Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential credential harvesting or phishing attempts by identifying specific URL redirection chains that involve a Microsoft login portal, a Microsoft Teams link, and an external third-party CDN domain (cdn.bloom.io). This pattern is consistent with adversary-in-the-middle or credential phishing campaigns designed to bypass security controls by utilizing trusted services for initial delivery.
This rule detects potential OAuth token theft resulting from device code phishing (e.g., N0va phishkit). It monitors for a successful OAuth device-code authentication followed within 5 minutes by a secondary successful sign-in for the same user from a different IP address, different browser client, or different user agent, which is a common indicator of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking attempt.
Detects anomalous non-interactive sign-ins that bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements from a geographical location not previously seen in the user's historical sign-in baseline. This pattern is indicative of attackers using stolen OAuth access or refresh tokens to maintain persistence and bypass standard authentication controls.
Detects anomalous non-interactive sign-ins that bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements from a geographical location not previously seen in the user's historical sign-in baseline. This pattern is indicative of attackers using stolen OAuth access or refresh tokens to maintain persistence and bypass standard authentication controls.
This rule detects potential credential or token theft attempts from the N0va phishing kit. It monitors for emails lacking attachments that contain specific URL patterns associated with verification or session initialization, coupled with social engineering tactics such as spoofing legitimate service display names or subjects (e.g., Microsoft Teams, DocuSign, etc.) while originating from non-legitimate domains.
This rule detects phishing emails where the sender's display name impersonates well-known brands (e.g., Microsoft, DocuSign, Zoom) while using a non-official domain. It further correlates these suspicious senders with embedded URLs that either match the targeted brands' domains or contain patterns commonly associated with device code phishing or API verification workflows.
Detects anomalous administrative activity within Microsoft Exchange by identifying accounts performing multiple suspicious operations within a short timeframe. This rule flags activities like modifying transport rules, virtual directories, or management role assignments, which are often indicative of malicious persistence or configuration tampering, while excluding known authorized service accounts.
Detects anomalous administrative activity within Microsoft Exchange by identifying accounts performing multiple suspicious operations within a short timeframe. This rule flags activities like modifying transport rules, virtual directories, or management role assignments, which are often indicative of malicious persistence or configuration tampering, while excluding known authorized service accounts.
Detects anomalous, high-frequency access to sensitive Microsoft Graph API endpoints by a single service principal or user identity. The rule flags identities that interact with five or more distinct categories of sensitive resources (e.g., users, groups, applications, sites) within a 30-minute window, suggesting automated reconnaissance or environment discovery.
Detects anomalous, high-volume file access or download operations in SharePoint from a user agent identified as 'python-httpx'. This behavior is characteristic of automated scripts or potential data exfiltration attempts targeting cloud-based file storage.
Detects Direct Send bypass (null envelope + internal-domain spoof) using a file/document-sharing lure aimed at leadership. Tightened: added inbound-direction and auth-failure requirements (was previously missing any authentication check, so legitimate SharePoint/OneDrive-style sharing notifications from real internal senders could have matched), delivered-only filter, and case-insensitive recipient/job-title join.
Detects the publication or upload of RubyGems packages containing embedded Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) payloads within their author metadata, specifically targeting common testing strings like '<%= 7*7 %>'. This behavior is indicative of supply chain testing or potential exploitation attempts against package registry infrastructure or downstream consumers.
Detects modifications to a user's multi-factor authentication (MFA) settings, including changes to registered phone numbers, authenticator app configurations, or the registration of new authentication methods. This activity can indicate an attempt to weaken security defenses or gain persistent, unauthorized access to an account via MFA bypass.
This rule detects when a user account updates their MFA information in Azure AD or Microsoft 365, resulting in an increase in the number of associated MFA devices. This is a common indicator of an attacker registering a new MFA device (such as a hardware token or phone app) to a compromised account to establish persistence or bypass existing MFA requirements.
Detects Microsoft Teams messages containing keywords related to authentication updates, passkey enrollment, or SSO changes combined with urgent language or calls to action (e.g., clicking links). The rule attempts to identify potential credential harvesting or account takeover attempts within the chat platform.
Detects incoming emails containing subject lines, body text, or URLs related to passkey, SSO, or MFA configuration updates. These indicators are often used in social engineering campaigns to lure users into providing credentials on fraudulent login pages.
Detects high-frequency requests to various Microsoft Graph API endpoints, such as users, groups, applications, and mailboxes, within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to map out a target's cloud identity infrastructure and environment, often as a precursor to more focused attacks like phishing, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within M365.
Detects high-volume file access and download operations in SharePoint Online and OneDrive where the user agent is identified as 'python-httpx'. This behavior is indicative of automated exfiltration scripts potentially used in malicious cloud intrusion campaigns.
Detects a single identity, application, or IP address performing Graph API requests across multiple disparate categories (e.g., tenant, directory, privilege, application, repository, mailbox) within a short window. This pattern is indicative of automated reconnaissance or tenant enumeration, commonly performed during the post-compromise phase to map the environment prior to exfiltration.
Detects high-volume access to Exchange Online mailboxes by a single user from a single IP address using the 'One Outlook Web' application ID, potentially indicating unauthorized automated mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects emails delivering links to IronToll government-impersonation traffic-fine/payment portals (Egyptian and Moroccan justice-ministry lures), correlated with Safe Links click-through telemetry for the same URLs.
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