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Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors Entra ID Audit Logs for device registration events where the display name of the registered device matches a specific naming pattern used by the GhostCode phishing kit. The pattern typically consists of three dash-separated words, a dash-separated hex string, and an optional suffix, which is indicative of automated phishing-based device enrollment.
This rule detects potential abuse of the device code authentication flow by correlating a successful device code login with a subsequent non-interactive sign-in using the 'python-requests' user agent for the same user within 10 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker programmatically accessing resources or APIs immediately after gaining authorization via a device code phishing or relay attack.
Detects anomalous device registration behavior where a user account registers multiple unique devices within a very short timeframe (less than 90 seconds). This behavior is characteristic of device code phishing attacks, where an adversary uses automated scripts to rapidly register devices after obtaining authorization codes from victims.
This rule monitors Entra ID Audit Logs for device registration events where the display name of the registered device matches a specific naming pattern used by the GhostCode phishing kit. The pattern typically consists of three dash-separated words, a dash-separated hex string, and an optional suffix, which is indicative of automated phishing-based device enrollment.
Detects suspicious Microsoft Intune device enrollment activities characterized by the use of a spoofed User-Agent (matching Microsoft Office/Outlook strings) and rapid, multiple enrollment attempts within a short timeframe. This behavior is associated with adversary use of device-code phishing kits to enroll rogue devices using stolen session tokens.
This rule detects potential abuse of the device code authentication flow by correlating a successful device code login with a subsequent non-interactive sign-in using the 'python-requests' user agent for the same user within 10 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker programmatically accessing resources or APIs immediately after gaining authorization via a device code phishing or relay attack.
Detects rapid rotation of multiple unique IP addresses originating from the same user account shortly after a device code authentication event. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using proxy rotation services (like FlashProxy) to obfuscate their origin and bypass location-based security controls or impossible-travel detections after hijacking a session.
Detects rapid rotation of multiple unique IP addresses originating from the same user account shortly after a device code authentication event. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using proxy rotation services (like FlashProxy) to obfuscate their origin and bypass location-based security controls or impossible-travel detections after hijacking a session.
Detects anomalous sign-in activity originating from the Microsoft Authentication Broker or utilizing the OAuth device code flow, which are frequently abused by adversaries to perform OAuth phishing and obtain access tokens.
Detects non-interactive Entra ID sign-ins utilizing the python-requests library, which suggests an automated polling mechanism. This is indicative of 'GhostCode' or similar device code phishing attacks where an adversary uses a stolen device code token to programmatically poll for a successful authorization grant.
Detects anomalous, rapid registration of rogue devices following a device-code authentication flow. The rule identifies instances where an 'unbound' device registration is immediately followed by a 'bound' call to obtain Azure AD and Microsoft Graph tokens, or where a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) is acquired shortly after a device-code sign-in, indicating potential abuse of the device authorization grant flow by an attacker using phishing kits.
Detects a successful user authentication event following a Microsoft OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow. This detection identifies scenarios where a user may have been phished into entering an attacker-supplied device code on a malicious Microsoft device login page, resulting in the attacker successfully obtaining OAuth tokens.
Detects anomalous device registration activity where a single user principal registers three or more distinct devices within a short duration (2 minutes). This behavior is characteristic of device-code phishing attacks where adversaries abuse stolen device authorization codes to register multiple rogue devices, potentially for PRT (Primary Refresh Token) acquisition.
Detects malicious OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant requests directed at Microsoft services. This rule identifies usage of specific App IDs associated with the Microsoft Authentication Broker combined with the 'offline_access' Graph scope, a pattern indicative of GhostCode-style phishing campaigns designed to steal access and refresh tokens.
Detects a suspected device code phishing (GhostCode) attack where a user authenticates via a device code flow, followed within 10 minutes by a non-interactive authentication request originating from a client utilizing the 'python-requests' user agent. This pattern is indicative of an adversary abusing a stolen device token to gain access to cloud resources.
This rule detects successful device-code authorization logins to Azure AD that originate from a country or region not previously associated with the user. It evaluates the user's historical sign-in locations to establish a baseline and flags deviations, which may indicate account compromise via device-code phishing or MFA bypass attempts.
Detects anomalous device registration or Intune enrollment activity where a single user principal name (UPN) is associated with three or more distinct source IP addresses performing registration actions within a 90-second window. This behavior is indicative of automated, rapid rogue device registration campaigns aiming to bypass conditional access policies or establish unauthorized persistence.
Detects potential device code phishing activity by identifying a successful device code authentication event followed shortly (within 10 minutes) by an interactive or API sign-in from the same user utilizing a Python-requests user agent, which is commonly associated with adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits.
This rule monitors for security-related account activities in Azure AD, specifically tracking self-service password resets, admin-led password resets, and changes to user security information. It aggregates these events by user to identify potential account manipulation, unauthorized password changes, or MFA registration abuse.
This rule identifies potentially compromised Entra ID accounts by correlating multiple suspicious behaviors within a 14-day window. It aggregates four specific indicators: successful authentication following repeated MFA failures, impossible travel (sign-ins from multiple countries within a short timeframe), unusual hour logons (00:00-05:00), and sign-ins flagged with medium/high risk or reported as compromised. The rule triggers when an account exhibits two or more of these distinct anomalous behaviors.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating risky user identity events (such as impossible travel or malicious IP access) with subsequent endpoint behavior typical of ransomware, specifically the deletion of shadow copies or system backups, or mass file modification activity occurring within a short window.
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