators can legitimately assign privileged roles to service principals. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
This rule correlates phishing emails containing URLs with successful, MFA-satisfied sign-ins from an ASN or network location that has not been associated with the user account within the previous 30 days. This pattern is highly indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session hijacking attempt, where a user is phished and their session cookie is intercepted by an attacker.
This rule performs a retrospective sweep across Microsoft Defender XDR data sources (DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, and EmailEvents) to identify activity associated with the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for specific file hashes, file names, known C2 IP addresses and domains, malicious URL patterns, and known phishing email sender addresses identified in threat intelligence reporting.
Detects modifications to domain federation settings in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) where a domain is converted from a managed authentication state to a federated authentication state. This type of configuration change is often used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate domain-level identity deception.
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID security configurations that lower the security posture, specifically the disabling of Security Defaults, per-user MFA requirements, or strong authentication enforcement. This is often a precursor to account takeover or persistence following unauthorized administrative access.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application sensitive, high-privilege permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All) that are commonly abused in consent phishing campaigns to maintain persistent, silent access to mail and files independent of user credentials.
This rule detects successful non-interactive sign-ins to high-value applications (e.g., Office 365, Azure, Okta) where no multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge was performed during the current session. Such activity is a strong indicator of session hijacking or token replay attacks, where adversaries reuse stolen session cookies to bypass interactive login requirements and MFA.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox rules using the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule cmdlets that perform automatic forwarding or redirection of email to external, non-trusted domains. This technique is commonly employed during account takeover events to facilitate covert data exfiltration.
Detects M365 Copilot information extraction jailbreak attacks that attempt to obtain sensitive, classified, or comprehensive data through various social engineering techniques including fictional entity impersonation, bulk data requests, and privacy bypass attempts. The detection searches exported eDiscovery prompt logs for extraction keywords like "transcendent," "tell me everything," "confidential," "dump," "extract," "reveal," and "bypass" in the Subject_Title field, categorizing each attempt by extraction type and assigning severity levels (CRITICAL for classified/proprietary data, HIGH for bulk extraction or privacy bypass). Prompts are further analyzed for compound risk patterns such as "Confidential+Extraction" or "Bulk_Request+Bypass," filtering out low-severity cases to surface the most dangerous attempts to exfiltrate sensitive organizational information through AI manipulation.
Correlates an Entra ID MFA/authenticator reset with a new device registration within 30 minutes for the same account. Models the Scattered Spider (UNC3944/Octo Tempest) and CrowdStrike-tracked 'Mutant Spider' helpdesk-vishing playbook, where Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 measured ~40 minutes from vished reset to domain admin.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects potential consent phishing attempts by identifying when a user grants high-risk, persistent-access OAuth scopes (such as Mail or Files) to a new third-party application. The rule specifically excludes known first-party Microsoft apps and utilizes a lookback period to avoid alerting on applications that have already been consented to within the tenant, reducing noise from routine enterprise app usage.
Detects an anomalous OfficeHome sign-in from an unmanaged device that completes secondary auth (error 50074) followed by a keep-me-signed-in event (error 50140), with the same session/user then rapidly accessing multiple sensitive applications (My Apps, My Profile, Account Controls, My SignIns, SharePoint/OneDrive/Outlook) - consistent with AiTM-assisted MFA bypass and persistent session establishment
Device code authentication flow completed, followed by subsequent session activity from a different IP/user-agent, indicating token replay to an attacker-controlled client that bypasses MFA
Detects activity associated with the MALFEX npm supply-chain campaign (also known as Overlord/movinlike). This rule performs a sweep for known malicious file hashes, suspicious process command lines, outbound network connections to malicious domains or IPs, and email communications from identified adversary-controlled accounts.
Detects potential help-desk impersonation or social engineering activity involving account credential or MFA method resets, followed shortly by a sign-in from an unknown device or geography. The rule excludes activity tied to established ticketing systems or standard automated password expiration processes.
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