Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects unauthorized processes attempting to access 'Login Data' files associated with Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge web browsers. Legitimate browser processes are excluded, so any external process attempting to read these files is potentially malicious, indicating an attempt to dump stored browser credentials.
Detects instances where a GitLab runner process (gitlab-runner.exe) spawns a PowerShell process with arguments typically used to execute scripts while bypassing security restrictions, such as -NoProfile, -NonInteractive, -ExecutionPolicy, and Bypass. This pattern is indicative of automated task execution or potential abuse if the runner environment is compromised.
Detects signs of malicious activity involving specific files (StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1, ComponentTask33Agent) and behaviors, including PowerShell execution, scheduled task creation, script execution via wscript, and registry run key modification. These behaviors are indicative of persistence mechanisms and potentially suspicious command execution.
Detects the execution of specific web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Opera) to facilitate identification of vulnerable browser versions as indicated by CVE-2026-0628 and CVE-2026-55945. This rule does not perform version checking directly but serves as a telemetry trigger for external asset inventory correlation.
The following analytic identifies a process command line referencing the IronLanguages GitHub repository, which hosts .NET implementation of popular scripting engines.
Adversaries have downloaded these .NET implementations to avoid getting detected by security controls while executing their payloads.
This activity is uncommon in typical enterprise environments outside of software development contexts.
Adversaries have downloaded these .NET implementations to avoid getting detected by security controls while executing their payloads.
This activity is uncommon in typical enterprise environments outside of software development contexts.
This rule detects when the Node.js runtime process (node.exe) initiates the Windows command interpreter (cmd.exe) with the '/c' flag, which is commonly used to execute commands or scripts. This behavior is frequently associated with malicious Node.js activity, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) or web shells, which may use the shell to execute system-level operations or bypass typical application constraints.
Detects the execution of a renamed Microsoft CoreCLR Debugger (vsdbg.exe) from a directory outside of standard Visual Studio installation paths. This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, where a malicious vsdbg.dll is planted alongside the renamed vsdbg.exe, a technique observed in malware loader chains like Rapuncel/BoryptGrab.
This rule detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run keys that execute rundll32.exe. This is a common persistence technique where attackers configure malicious DLLs or scripts to run automatically upon user logon or system boot by leveraging the Rundll32 utility.
Detects modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key where the value contains suspicious strings such as 'powershell', 'curl', or long encoded strings. This behavior is indicative of potential command execution, persistence, or staging via the RunMRU list.
Detects modifications to registry keys associated with the 'ms-settings' COM object, specifically targeting the shell open command or DelegateExecute value. This technique, commonly referred to as 'ms-settings' hijacking, is used by adversaries to achieve persistence or elevated execution by redirecting legitimate COM object references to malicious payloads.
Detects rapid, machine-speed, sequential attack-path adaptation by suspected AI agent binaries. The rule monitors for a correlation of four stages occurring within a tight 20-minute window: 1) Failed service connections across three or more distinct protocols (SMB, SSH, HTTP, RDP, WinRM), 2) Credential access attempts (Logon events or execution of known credential-dumping tools), and 3) A lateral movement pivot to a new, previously un-targeted internal destination. The rule specifically keys on the InitiatingProcessId and InitiatingProcessCreationTime to ensure the sequence is attributed to a single process instance, distinguishing it from human manual penetration testing activity. Covers T1190, T1210, T1078
This rule detects suspicious outbound network connections originating from processes frequently abused in the Exvicy/ErrTraffic ClickFix malware delivery chain, specifically powershell.exe, msiexec.exe, and putty.exe. It also monitors for direct communication to known C2 IP addresses associated with the Exvicy threat actor, providing coverage for both the initial payload delivery and post-compromise C2 phases.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is launched with hidden window arguments by explorer.exe or mshta.exe, and the command line indicates interactions with specific file extensions (.vbs, .ps1) located within the AppData directory. This pattern is often indicative of malicious script execution, such as those used in Konni malware campaigns to drop and execute payloads.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands indicative of the VelvetCake variant of the Konni malware. The rule identifies the use of 'Net.WebClient.DownloadString' combined with 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) to execute scripts in memory, alongside specific command-line indicators such as the 'Areyou=cake' campaign marker or associated C2 domains.
Detects the execution of elevated cmd.exe processes (running with High or System integrity) spawned by parent processes originating from the AppData directory. This pattern is commonly associated with malicious installers, droppers, or payload execution where a staged binary in the user profile attempts to perform administrative actions.
Detects unauthorized access to critical Chromium-based browser credential databases (such as Login Data, Cookies, and History) by processes other than recognized browser executables. This behavior is indicative of credential-harvesting activity, specifically matching techniques employed by infostealers like RevStealer.
Detects the execution of a RevStealer native PE payload by an Electron-based loader (XabivSystem.exe). The rule identifies when the loader spawns an unsigned, detached process from a hidden, randomly-named subdirectory within the user's AppData folder. This process creation is a precursor to the malware's environment checks, anti-VM/sandbox gating, and CAPTCHA verification routines.
Detects the loading of an unsigned or attacker-controlled DLL into a SYSTEM-context dllhost.exe process, consistent with the exploitation of dangling COM CrossDevice CLSIDs (e.g., forcing ICreateObject::Proc3 to LoadLibrary from a C:\ProgramData location).
Detects the GHAPPIER four-stage loader execution chain initiated during npm postinstall processes. This rule monitors for malicious child process spawning (cmd, powershell, curl, wget) by node or npm, as well as the presence of specific markers like the '.git-checker' string or URLs associated with the PolinRider/FAMOUS CHOLLIMA npm supply chain campaign.
Detects the presence of PIVOTPIPE loader artifacts, specifically the COFF sleep-mask object file (sleepmask.o) and its associated debug log (nb_sleep_dbg.txt), which are written to a randomly named subfolder within the Windows temporary directory as part of a sleep-obfuscation evasion sequence.
Detects the creation of specific named pipes often associated with Cobalt Strike and similar C2 frameworks used for peer-to-peer (P2P) lateral movement. The detection looks for anomalous pipe names created by processes other than standard Windows system processes (svchost, services, lsass), which is a common indicator of beacon communication relaying.
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