Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when a user registers a new MFA or authentication method, such as a software token or authenticator app, within one hour of a suspicious sign-in event. This pattern is commonly indicative of an adversary establishing persistence or bypassing authentication controls following account compromise via phishing or credential harvesting.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user successfully completes an OAuth device-code grant, followed by a subsequent login event using the same user context but originating from a different source IP address. This pattern is indicative of device-code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into authorizing a device, then uses the resulting session or token from their own infrastructure.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to multiple distinct Microsoft Graph API endpoints (e.g., users, groups, applications) by a single user within a short timeframe, which is indicative of tenant-wide reconnaissance following identity compromise.
Detects anomalous reconnaissance activity targeting sensitive Microsoft Graph control-plane endpoints, including directory roles, MFA settings, application registrations, service principals, and OAuth consent configurations. The rule identifies high-volume access across multiple distinct sensitive endpoints within a short time frame, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating infrastructure to identify opportunities for privilege escalation, persistence, or bypass of security controls.
Detects anomalous authentication behavior where a user successfully completes an OAuth device-code grant, followed by a subsequent login event using the same user context but originating from a different source IP address. This pattern is indicative of device-code phishing, where an adversary tricks a user into authorizing a device, then uses the resulting session or token from their own infrastructure.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to multiple distinct Microsoft Graph API endpoints (e.g., users, groups, applications) by a single user within a short timeframe, which is indicative of tenant-wide reconnaissance following identity compromise.
Detects anomalous, high-volume enumeration of SharePoint and OneDrive resources via Microsoft Graph API by monitoring for repeated access patterns involving /sites, /drives, or /drive endpoints combined with search, directory traversal, and pagination parameters.
Detects suspicious reconnaissance or modification activity within Microsoft Graph API by identifying high volumes of requests targeting sensitive management endpoints (such as directory roles, authentication methods, service principals, or OAuth permissions) from a single actor within a 30-minute window.
Detects anomalous Microsoft Graph API usage patterns where a single account interacts with a high number of unique request paths using common API pagination or search parameters, indicating potential resource enumeration or reconnaissance activity.
Detects anomalous certificate-based authentication attempts to Jasmine network services characterized by rapid, impossible-travel scenarios or geo-inconsistent session patterns. This behavior is indicative of a stolen certificate being reused from a different geographic location or network, bypassing standard authentication patterns.
Detects anomalous certificate-based authentication attempts to Jasmine network services characterized by rapid, impossible-travel scenarios or geo-inconsistent session patterns. This behavior is indicative of a stolen certificate being reused from a different geographic location or network, bypassing standard authentication patterns.
Detects non-interactive sign-ins, such as those using refresh or session tokens, originating from an IP address, ASN, device, or country that does not match the user's recent interactive sign-in history. The absence of an MFA challenge for these new contexts is characteristic of session token replay attacks, often associated with AiTM phishing campaigns.
No description available.
Detects anomalous sign-in behavior where a device code authentication flow is initiated from one location, but the resulting session is replayed from a different IP address in a different country within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary capturing an authentication token via a device code phishing or relay attack and attempting to use it from their own infrastructure to bypass conditional access policies and MFA.
Detects potential device code authentication phishing attacks by correlating a successful device code authentication event with a subsequent non-interactive sign-in from a suspicious user agent (Python Requests or specific Outlook versions) within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using a device code phishing lure to capture a token or session, followed by automated access via a script or impersonated client.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity where a user performs a device code authentication followed by multiple rapid token exchanges (often of different types) within an extremely short time window. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to leverage a compromised device code grant to programmatically retrieve access or refresh tokens before the user has completed a legitimate flow or to automate malicious access.
Detects instances where a user authenticates via the device code flow and subsequently performs a device enrollment or registration action from an unusual or non-compliant device naming convention. This pattern is indicative of an adversary enrolling their own device to bypass MFA or gain persistent access to corporate resources.
This rule detects potential OAuth 2.0 device code phishing attempts by monitoring network activity for requests to common Microsoft OAuth device authorization endpoints. It flags requests that utilize a specific hardcoded client_id associated with known suspicious application registrations, combined with requested scopes for graph.microsoft.com and a Python-based user agent. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application.
Detects an Azure AD Device Code authentication event followed within 60 seconds by a non-interactive Primary Refresh Token (PRT) sign-in event from the same user. This sequence is characteristic of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks where a user is tricked into authorizing a device code, and the adversary immediately leverages the resulting session/token to obtain a PRT for persistent access.
This rule detects potential OAuth 2.0 device code phishing attempts by monitoring network activity for requests to common Microsoft OAuth device authorization endpoints. It flags requests that utilize a specific hardcoded client_id associated with known suspicious application registrations, combined with requested scopes for graph.microsoft.com and a Python-based user agent. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to gain unauthorized access by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application.
Detects instances where a user successfully authenticates using the OAuth Device Code flow followed by subsequent mailbox operations (such as reading, sending, or deleting items) from a different IP address within a 10-minute window. This behavior is a strong indicator of adversary-in-the-middle phishing attacks where an attacker captures a session token and utilizes it from a remote location.
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