Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
40,056 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
15,357
13,598
2,797
1,803
1,721
Contributors
7,678
5,999
5,315
4,504
4,191
Categories
18,109
9,757
3,851
3,758
3,713
Platforms
40,056
7,331
6,542
3,907
3,664
Products / Services
10,439
9,678
6,723
1,887
1,878
MITRE Techniques
13,737
13,116
8,066
5,949
4,414
CVEs
49
45
30
30
29
IDS Classtypes
214
56
43
23
19
IDS Protocols
183
172
20
16
8
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to read sensitive session files or databases associated with messaging applications like Telegram, Signal, and Discord. Accessing these files (such as 'tdata', 'db.sqlite', or 'leveldb') allows for full account takeover by extracting session tokens, enabling attackers to bypass authentication and 2FA.
Detects unauthorized access to DPAPI master key files located in the Windows user profile (%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\). This activity is commonly associated with infostealers attempting to decrypt browser-stored credentials (cookies, passwords) by manually accessing the master key files after exfiltrating encrypted data stores.
Detects DNS resolution attempts for newly registered or suspicious top-level domains (e.g., .xyz, .top, .live) that mimic corporate Identity Provider (IdP) or Single Sign-On (SSO) login portals. This behavior is characteristic of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits like EvilProxy or Tycoon2FA, intended to capture user session tokens. Note: This rule monitors for initial domain contact and should be correlated with subsequent authentication logs to identify potential session hijacking.
Detects indicators associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix campaign across process, network connection, DNS, and HTTP telemetry: known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, the chattypetty.com domain, and known payload-hosting URLs.
Detects the abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe or similar Windows Error Reporting processes, invoked with debugging or dumping flags against security/EDR process names, or spawned by unexpected parent processes. This technique is often used to freeze security tools (EDR-Freeze) by exploiting process suspension via mini-dump handles.
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
Detects a sequence of events indicative of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) exploitation. The rule correlates the creation of a new service with kernel-mode drivers, the loading of a signed driver, and the subsequent termination or disabling of common EDR security processes within a short timeframe, suggesting the exploitation of the driver to bypass EDR defenses.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands to modify file timestamps (CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime) on web application directories and configuration files, a technique often used by attackers to hide modifications made to webshells or malicious scripts.
Detects web server requests for .aspx files where the User-Agent string identifies as Windows PowerShell and includes the zh-CN locale setting. This behavior is often characteristic of automated exploitation tools or web shells (like China Chopper) interacting with compromised web servers.
Detects the establishment of persistence on a Windows host by monitoring both Registry Run/RunOnce key modifications and Scheduled Task creation. The rule specifically looks for command lines or registry values that reference common Windows binary names (e.g., Microsoft Edge/Teams update helpers, LockScreenContentServer) which are frequently used by adversaries for masquerading.
Detects instances where a Microsoft IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) executes commands such as 'findstr', 'Get-Content', or 'Select-Xml' to scan configuration files (e.g., applicationHost.config, web.config) or source code files (e.g., App_Code/*.cs) for sensitive information like passwords, connection strings, or API keys. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting by an attacker using a webshell or compromised IIS process.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute common reconnaissance commands such as whoami, hostname, systeminfo, and net user. This behavior is strongly indicative of post-exploitation activity following a successful web shell deployment on a web server.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute common reconnaissance commands such as whoami, hostname, systeminfo, and net user. This behavior is strongly indicative of post-exploitation activity following a successful web shell deployment on a web server.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects potential AiTM or credential harvesting campaigns where a device visits known lure or redirect paths (such as specific domains or workers.dev paths) and subsequently accesses the Microsoft device code authentication page within a 15-minute window.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MATCHBOIL campaign, identifying instances where a registry run key and a scheduled task pointing to an application data (%LOCALAPPDATA%) path are created by the same process within a short window, or where known specific scheduled task names and run value names are observed.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the MATCHBOIL campaign, identifying instances where a registry run key and a scheduled task pointing to an application data (%LOCALAPPDATA%) path are created by the same process within a short window, or where known specific scheduled task names and run value names are observed.
Detects activity associated with Everest ransomware by matching known file hashes (in DeviceFileEvents/DeviceProcessEvents) and known C2/leak-site domains (in DeviceNetworkEvents).
This rule detects a high frequency of SMB (port 445) connection attempts from a single internal source host to a large number of distinct internal destination hosts within a short timespan. This activity is indicative of internal network scanning, host discovery, or automated lateral movement attempts using SMB.
Page 70 of 1908