Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to a user's Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) account involving the addition of a new MFA authentication method or device, such as software tokens or mobile devices. This activity is often performed by an adversary to establish persistence by registering a device they control for future authentication bypass.
Detects high-frequency requests to various Microsoft Graph API endpoints, such as users, groups, applications, and mailboxes, within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to map out a target's cloud identity infrastructure and environment, often as a precursor to more focused attacks like phishing, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within M365.
Detects a single identity, application, or IP address performing Graph API requests across multiple disparate categories (e.g., tenant, directory, privilege, application, repository, mailbox) within a short window. This pattern is indicative of automated reconnaissance or tenant enumeration, commonly performed during the post-compromise phase to map the environment prior to exfiltration.
This rule detects authentication events occurring from devices that have not been seen in the user's history over the previous 14 days and involve non-compliant, unmanaged, or non-Azure AD joined devices. The detection specifically looks for sign-ins that do not utilize interactive credential prompts (token-based), which may indicate an adversary using a stolen session token (e.g., a Primary Refresh Token) from an unrecognized or insecure source.
Detects instances where an Azure AD Connect or MSOL synchronization account performs directory replication actions (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) from a host or at a time inconsistent with its 14-day established baseline. The rule further correlates these anomalies with Azure Audit logs or AzureActivity entries associated with the identity to identify potential cloud-originated abuse or credential compromise.
This rule detects OAuth authorization requests (targeting Microsoft or Google identity providers) that use 'prompt=none' (silent authentication) and redirect the user to an unexpected or untrusted domain. This pattern is commonly used in OAuth consent phishing or token theft attacks, where an attacker attempts to silently acquire an authorization code by redirecting it to a malicious application server instead of the legitimate service provider's domain.
This rule detects high-frequency account and email address enumeration attempts. It monitors syslog data for SMTP commands such as VRFY, EXPN, or RCPT TO, and analyzes Microsoft Entra ID (SigninLogs) for authentication failures specifically associated with error code 50034 (user not found). Both behaviors are indicative of an adversary attempting to validate user identities within an environment, often as a precursor to targeted phishing or brute-force attacks.
Detects anomalous authentication patterns indicative of session token replay attacks. The rule identifies instances where a user successfully performs an MFA-authenticated, interactive sign-in, followed shortly (within 5-60 minutes) by a single-factor sign-in for the same user. The suspicious activity is characterized by a shift to a different IP/ASN, an unmanaged device (non-trusted), and a change in browser or OS identifiers, all while the user's geolocation (city/country) remains consistent. This behavioral pattern is highly consistent with the use of residential proxy infrastructure to replay stolen session tokens, effectively bypassing MFA.
This rule detects user authentication events that deviate significantly from a 14-day historical baseline of known devices, operating systems, browsers, and network locations (ASN). It flags logins where at least two out of four key metadata signals (DeviceId, OS, Browser, ASN) have changed compared to the user's historical pattern, specifically targeting successful authentications that did not trigger a fresh multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenge, potentially indicating token theft or unauthorized session reuse.
Detects Microsoft 365 sign-in events where a session token is reused without a fresh MFA challenge, originating from known residential proxy service providers. This behavior is indicative of threat actors using stolen session tokens (Session Replay) to bypass MFA protections.
This rule monitors Azure AD Sign-in logs to identify 'impossible travel' scenarios, where a user authenticates successfully from two geographically distant locations within a time window (1 hour) that would require travel speeds exceeding a plausible threshold. This behavior is a common indicator of credential compromise or session token replay attacks.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating risky user identity events (such as impossible travel or malicious IP access) with subsequent endpoint behavior typical of ransomware, specifically the deletion of shadow copies or system backups, or mass file modification activity occurring within a short window.
This rule detects potential ransomware activity by correlating risky user identity events (such as impossible travel or malicious IP access) with subsequent endpoint behavior typical of ransomware, specifically the deletion of shadow copies or system backups, or mass file modification activity occurring within a short window.
This rule detects anomalous activity involving guest users (external identities) or service principals in Azure AD (Microsoft Entra ID). It baselines typical behavior—including IP addresses, countries, and sign-in frequency—over a 14-day period and alerts when activity in the last 24 hours deviates significantly. This includes sign-ins from new IP addresses or countries, sudden spikes in sign-in volume, after-hours access, or failed authentication attempts, which may indicate account takeover or misuse of third-party vendor access.
Detects high-frequency, automated requests to product and catalog pages within a short time window, characteristic of web scraping or catalog harvesting often used to feed fake-shop networks or build clone sites.
Detects high-frequency, automated requests to product and catalog pages within a short time window, characteristic of web scraping or catalog harvesting often used to feed fake-shop networks or build clone sites.
Detects high-frequency, automated requests to product and catalog pages within a short time window, characteristic of web scraping or catalog harvesting often used to feed fake-shop networks or build clone sites.
Detects inbound emails masquerading as reputable advisory firms (PwC or KPMG) using lookalike sender domains, combined with wire-transfer fraud phrases in the subject line. Correlates with identity logon telemetry for the same fraudulent WhatsApp Business phone number, enabling detection across both email and authentication channels. Note: message body content is not available in the EmailEvents schema, so fraud-phrase matching is subject-only.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
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