Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with a bypass execution policy that performs a download or web request to save content to a file in the user's temp directory, followed by the immediate execution of that file. This pattern is characteristic of multi-stage malware droppers or fileless attack techniques attempting to stage and execute malicious scripts from temporary locations.
This rule detects attempts by an attacker to disable or modify Windows security software and features. It monitors for three distinct behaviors: execution of 'Set-MpPreference' to modify Windows Defender settings (exclusions or real-time monitoring), execution of 'sc.exe' to stop security-related services (such as EDR or AV services), and direct modification of Windows registry keys to disable Windows Defender components.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender via registry modifications or malicious PowerShell/reg.exe commands, specifically targeting security settings like DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, and exclusion paths.
This rule detects suspicious NTLM network logon events (Logon Type 3) involving privileged accounts that do not have corresponding Kerberos authentication events (4768/4769) in the preceding hour. The detection specifically triggers when a single account logs into two or more distinct hosts within a 15-minute window, which is indicative of lateral movement using compromised credentials or Pass-the-Hash techniques.
This rule detects network beaconing behavior consistent with Cobalt Strike's default malleable C2 profiles. It monitors HTTP GET and POST requests for specific URI patterns commonly used by default Cobalt Strike configurations and triggers when multiple such requests are observed from a single host over a 15-minute window.
This rule detects potential post-compromise activity related to a campaign using MSP360-masqueraded installers and ScreenConnect remote access tools. It performs an IOC sweep across device file events for known malicious file hashes (associated with installers and post-compromise utilities) and device network events for connections to known malicious domains used for command and control.
Detects anomalous SOAP requests to the SharePoint WebPartPages.asmx endpoint specifically targeting the 'GetWebPartPageConnectionInfo' method. This pattern is associated with exploitation attempts against SharePoint vulnerabilities.
Detects the loading of the known vulnerable GIGABYTE driver (gdrv.sys) on Windows systems. Attackers leverage this driver as part of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to perform privilege escalation by exploiting kernel-mode vulnerabilities.
This rule detects instances where the MSP360 RMM Agent installer triggers an UAC elevation failure. The detection specifically monitors the execution of eventcreate.exe, which is often used to log events, when the command line includes strings indicating that the MSP360 installer failed to elevate privileges.
Detects the deletion of Volume Shadow Copies and disabling of Windows boot recovery options using native administrative utilities such as vssadmin, wmic, powershell, wbadmin, and bcdedit. This behavior is frequently associated with pre-encryption activities in ransomware attacks to prevent system restoration.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious flags such as encoded commands (-enc, -ec, -encodedcommand) combined with execution policy bypass flags and common .NET classes or methods used for downloading content from the internet (e.g., Net.WebClient, IEX, Invoke-WebRequest). This pattern is commonly observed in fileless malware delivery or secondary payload retrieval stages.
This rule identifies installations of TeamViewer software that are vulnerable to specific CVEs (CVE-2026-19743, CVE-2026-92368, CVE-2026-92369, CVE-2026-92370, CVE-2026-92371) by analyzing the 'DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory' dataset. It checks for versioning patterns against known vulnerable build numbers across Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms to pinpoint systems requiring patching.
Detects unauthorized processes accessing sensitive credential storage files (e.g., 'Login Data', 'Cookies', 'Local State') from known Chromium-based browser profile directories. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting by infostealer malware attempting to exfiltrate browser data before performing decryption.
This rule monitors network traffic, DNS queries, and user web clicks to detect interactions with known malicious domains associated with credential harvesting and phishing campaigns, specifically those impersonating security or SSO portals.
This rule monitors for various indicators of compromise (IOCs) including malicious domains, IP addresses, specific URI paths, file names, and file hashes. It aggregates telemetry from network, file, process, and certificate events to detect potential threats interacting with known bad infrastructure or executing suspicious files associated with malware campaigns.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where a user is instructed to copy and paste a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog. The rule triggers on PowerShell being launched from explorer.exe with 'ExecutionPolicy Bypass', utilizing 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) to download content, and saving it to the user's TEMP directory via 'Out-File' for subsequent execution.
Detects the execution of batch or command scripts initiated by SQL Server (sqlservr.exe) or in contexts involving command-line utility misuse often associated with SQL Server exploitation, such as xp_cmdshell or certutil, particularly when involving paths like AppData or ServiceProfiles.
Detects suspicious command execution patterns involving cmd.exe or powershell.exe spawned by services.exe, or involving redirection to temporary files, which are consistent with Impacket-based remote service execution commonly associated with NeedyMantis malware deployment.
Detects the installation of unauthorized AI-related browser extensions followed by outbound network communication from the browser process to known external AI service API endpoints within one hour. This behavior is indicative of potential data exfiltration via shadow AI tools, bypassing standard enterprise DLP controls.
This rule detects potential identity-led lateral movement in two scenarios: 1) A single account performing RDP authentications to multiple distinct hosts within a short time frame (RDP Fan-Out), or 2) An RDP login occurring on a host shortly after evidence of LSASS process memory access on that same host, suggesting potential credential theft followed by immediate reuse.
Detects the execution of known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools from common staging directories (e.g., Temp, Downloads, AppData) or using command-line arguments indicative of a silent or hidden installation, which is a common pattern for initial access and persistence by adversaries.
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