Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by command shells where the task command points to files residing in non-standard or user-writable directories such as \Users\Public\, \PerfLogs\, or \ProgramData\. This pattern is frequently utilized by malware loaders like SocGholish, GootLoader, and various ransomware strains to achieve persistence following initial compromise.
Detects the creation or start of the PSEXESVC service, which is a characteristic behavior of the PsExec tool used for remote execution and lateral movement.
Detects a multi-stage installation of the Level RMM agent. This rule monitors for a correlation of events including the execution of 'LevelInstaller.exe' with specific installation arguments, file drops in potentially spoofed vendor paths (Dell or Level), the creation of a 'Level' service, and the addition of a 'Level Watchdog' scheduled task on the same device within a 24-hour window.
Detects active attempts to disable or interfere with security products, including EDR agents and antivirus software. The rule monitors for the use of 'sc.exe' to stop or reconfigure services, 'taskkill' to terminate security-related processes, and PowerShell commands utilizing 'Set-MpPreference' to modify Windows Defender real-time protection settings. These actions are frequently observed as a precursor to ransomware deployment or other malicious activities designed to evade detection.
Detects the creation of new system services using EventID 7045 where the ImagePath points to suspicious temporary directories, administrative shares (ADMIN$), or utilizes randomly generated service names. This pattern is commonly associated with PsExec-style lateral movement and ransomware staging.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack pattern consistent with a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) chain. It identifies the installation of specific known vulnerable drivers (e.g., Alinubx.sys, nvfsflt64.sys) and the registration of a corresponding service (NvFsFilter), followed by the mass termination of various security software and EDR processes within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using kernel-mode privileges to disable security controls.
Detects the execution of ReAgentC.exe with the /disable flag, which disables the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). This activity is often used by adversaries to prevent system recovery or to facilitate data impact, such as ransomware deployment.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell that masquerade as legitimate Microsoft Edge or OneDrive update tasks. This behavior is associated with APT36 (Transparent Tribe) and their use of modular malware to establish persistence.
Detects malicious scheduled task creation using names associated with Microsoft Edge updates, or the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize encoded arguments and known APT36 download cradles, indicating an attempt to establish persistence or retrieve secondary payloads.
Detects a single host or account interacting with a high volume of archive (PST/OST) and document files, or initiating mailbox exports within a short window, which is often indicative of mass data staging and collection prior to exfiltration.
Detects when a single process terminates two or more critical security, database, or backup related processes within a short window. This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to disable security controls or disrupt database operations, commonly observed during the impact phase of an attack or preparatory to data destruction/encryption.
Detects the creation of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager', which is associated with the SparroWocky threat. The rule flags the service creation event (Event ID 7045) and identifies if the service description matches the known malicious signature, which attempts to masquerade as a legitimate auditing tool.
Detects the loading of radcui.dll by the WkspBroker.exe process when the DLL is located within a path associated with Microsoft RemoteApp Gateway, which is often indicative of DLL sideloading or execution hijacking of a legitimate process.
This rule detects attempts to clear Windows Event Logs using the 'wevtutil.exe' command-line utility or by identifying the generated Windows Security Event ID 1102 (Audit log was cleared). It tracks multiple instances of log clearing to identify suspicious bulk log deletion activity.
Detects the execution of binaries or scripts named with keywords related to AI agent plugins (e.g., 'skill', 'plugin', 'mcp-server') from potentially untrusted locations like Downloads or Temp folders. The rule further correlates this execution with post-exploitation indicators such as persistence establishment (registry keys, scheduled tasks, launch agents) or outbound network activity.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service using the service control manager command-line utility (sc.exe). This command is commonly used by attackers to achieve persistence by creating services that execute malicious binaries at startup, or to run processes with SYSTEM privileges.
Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects the execution of 'ReportDump.exe' from within the 'C:\ProgramData' directory when initiated by system processes associated with scheduled tasks (svchost.exe, taskeng.exe, schtasks.exe) containing 'Schedule' in the command line. This behavior is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or malicious file execution using legitimate Windows scheduling utilities.
Detects the presence or installation of 'truesight.sys' or 'rentdrv2.sys' drivers, which are associated with malicious activity. The rule also triggers when system utilities like sc.exe or services.exe are used to set services related to these names to a 'demand' start type, indicating potential persistence or malicious driver loading.
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